Tag Archives: SRS

“Plutonium is not for Amateurs.” Part 2:

Offsite Insight 2023-2: What will the Chamber of Commerce say after $Billions in SRS worker claims?

by Don Moniak

January 19, 2023

The lively plutonium (Pu) disposition debates in the 1990’s, which at one point included Senator Strom Thurmond describing Texas nuclear weapons workers as “amateurs,” were very different from today’s muted discourse. The most dramatic change might be the quiet acceptance that hundreds of thousands of nuclear weapons workers, uranium miners, and nuclear testing downwinders suffered harm during the Cold War, when safety was often secondary to production. A second change in South Carolina involves an erosion of public trust in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) among its strongest supporters.

In the early 1990’s, more than fifty tons of military plutonium resulting from the end of Cold War plutonium production, coupled with the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons under the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), was declared surplus to national security needs. An international effort to dispose of excess plutonium to prevent it from being used in future nuclear weaponry coalesced in both the U.S. and Russia in the early 1990’s. The debate over how to pursue disposition was long and contentious, and has remerged following decades of failed and stalled efforts.

While the surplus weapons plutonium was viewed as a threat by nuclear nonproliferation advocates, it was also viewed as an economic opportunity by communities in the shadows of some traditional nuclear weapons production industrial sites like the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, the Pantex Plant in Texas, and the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory in Idaho. In Carlsbad, New Mexico, the prospect of jobs for disposing the tremendous volumes of plutonium-contaminated Cold War waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) created a new community ally for Department of Energy (DOE) disposition schemes.

Prior to disposition, surplus plutonium needed to be stored. In the Central Savannah River Area (CSRA), SRS community boosters accepted the proposal to centralize surplus plutonium storage for up to fifty years at the site. But the local expectation in exchange for this acceptance of mere storage included operational jobs, mostly in the form of a plutonium fuel production plant that would convert the excess plutonium into commercial fuel for nuclear power plants.

This form of plutonium fuel is called Mixed Oxide fuel, or MOX, because it mixed plutonium and uranium oxides. In the 1990’s and through the early 2010’s, MOX was viewed as a “sword to plowshares” program by the Atoms For Peace lobby that began in the early 1950’s.

The Pu/MOX fuel plant was one of many promised by the Department of Energy (DOE), and SRS boosters wanted the whole package. In addition to the MOX fuel plant, which was most coveted, DOE dangled three other facilities in its plutonium storage and processing bonanza package:

  • An Actinide Packaging and Stabilization Facility (APSF) to store non-pit plutonium including metals, alloys, and powders; and provide a means of stabilization if necessary.
  • A Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) that would dilute the plutonium with inert materials and isolate it within the massive stainless steel canisters of glassified waste at SRS’s Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). The glassified, or vitrified, waste at DWPF is the end product from the conversion of unstable, highly radioactive sludge contained in dozens of underground, million gallon waste tanks housing decades of waste generated by plutonium production.
  • A Plutonium Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) to disassemble sealed plutonium pits, separate the classified pit parts, and convert the plutonium within to an declassified, powdered oxide form.

    Across the CSRA, every local government body issued resolutions in support of plutonium missions at SRS. Rallies were held and mail-in post card campaigns drew thousands of participants. Some regional opposition to these 21st century plutonium central proposals existed in distant environs such as Columbia, Savannah, and Atlanta, but local dissent was largely viewed and treated as heresy.

    Local Chambers of Commerce predictably joined forces to issue a unified message in support of SRS, and other groups ranging from the local NAACP to the North Augusta City Council followed their lead and endorsed identical resolutions. Within their resolutions endorsing “major plutonium missions for the Savannah River Site,” the Aiken and North Augusta Chambers of Commerce included one statement that is unlikely to be repeated today:

    “…the Savannah River Site has produced approximately 40 percent of all the US weapons grade plutonium over the last 45 years and has safety handle plutonium in glovebox processing equipment with no adverse impact on workers, the public, or the environment.”
1998 Aiken Chamber of Commerce resolution in support of plutonium work at Savannah River Site.. Identical resolutions were adopted by the North Augusta Chamber of Commerce, Aiken Chapter of the NAACP, Aiken County Council on Technical Education, Barnwell County Council, the Lower Savannah Council of Industry, North Augusta City Council, and the Savannah River Regional Diversification Initiative


Whereas comments of support from U.S. Senators Strom Thurmond and Fritz Hollings and Aiken County Council cited a the history of “safe” plutonium operations at SRS—without every defining “safe”—the Chamber of Commerce resolution took the further step of claiming no harm to workers, people outside the gates, or our environment.

Much has changed since 1998. CSRA communities and the State of South Carolina became increasingly wary of DOE’s plans after the cancellation of the APSF (2000), the PIP (2002), the PDCF (2007), and finally the treasured MOX plant (2018). Instead of modern buildings, SRS was left with operational facilities that are now nearly seventy years old, and an unfinished plutonium/MOX fuel plant.

DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which took over the management of the remaining nuclear weapons program at the turn of the century, salvaged much of the lost goodwill by promising to convert the unfinished plutonium/MOX plant into a new plutonium pit production facility. The plan is to make 50 new plutonium pits per year, mostly for new nuclear weapon designs, even as DOE/NNSA proposes to discard ~500 pits per year for the next twenty years.

Even with the prospect of pit production, the loss of the MOX plant was the last straw at the Capitol, and the loss of production work soured the taste of top officials for the relatively benign mission of long-term plutonium storage. As described in SRS CAB Might Stop Snubbing Barnwell and Allendale Counties, in the years of litigation and lobbying that resulted in the the state’s $600 million plutonium settlement with DOE, politicians who rarely uttered a negative word about SRS suddenly expressed trepidations about the prospects of becoming a “plutonium dump.”

In pursuit of the largest slice of the plutonium settlement pie, the Aiken Municipal Development Commission, which included Aiken Chamber of Commerce President David Jameson, sent letters to the Aiken state legislative delegation suggesting there was harm done from seventy years of special nuclear materials work at SRS:

There is no debate that due to 70 years of SRS operations, Aiken County and the City of Aiken share the greatest impact and risk in South Carolina. Aiken County serves as the home of virtually all the 35 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste which is a result of the production of nuclear materials such as plutonium. The liquid waste is stored in large carbon steel tanks and serves as the State of South Carolina’s #1 environnmental risk and will impact our community for decades.”

This statement provides a sharp contrast in perspectives in the two decades since local Chambers and their allies claimed no harm—a false claim DOE and its SRS contractors chose not to dispute. But it pales in comparison to the second change since 1998: the steady cascade of worker illness claims following the passage of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) in 2000. The act was passed to:

Compensate current or former employees (or their survivors) of the Department of Energy (DOE), its predecessor agencies, and certain of its vendors, contractors and subcontractors, who were diagnosed with a radiogenic cancer, chronic beryllium disease, beryllium sensitivity, or chronic silicosis, as a result of exposure to radiation, beryllium, or silica while employed at covered facilities.

The compensation act created new sub-bureaucracies within the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services to handle the flood of claims from former workers from across the former and current nuclear weapons complex, including SRS workers. To help navigate the bureaucracy and the complexities of radiation and toxic substance dose reconstruction, a cottage industry of health care providers emerged that promised assistance for former workers whose illnesses qualified for the program, and law firms followed suit.

The nuclear weapons workers health care companies advertise on local television stations and send out mass mailings to former employees. Some companies even set up not for profit organizations to complement their efforts, such as the now ubiquitious Cold War Patriots.

Cover for a publication from Nuclear Care Partners http://nuclearcarepartners.com, an EEOICPA specialist firm.



Since the passage of the compensation program, former SRS workers have been awarded nearly two billion dollars in claims involving more than 20,000 cases and 12, 385 workers:

As of 01/08/2023, the total compensation paid under Parts B and E of the EEOICPA, including medical compensation, for workers suffering from the effects of having worked at the Savannah River Site is $1,913,612,814. “ (Stephens and Stephens law firm, citing Department of Labor statistics).

Department of Labor statistics for SRS compensation claims under EEOICPA.


While the nuclear weapons worker compensation program created a new business opportunity in former and current nuclear weapons complex communities, the proclamation of “no harm” by the local Chambers of Commerce was known to be false at the time.

While not well publicized, SRS and other plutonium sites medically treated workers who inhaled plutonium with a chelating agent known as Diethylene Pentacetate (DTPA). According to a 1980’s DuPont medical department pamphlet, between 1965 and 1985 “more than 235 people received more than 650 doses of DTPA” at SRS, then known as Savannah River Plant (SRP).

Savannah River Plant medical department pamphlet, circa 1985.


In other words, people were harmed on the job and had to seek medical treatment. Strom Thurmond was right when he stated, “plutonium is not a material to be handled by amateurs,” but wrong to have implied Pantex weapons workers were amateurs. Two days after the uproar in Amarillo over his comments, Senator Thurmond’s office sent a letter to SRS Manager Greg Rudy that left out the “amateurs” charge:

Plutonium is far too volatile a material to be handled by individuals or facilities that have no experience in dealing with it.”

August 13, 1998 letter. Red block shows change in language from June 23, 1998 letter.


The local Chambers of Commerce never admitted how wrong their assertion of “no harm” was. What will the Chambers say this time as SRS is back on the docket for a proposal to import another 25-35 tons of plutonium for processing into a diluted waste.

Plutonium is Not For Amateurs.” Part I.

————————————————————————————————————

*Disclosure : Don Moniak was a paid organizer, writer, and researcher from 1997 to 2003 for two non governmental organizations working on the plutonium disposition issue:
Serious Texans Against Nuclear Dumping, Amarillo, Texas (1997-2000); and Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (2000-2003).












“Plutonium is Not For Amateurs” Pt 1.

Offsite Insights 2023-1:
Revisiting the 1998 plutonium pit debate and the day Senator Strom Thurmond insulted nuclear weapon workers in Texas.

by Don Moniak

January 18, 2023

For the first time in nearly twenty-five years, the U.S. Department of Energy is holding hearings to discuss the future of more than 12,000 “surplus” plutonium “pits” that remain in storage at the 18,000 acre Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant near Amarillo, Texas. (1).

Plutonium pits form the primary nuclear explosives in the the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Pits are complex, sealed pressure vessels designed to withstand hundreds of pounds per square inch of gaseous pressures without explosive tritium booster gas leaking. Within beryllium, stainless steel, aluminium, or vanadium cladding is a nested shell of materials, most notably a generally spherical, hollow ring of one to six kilograms of military grade plutonium in a subcritical configuration.

The term “pit” is a wry, Cold War term given to the sealed core of the primary nuclear explosive that is surrounded by carefully machined high explosive spheres, which, when detonated, cause the plutonium to compress, implode, go critical, and trigger a nuclear detonation. Early weapon designers compared the pit to the dry core of a fleshy fruit, as if their creations were living things providing vital sustenance.

The last time the future of surplus pits was under discussion, the Department of Energy had set off a contentious debate between two of its remaining nuclear weapons sites, the 18,000-acre Pantex plant on the open prairie of the Texas Panhandle, and the 200,000-acre Savannah River Site (SRS) hidden within extensive forestland in Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale Counties, South Carolina. At stake were hundreds of operational jobs in a plutonium pit disassembly and conversion (PDCF) facility, and thousands of construction jobs preceding operation. Also at stake was the prospect of more radioactive, toxic waste generation and environmental contamination.

It was in this context that long-time South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond set off a tempest by describing Pantex workers as “amateurs.” On June 23, 1998, Thurmond’s office released a press release in which the Senator stated the obvious:

Plutonium is not a material to be handled by amateurs.”

Part of a Press Release from the office of Senator Strom Thurmond, June 23, 1998.


The “amateurs” statement was a clear reference to the Pantex plant, where plutonium had only been handled in “pit” form—sealed containers containing plutonium-gallium alloy designed for both malleability and long term stability. Pantex had handled plutonium in its most toxic and difficult powder form only in the case of a rare accident involving a cracked pit.

The statement was also made in the context that it was unwise to introduce plutonium processing to a facility with no plutonium processing infrastructure, expertise, or existing plutonium contamination, but that nuance was lost. Pantex workers heard “amateurs” and responded as expected, with righteous anger.

To say that Pantex weapon workers were no strangers to dangerous operations is a grave understatement. Pantex is the nation’s only nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly site, and also is the primary production site for the high explosives (HE) used in the arsenal. In 1977 an accidental detonation of HE killed three workers, an explosion that also catalyzed another round of scientific research and development into less sensitive HE.

Workers who disassembled and assembled nuclear warheads are responsible for separating or joining—or “mating”—the high explosives and the pit. This is considered the only procedure during nuclear weapons production or disarmament involving the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation—even if the risk was remote. The work is conducted in clean rooms in groups of three, one worker reading procedures and the other two workers methodically carrying the the instructions.

More probable is an accidental detonation of high explosives that would scatter radioactive debris. For this reason weapons assembly and disassembly work is conducted in massive, domed, “gravel gerties” designed to collapse if the explosion involved more than 106 pounds of high explosive and thus contain much of the dispersal of radioactive materials—-a design that meant workers would be buried alive under even if they somehow survived the explosion.

Gravel Gerties at Pantex. From Department of Energy files.
DOE file photo of nuclear weapon disassembly work at Pantex. A small electrostatic discharge during a disassembly operation in 1989 activated a tritium canister part, resulting in a release of 40,000 curies of tritium that harmed three workers and compelled DOE to shut the facility.


Pantex workers learned of Thurmond’s contemptuous barb in the days before a scheduled plutonium disposition hearing in Amarillo. On the day of the hearing, August 11, 1998, workers set up a booth where hastily made picket signs and cheap plastic buttons saying “Site PDCF at Pantex” were distributed. The table contained two handouts—a pro-Pantex letter from Amarillo Chamber of Commerce President Gary Mohlberg and the news release from Strom Thurmond’s office.

Normally more reserved, Pantex workers dominated the hearing that day, waving picket signs like it was a political convention, and taking turns at the podium. It was unlike anything ever before seen in Amarillo, all courtesy of The Department of Energy’s cynical strategy of pitting nuclear weapons production communities against each other over jobs; as well as Strom Thurmond’s fierce defense of the Savannah River Site, which received his legislative largesse for more than four decades.

Ultimately, the job of Pit Disassembly and Conversion went to SRS, as expected. But the prize was short-lived. The PDCF never progressed past the early design stage, and the pits continued to pile up at Pantex, to be stored in World War Two bunkers with little or no temperature or humidity controls.

The pits remain at Pantex, having aged another twenty five years. Pantex will only be involved in this disposition debate if no action is taken and more prolonged plutonium pit storage is required.

This time around, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, the “semi-autonomous” sub-agency which began controlling DOE”s downsized nuclear weapons production complex in 2002, has admitted that, at one-tenth the size of SRS and lacking in waste management infrastructure, Pantex is a poor candidate for plutonium processing—-although NNSA has still not admitted that it is a bad idea to process plutonium within a half mile to a mile of productive farmland.


Next: “Plutonium is Not for Amateurs” Pt 2: What will the Chambers of Commerce say after $billions in SRS worker compensation claims?

(1) Announcement and Opportunity to Comment.



The Draft EIS, Federal Register Notice, meeting materials, and listing of public comment opportunities is at https://www.energy.gov/nepa/doeeis-0549-surplus-plutonium-disposition-program


SRS Watch News Release: October 27, 2022: Delay at SRS Plutonium Bomb Plant

The watchdog organization Savannah River Site Watch issued the following news release today detailing the status of the proposed Plutonium Pit Fabrication Plant at the Savannah River Site, located south of Aiken, SC and west of Barnwell, SC. Plutonium pits are nuclear weapon components composed of machined plutonium and other essential parts; and form the core of the primary nuclear explosive in advanced modern weapons. They are surrounded by high explosives and function to trigger the nuclear blast in most nuclear explosives.

DOE Official Reveals Costly 6-Month Delay in Proposed SRS Plutonium Bomb Plant (PBP); As Russia, U.S. Threaten Nuclear War $11.5 Billion Pit Plant Key to New U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Irresponsible Planning for Full-Scale Nuclear War

For Immediate Release
October 27, 2022
Contact: Tom Clements, srswatch@gmail.com, tel. 803-834-3084

DOE Official Heightens Concerns about Controversial Plutonium Bomb Plant at Savannah River Site by Admitting an Additional 6-Month Delay in the Project; Cost Could Jump $375 Million, to $11.5 Billion

As Russia and the U.S. Recklessly Flirt with Nuclear War, the Plutonium “Pit” Facility in South Carolina Would Play Key Role in New Nuclear Weapons Integral to Planning for Nuclear War

Full SRS Watch news release:   news pit plant delay Oct 27 2022 SRS Watch

How Safe were “Millions of Safe Hours?”

Offsite Insights 2022-3

by Don Moniak
October 21, 2022

A Savannah River Site (SRS) work place safety record may have ended this past August, shortly after an SRS contractor publicized the accomplishment.

On June 29, 2022 Savannah River Mission Completion’s (SRMC) public relations office issued a news release stating “Over the past 24 years and spanning three liquid waste contractors, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management’s (EM) construction team at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has achieved 35 million safe hours without injury resulting in a missed day of work.

According to a September 18, 2022, Savannah River Site (SRS) Occurrence Report, the record could be over. On August 9, 2022, an SRMC construction carpenter tripped on a scaffold pole and fell on the asphalt. The injured worker was diagnosed by a nurse and doctor at the contractor’s onsite Health Services as having “a small abrasion to the left elbow and a right shoulder strain,” treated with an anitbiotic ointment and a bandaid, and was released for work. 

At a follow up visit nine days later the worker complained of pain and discomfort in the injured shoulder, was referred to an offsite orthopedist, and diagnosed with a torn rotator cuff. A month after the accident, the carpenter underwent surgery to repair the right torn rotator cuff. On the day of the surgery, the accident finally made it into DOE’s Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS); which is designed to provide “timely notification to the DOE complex of events that could adversely affect: public or DOE worker health and safety, the environment, national security, DOE’s safeguards and security interests, functioning of DOE facilities, or the Department’s reputation.”

The accident raises questions about the site’s claim to 35 million hours without a lost day of work in the liquid radioactive waste management’s construction program; as well as safety claims made across the rest of the site. OSHA regulations regarding recordable injuries are filled with frequently asked questions and specific scenarios about what constitutes a lost day.

Companies constantly strive to reach accomplishments on paper that may not accurately reflect actual safety records. There is no shortage of stories involving injured workers being pressured and harassed to return to work. Whether there was pressure to return to work in this case is unknown. SRS officials at both the contractor’s and Department of Energy’s public affairs offices were asked (1) about this specific event and chose to ignore the inquiry.

What is known is that serious workplace injuries and accidents are more common at Savannah River Site than the polished record presented by public relations offices of both DOE and its contractors. A news release with an asterisk such as “only construction workers” can easily be misunderstood as “all workers” by a casual reader.

Just a few of the reportable accidents that met the reporting thresholds in the ORPS program during this calendar year include:

On January 27, 2022, a worker supporting “disassembly of a roofing support shoring tower” at a radioactive waste disposal site was struck by the tower frame, lost consciousness, and was transported to Augusta University Hospital. The diagnosis was a temporal bone fracture, a laceration requiring seven sutures, and a concussion. This accident within the liquid radioactive waste program occurred six months before the SRMC’s “35 Million Safe Hours” new release; casting further doubts on the validity of the claim.

On Friday July 22, 2022, a Savannah River Ecology Lab (SREL) researcher suffered a snakebite on the hand from a Copperhead while “attempting to retrieve a radio tracked gopher frog in a remote area.” The worker was transported to AU Medical Center and was treated for more than 48 hours.

Lessons Learned From Occurrence Report EM-SR–GOSR-GOSR-2022-0003


On September 8, 2022, “while performing valving inside of the contamination area for the Acid Recovery Unit, an operator tripped over a piece of plywood and fell backwards, resulting in a back injury.” A day later an X-ray showed a fractured vertebrae.

On September 26, 2022, a crane operator exited a 50-ton crane to evaluate the crane placement for an upcoming job. After exiting the crane, the 50-ton crane rolled into a dumpster, pushing the dumpster into a fence causing damage to the crane, dumpster, and fence. There were no injuries and no damage estimates.

On July 2 and 3, 2022, an evacuation occurred at Savannah River National Laboratory due to the failure of portable air compressors for radiological exhaust systems. The portable compressors were being used due to a cooling water outage. Replacement compressors failed seven times before a larger air compressor was employed.

This particular occurrence drew the attention of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) representatives. In their July 8, 2022 weekly report , Resident Inspectors reported “poor (Technical Safety Requirements) administration and weaknesses in the abnormal event response;” and several several safety issues with the exhaust, ventilation, and fire systems.

The inspectors also found several oversights in the lab’s subsequent fact-finding investigation, particularly in the implementation of Limited Conditions of Operation (LCO). The Board reps wrote: “Most egregiously, the logbook indicated not completing two separate LCO required actions within the required completion time.” Defense Board representatives are often understated and seldom employ words like “egregious.”

The incident was entered into the ORPS notification system on July 14, 2022 and the final report, titled “Loss of Instrument Air and failure of associated radiological exhaust,” was not completed until September 21st. Eight corrective actions were noted, suggesting Board representatives properly recognized the seriousness of the incident and the muddled response to it before the lab did.

Corrective Actions for EM-SR–BSRA-SRNL-2022-0006

_________________


Footnotes

(1) The following email was sent to SRMC’s L. Ling and cc’ed to DOE’s Amy Boyette:

Mr. Ling, 

In regard to the story about 35 million hours without a lost workday accident, was this record affected by this accident, EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0005, 

31. HQ Summary:

On August 9, 2022, construction carpenters were disassembling a containment hut in a barricaded work area near Tank 35. Laborers had placed scaffold poles in the storage rack just prior to the incident. During the work evolution, a construction carpenter tripped on a tube-lock scaffold pole that was extending outside of the storage rack and fell on the asphalt (same level fall). The worker was evaluated by a Savannah River Mission Completion Health Services nurse and a site medical physician. The initial diagnosis was a small abrasion to the left elbow and a right shoulder strain. For initial treatment, the abrasion to the left elbow was cleaned, and antibiotic ointment and a band aid was applied. The worker was discharged and returned to work. On August 18, the worker followed up at site medical, where they reported pain and discomfort in their right shoulder. The worker was subsequently referred to an offsite orthopedic physician. On August 23, Safety Reporting was notified that the employee was seen by an orthopedic physician and given prescription medication. A Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) was scheduled, and the worker returned to work with instructions to use their right arm as tolerated. On August 30, the MRI results indicated the worker had a torn rotator cuff. On September 8, the worker had an outpatient arthroscopic procedure where the surgeon confirmed and repaired the right torn rotator cuff.

If not, how often have injuries later turned out to be worse than initially diagnosed? Was this worker pressured to return to work to avoid an OSHA recordable lost-day event? 

This is also a final occurrence report. Can SRMC explain why there were no lessons learned? 

There was no link to news release author Jim Beasley, so I was unable to ask him directly about this. Please forward if necessary. 

Thank You, 

Donald Moniak
Eureka Research, LLC
PO Box 112
Vaucluse, SC 29850
803-617-9736
contributor: aikenchronicles.com

(2) Savannah River Mission Completions Occurrence Reports for 2022.

Report NumberSubject/Title
1)EM-SR–SRMC-FTANK-2022-0001Failure of Tank 3 Purge Ventilation Fan
2)EM-SR–SRMC-FTANK-2022-0002Uncontrolled hazardous energy due to common neutrals L/T FTF-22-38
3)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0001Employee received mild shock while working in 707-H
4)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0003Tk 32 Thermocouple Failure
5)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0004Light Plant Trailer Tongue Failure
6)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0005Confirmed Rotator Cuff
7)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-000650 Ton Crane rolled into Dumpster at HY-1 Laydown Yard
8)EM-SR–SRMC-SWPF-2022-0002Pressure Relief Drain Plug Air Leak
9)EM-SR–SRMC-SWPF-2022-0003Inadvertent Switch Manipulation
10)EM-SR–SRMC-SWPF-2022-0004Failure to Administratively Enter Limiting Condition of Operation
11)EM-SR–SRMC-SWPF-2022-0005Pressure Transmitter Manifold Leak Prevents Surveillance Completion
12)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0001JIT-1140B Performance Degradation and is Inoperable while in Operation Mode
13)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0002DWPF Lab Personnel hit head on a Manipulator Arm
14)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0003PRFT to SRAT Transfer Interlock Due to Low Steam Flow
15)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0004Cell Cover Dropped While Moving With MPC Crane in DWPF
16)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0005DG200 Failure to Start During Surveillance Testing
17)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0006DG200 Inoperable when required
18)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0007Inadvertent Contact with Electrical Cord
19)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0008Local Control System (LCS) 500A Train Loss of Indications
20)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0009511-S Safety Grade Nitroge




Offsite Insights 2022-2: SRS CAB Might Quit Snubbing Barnwell and Allendale Counties

by Don Moniak
September 16, 2022

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) is an official federal advisory committee formed in the 1990s during a short-lived period of government “openness.” According to its mission statement, the SRS CAB “will provide” the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) office with “information, advice, and recommendations concerning issues affecting the EM program at SRS.” The Board also functions to provide offsite communities and its citizens one of the sole information and communications path to a mammoth government and corporate bureaucracy. 

For the past two decades, when choosing bi-monthly meeting venues, the Citizens Advisory Board has snubbed poorer, rural communities that are closest downriver and downwind to SRS. These include Allendale and Barnwell Counties on the South Carolina side of the river; and Burke and Screven counties on the Georgia side of the river. The last Citizens Advisory Board meeting held in Barnwell County was in 2000; and no meeting has ever been held in Allendale, Burke, or Screven Counties. 

The snubbing of Barnwell and Allendale counties is particularly relevant today in light of the plutonium settlement of 2020. The situation could change in 2023.

Aiken, Allendale, Barnwell Counties and The Plutonium Settlement 

On August 31, 2020, the State of South Carolina and the Department of Energy (DOE) signed a $600 million settlement agreement (1) related to the decades long mismanagement of DOE’s plutonium storage and surplus disposition program. Central to the settlement is the presence of, and fate after the year 2037, of 9.5 out of the more than 11.0 tons of plutonium in long-term (up to fifty years) storage at the Savannah River Site’s (SRS) converted K-Reactor building. 

During the years of litigation and negotiation, South Carolina politicians normally enamored with all nuclear developments and national defense missions began to describe plutonium storage as a nuclear dumping scheme. For example, Governor Nicki Haley told the Post and Courier newspaper in 2016: 

We will not back down: South Carolina will not be a permanent dumping ground for nuclear waste.” 

This was in spite of the fact that all plutonium storage is above-ground; and the materials are closely monitored and retrievable. 

(Plutonium storage at K-Area, Savannah River Site. DOE Photo)

According to the settlement agreement, the primary intent was to resolve economic impact and assistance payments related to the plutonium presence, the lack of progress in the disposition program, and the demand for a timeline to remove surplus plutonium. There is no intent in the agreement to end the storage and processing of plutonium at SRS—which is presently preparing for decades of producing nuclear weapon components called “plutonium pits.” 

“The parties intend that this agreement will resolve all claims relating to economic and assistance payments or removal of plutonium, or will arise, between 2016 and the date on which the Department of Energy completes removal of the subject 9.5 metric tons of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials.” (Settlement Agreement, Paragraph 13)

Local officials and media immediately angled for the prime cut of funding, citing Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties as most impacted and most worthy. Congressman Joe Wilson, whose district encompasses SRS, stated the day of the settlement that: 

These funds should go directly to the counties of Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell were most impacted by the 1,700 jobs lost due to the DOE’s abandonment of MOX.” (WXLT-News) 

On September 5th, the Aiken Standard’s editorial board wrote 

It’s time to financially assist those of us who have been most impacted by the economic ebb and flow surrounding the Savannah River Site, the shuttered MOX facility and its workforce.” 

The Aiken Municipal Development Commission (AMDC) made a splash a few weeks later when it sent letters to various local and state elected officials that advocated for the entire settlement, after legal fees, go to the three South Carolina counties surrounding SRS: Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell. The AMDC wrote: 

The risk of SRS operations and shipping/storing plutonium rests squarely within these three counties.

The letter’s author was AMDC Chairman Keith Wood, whose day job is Vice-President of Marketing and Communications for the National Security Group of Savannah River Site contractor Amentum Corporation. Other commissioner signatories included: 

  • Stuart McVean, the Chief Executive Officer of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, the primary SRS operating contractor; and 
  • J. David Jameson, President of the Aiken Chamber of Commerce. 

The letter may have marked the first time in SRS history that top SRS contract officials and the Aiken Chamber of Commerce collectively presented threats from past and present site operations in such a public light. 

From: September 17, 2020 AMDC Letter to State Senator Tom Young and sixteen other elected officials.

Governor Henry McMaster concurred, and by the end of the 2020 issued a proposal advocating for all of the remaining $525 milllion to be allocated to the three counties, writing: 

It is my belief that the communities surrounding SRS should be the prime beneficiaries of these settlement funds.

SRS CAB Meetings: Everywhere but Barnwell and Allendale

On September 26th, two years after the plutonium settlement was announced, the Savannah River Site (SRS) Citizen’s Advisory Board (SRS CAB) will meet at the Embassy Suites by Hilton in the historic district of Savannah, GA. The meeting marks the seventh time in the past ten years of in-person meetings the Board has met in upscale hotels in Savannah. 

(The Embassy Suites by Hilton, Savannah, GA). 

During that time it has met twelve other times along the coast: 

  • seven times at Hilton Head Island, whose water supply originates from the Savannah River; 
  • four times in Charleston, where the Port of Charleston accepts shipments of foreign nuclear waste and materials of U.S. origin; 
  • and once in Beaufort, where the primary water source is also the Savannah River. 

While all of these cities have a strong vested interest in the safety of the Savannah River Site, Barnwell and Allendale Counties are adjacent to, generally closest downwind from, and always the closest downriver South Carolina communities. The Town of Barnwell is only eight miles from the SRS boundary, the closest county seat to the sprawling complex of nuclear weapons materials processing and cleanup sites. 

Allendale County has never been selected for a Board Meeting. Barnwell County has not hosted an SRS CAB meeting since the September, 2000, when the last one occurred at Barnwell State Park—which still boasts a “large meeting facility and five vacation cabins.” 

The Board did meet in Barnwell County three times between 1996 and 2000—the same year it also convened at luxurious Kiawah Island. The years 2015 and 2016 marked a sea change in meeting venues, with Board meetings held for a full year (2015) at the New Ellenton Community Center. Two more meetings were held in the small town bordering SRS in 2016, along with a pair of meetings at the nearby Applied Research Center in 2016 and 2017. 

But only since July 24, 2017 has a Board meeting convened within fifteen miles of the site boundary, during a meeting in downtown Aiken twelve miles from the site boundary. 

During this period meeting venues have been dominated by a rotation of upscale locations: Hyatt House, Sonesta, Double Tree, Crown Plaza, and the Hilton Garden Inns—-with the exception being nearly two years of virtual meetings due to COVID-19 guidelines and restrictions. 

SRS CAB MEETINGS July, 2017 to November 2022. 

Month/Year LocationCity
July 2017Applied Research CenterAiken County, New Ellenton
September 2017Courtyard HiltonCharleston, SC
November 2017Hilton GardenAugusta, GA
January 2018Beach House HotelHilton Head Island, SC
March 2018North Augusta Municipal CtrNorth Augusta, SC
May 2018 Hyatt RegencySavannah, GA 
September 2018Double Tree InnColumbia, SC
November 2018Partridge InnAugusta, GA
January 2019Sonesta HotelHilton Head, SC
March 2019Savannah Rapids PavillionMartinez, GA
May 2019Hyatt RegencySavannah, GA
July 2019Municipal BuildingNorth Augusta, SC
September 2019Frances Marion HouseCharleston, SC
November 2019Hyatt HouseAugusta, GA
Jan 2020 to Sept 2021Virtual Meetings 
November, 2021Holiday Inn Beach HouseHilton Head, SC
January 2022Aiken Municipal BuildingAiken, SC
March 2022Crown PlazaNorth Augusta, SC
May 2022Columbia Convention CtrColumbia, SC
July 2022Double Tree HotelAugusta, GA
September 2022Embassy Suites-HiltonSavannah, GA
November 2022Augusta UniversityAugusta, GA 

SRS CAB MEETINGS July, 2017 to November 2022. 
Barnwell and/or Allendale in 2023?

The snubbing of Barnwell and Allendale by the Citizen’s Advisory Board could be ending soon. The issue of a change in venue was raised at the last SRS CAB meeting, convened on July 26-27, 2022, at the Double Tree Inn in West Augusta twenty-five miles upriver and generally upwind from SRS.

At the meeting, I asked SRS officials and the CAB about the absence of Barnwell and Allendale Counties from the Board’s meeting locations and agendas. SRS Public Affairs specialist Amy Boyette informed me, with DOE SRS Manager Michael Budney listening, that Barnwell and Allendale lacked the necessary facilities to host a CAB meeting. I followed up a day later with an email, writing: 

You expressed the opinion that Barnwell and Allendale Counties are not feasible for CAB meetings due to a lack of suitable meeting space and equipment. And Mr Budney was standing there and did not disagree. 

Are there any other reasons why full monthly Board meetings are not held in the two counties parochially identified by every SC elected officials at every level as the three most affected by SRS past and present operations?”

Ms. Boyette replied: 

We do not have full Board meetings monthly. There are 6 full Board meetings per year. These meetings are of/for the Citizens Advisory Board and they are also open to the public to observe. We have meetings both locally and in downstream communities. When selecting meeting venues, the primary factors, as I told you on Tuesday, are appropriate meeting space (large room, plenty of parking, food options nearby), dependable utilities (reliable WiFi and IT systems that can support virtual meetings/Live streaming, etc) and suitable overnight accommodations for those to have to travel to attend.

That said, your comments have made me want to double check Barnwell and Allendale. It has been a while since we visited those areas in person (we look online every year) to  scope out possible venues and accommodations. I have asked my staff to reconsider those areas and determine if holding at least one meeting there is feasible.

Conclusions

The Sonesta Hotel in Hilton Head boasts 23,000 square feet of indoor and outdoor meeting space able to accommodate 1,100 people. But the meeting facilities there and every other venue the Board rents look nearly identical to this SRS CAB meeting scene at the Crown Plaza Hotel in North Augusta in March, 2022. 

The SRS CAB has 25 members and a small support staff during meetings. Does the notion that places like Barnwell, Allendale or other small rural communities cannot accomodate such a small contingent reflect an institutional class bias? Or could another issue be that membership on the Savannah River Site Citizen’s Advisory Board presents opportunities to spend some time at government sponsored meetings at posh resorts and upscale hotels? 

The Sonesta Resort on Hilton Head Island, scene of the January 2109 CAB Meeting. 

________________

REFERENCES

(1) https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/South-Carolina-Settlement-Agreement-Final-signed-8-28-20.pdf

(2) 

https://www.wltx.com/article/news/politics/southcarolina-wins-federal-lawsuit-remove-plutonium-from-savannah-river-site-by-2037/101-2728bd82-4a77-47ec-8df2-2c412517c1f1

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