Tag Archives: Plutonium pits

January 2024, Savannah River Site

“Appalling” and “Abysmal”

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How the Department of Energy addressed Governor McMaster’s and Attorney General Alan Wilson’s conflicting and sometimes harsh opinions regarding the future of surplus plutonium.

by Don Moniak
January 22, 2024

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (SPDEIS) was completed last month and announced in the Federal Register this past Friday, January 19th.  A Record of Decision (ROD) is expected sometime in February, although that ROD might not result in any actual plans.

The Final SPDEIS is the fifth National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis addressing all or parts of 61.5 metric tons (MT) of surplus plutonium that has been conducted in the past three decades. During that time, the DOE/NNSA’s various contractors have processed and disposed of less than five tons of the surplus stockpile, and spent billions of dollars on a failed plutonium/Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel factory originally intended to handle up to eighty percent of the surplus material. Major changes in plans have occurred at least five times.

The latest analysis was released almost twenty-seven years to the day of the the 1997 Record of Decision to consolidate all surplus, “non-pit” plutonium at DOE’s Savannah River Site (SRS) for up to fifty years; nearly sixteen tons at the time but later reduced to about twelve tons.  Less than a ton of surplus plutonium has since been removed from the site.

Controversy over the storage decision began in 2002, and eventually resulted in the $600 million settlement between the federal government and the State of South Carolina in August 2020. That settlement requires DOE/NNSA to remove 9.5 metric tons from SRS by 2037. If the recent rate of transfer of plutonium waste from SRS to WIPP continues, that task will not be completed until well after 2040.

In the meantime, more than forty additional tons could be imported into South Carolina, stored, and then processed into waste over the next three to four decades. Several more tons of non-surplus plutonium is scheduled to be transported to SRS for the job of producing new plutonium pits for the weapons arsenal.

The Final SPDEIS nearly mirrors the Draft SPDEIS released in January 2023; summarized in Feds Propose 27 More Tons of Plutonium for Processing at Savannah River Site.  The preferred alternative and associated sub-alternatives remains the same: Use some combination of capabilities at SRS and Los Alamos to convert upwards of 34 metric tons (MT) of surplus military grade plutonium to plutonium oxide powder, dilute the plutonium into a less easily retrievable waste form, and dispose of that waste in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). 

The proposed action (Figure 1) does not commit to a specific plan. SRS could be assigned the whole job, part of the job, or very little of the job. 

Figure 1: Simplified version of DOE/NNSA’s proposed action to dispose of up to 34 metric tons of surplus military-grade plutonium. The total includes approximately 27 tons of plutonium within weapon components known as “pits,” which are the primary nuclear trigger in the U.S. arsenal; and 7.0 tons of already separated plutonium in metal or powder form.



Since January 2023, sixteen changes were made to the nearly one-thousand-page record, in response to 121 written comments submitted during the two month public comment period, and 53 oral comments made during three in-person public meetings and one Zoom call. The public comment process was incredibly subdued in comparison to the competitive spirit between weapons communities in the late 1990s; when thousands of comments were submitted, hundreds spoke at public hearings, and Senator Strom Thurmond described weapons workers in Texas as “amateurs.” (Comments and responses are contained in Volume III of the SPDEIS.)

Three of the submitted comments were from the South Carolina Congressional Delegation, Governor Henry McMaster, and Attorney General Alan Wilson. 

The comments and concerns from our elected representatives had several contradictory themes:

  • An obsession with long-term plutonium storage, but a near absence of concern about the most pivotal aspect of the program—the future availability of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal of the final plutonium wastes produced at SRS (most likely) or LANL (least likely). 
  • Skepticism to outright hostility towards DOE/NNSA, but strong support for the DOE’s Savannah River Site and its contract workforce.
  • Support for the more dangerous task of importing and processing more than forty tons of plutonium at SRS, but opposition to the more benign task of long-term storage. This is in keeping with the nearly decade-old tradition of South Carolina political leaders of welcoming plutonium into the state, but terming above-ground, long-term plutonium storage as “plutonium dumping.” 

DOE/NNSA’s responses to the comments from SC elected officials were uniformly finalized as:

“These comments did not result in a modification in the Final EIS.”

The most strident comments (Figure 2) were made by Attorney General Wilson, which included, in bold type, that:

“DOE/NNSA has an appalling record of not following through on its promises or projects. Its project management is abysmal, and South Carolina’s pessimism of DOE/NNA’s ability to implement any proposed alternative is well earned.” 

Wilson also wrote that, “DOE/NNNSA must be committed to removing the weapons grade plutonium on a schedule that ensures that South Carolina is not the dumping ground for such plutonium.” DOE/NNSA did not commit to any schedule, and Wilson’s comments “did not result in a modification to the Final EIS.”

Figure 2. Comments made by Attorney General Alan Wilson, with reference to DOE/NNSA’s response. (Highlighting is in the original document)


Wilson’s most harsh comment was lumped into the response category of “General Opposition to SPDP and NNSA/DOE.”  In other words, AG Wilson’s comments were not well accepted by the federal government. 

Such objections in the past have resulted in thinly veiled threats from NNSA. In 2018, a State of South Carolina lawsuit led by Wilson that opposed NNSA’s decision to terminate the MOX program resulted in the prospect to move tritium production operations from SRS:

“In light of this injunction, NNSA must reevaluate the viability to execute enduring missions at the Savannah River Site.”

Comments from the Governor’s office were more tactful. Governor McMaster wrote that his support for decades of more plutonium processing at SRS should “not be construed as support for long-term storage of surplus plutonium in South Carolina.” Because of his concern that “South Carolina not become a permanent plutonium repository,” McMaster asked NNSA to “conduct regular, direct, and detailed briefings with me and members of my staff.” (Page 229 of comments)

To this request, the DOE/NNSA merely responded that “NNSA has committed to periodic briefings on progress toward meeting the removal commitment to the Governor and the Attorney General of South Carolina.”

Of course, the Governor’s comments “did not result in a modification in the Final EIS.”

The Congressional Delegation’s joint letter was the least combative and most diplomatic, stating only that “NNSA does not have the greatest track-record with the State regarding a follow-through on commitments.” The delegation also asked for updates, continued operation of WIPP, compliance with legal obligations, and “maximum possible transparency;” while stating “ we are not supportive of long-term storage of surplus plutonium storage in South Carolina.” (Page 223).

Overall, DOE/NNSA issued platitudes to South Carolina’s highest elected officials, committed only to a minimal level of compliance and token updates on its progress, and refused to set a hard schedule for removal of plutonium. Again, there were no modifications of the Final EIS as a result of the delegation’s concerns.

DOE/NNSA’s responses are to be expected when, on the one hand, political leaders express full support for Savannah River Site, its corporate contractors, and the prospect of importing and processing more than forty additional tons of plutonium (Figure 3) into South Carolina; while on the other hand expressing distrust in the same federal cabinet agency that owns and oversees the Savannah River Site to merely store the material during the same time period.

Figure 3: Diagram in the SPDEIS showing the various forms of surplus plutonium and their future pathways. DOE/NNSA remains undecided on how to move forward with 18 tons, and has only disposed of less than five tons (3.2 MT of “scraps, residues” were transferred from Rocky Flats to WIPP in the early 2000s; and SRS has shipped less than 1 MT to WIPP since 2018.)



Footnotes

(1) Regarding the DOE/NNSA response methodology.

In the past, DOE printed individual comments with responses on an opposing column on the same page. Concerned parties who took the time to comment on matters affecting their communities and their constituents could see responses to their concerns without exerting any additional effort.

In Volume III of the Final SPDEIS, DOE employed a torturous response method. The agency’s contractor first sorted all comments into nearly thirty categories. These were followed by the actual comments. Determining DOE’s response to individual comments requires the concerned party to backtrack to the category of concern. For example, Attorney General Wilson would have to refer

For example, to determine DOE’s response to comments by Attorney General Alan Wilson published on page 255 of the comment section, the AG’s office would have to backtrack to five different response groupings on five separate pages.

The system is symbolic of the general attitude of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Agency; that “you the people” work for “us the government.”

(2) The plan does not involve changing the isotopic composition for the plutonium to make it less attractive for re-use in the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

January 2023, Offsite Insights, Savannah River Site

“Plutonium is Not For Amateurs” Pt 1.

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Offsite Insights 2023-1:
Revisiting the 1998 plutonium pit debate and the day Senator Strom Thurmond insulted nuclear weapon workers in Texas.

by Don Moniak

January 18, 2023

For the first time in nearly twenty-five years, the U.S. Department of Energy is holding hearings to discuss the future of more than 12,000 “surplus” plutonium “pits” that remain in storage at the 18,000 acre Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant near Amarillo, Texas. (1).

Plutonium pits form the primary nuclear explosives in the the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Pits are complex, sealed pressure vessels designed to withstand hundreds of pounds per square inch of gaseous pressures without explosive tritium booster gas leaking. Within beryllium, stainless steel, aluminium, or vanadium cladding is a nested shell of materials, most notably a generally spherical, hollow ring of one to six kilograms of military grade plutonium in a subcritical configuration.

The term “pit” is a wry, Cold War term given to the sealed core of the primary nuclear explosive that is surrounded by carefully machined high explosive spheres, which, when detonated, cause the plutonium to compress, implode, go critical, and trigger a nuclear detonation. Early weapon designers compared the pit to the dry core of a fleshy fruit, as if their creations were living things providing vital sustenance.

The last time the future of surplus pits was under discussion, the Department of Energy had set off a contentious debate between two of its remaining nuclear weapons sites, the 18,000-acre Pantex plant on the open prairie of the Texas Panhandle, and the 200,000-acre Savannah River Site (SRS) hidden within extensive forestland in Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale Counties, South Carolina. At stake were hundreds of operational jobs in a plutonium pit disassembly and conversion (PDCF) facility, and thousands of construction jobs preceding operation. Also at stake was the prospect of more radioactive, toxic waste generation and environmental contamination.

It was in this context that long-time South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond set off a tempest by describing Pantex workers as “amateurs.” On June 23, 1998, Thurmond’s office released a press release in which the Senator stated the obvious:

“Plutonium is not a material to be handled by amateurs.”

Part of a Press Release from the office of Senator Strom Thurmond, June 23, 1998.


The “amateurs” statement was a clear reference to the Pantex plant, where plutonium had only been handled in “pit” form—sealed containers containing plutonium-gallium alloy designed for both malleability and long term stability. Pantex had handled plutonium in its most toxic and difficult powder form only in the case of a rare accident involving a cracked pit.

The statement was also made in the context that it was unwise to introduce plutonium processing to a facility with no plutonium processing infrastructure, expertise, or existing plutonium contamination, but that nuance was lost. Pantex workers heard “amateurs” and responded as expected, with righteous anger.

To say that Pantex weapon workers were no strangers to dangerous operations is a grave understatement. Pantex is the nation’s only nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly site, and also is the primary production site for the high explosives (HE) used in the arsenal. In 1977 an accidental detonation of HE killed three workers, an explosion that also catalyzed another round of scientific research and development into less sensitive HE.

Workers who disassembled and assembled nuclear warheads are responsible for separating or joining—or “mating”—the high explosives and the pit. This is considered the only procedure during nuclear weapons production or disarmament involving the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation—even if the risk was remote. The work is conducted in clean rooms in groups of three, one worker reading procedures and the other two workers methodically carrying the the instructions.

More probable is an accidental detonation of high explosives that would scatter radioactive debris. For this reason weapons assembly and disassembly work is conducted in massive, domed, “gravel gerties” designed to collapse if the explosion involved more than 106 pounds of high explosive and thus contain much of the dispersal of radioactive materials—-a design that meant workers would be buried alive under even if they somehow survived the explosion.

Gravel Gerties at Pantex. From Department of Energy files.
DOE file photo of nuclear weapon disassembly work at Pantex. A small electrostatic discharge during a disassembly operation in 1989 activated a tritium canister part, resulting in a release of 40,000 curies of tritium that harmed three workers and compelled DOE to shut the facility.


Pantex workers learned of Thurmond’s contemptuous barb in the days before a scheduled plutonium disposition hearing in Amarillo. On the day of the hearing, August 11, 1998, workers set up a booth where hastily made picket signs and cheap plastic buttons saying “Site PDCF at Pantex” were distributed. The table contained two handouts—a pro-Pantex letter from Amarillo Chamber of Commerce President Gary Mohlberg and the news release from Strom Thurmond’s office.

Normally more reserved, Pantex workers dominated the hearing that day, waving picket signs like it was a political convention, and taking turns at the podium. It was unlike anything ever before seen in Amarillo, all courtesy of The Department of Energy’s cynical strategy of pitting nuclear weapons production communities against each other over jobs; as well as Strom Thurmond’s fierce defense of the Savannah River Site, which received his legislative largesse for more than four decades.

Ultimately, the job of Pit Disassembly and Conversion went to SRS, as expected. But the prize was short-lived. The PDCF never progressed past the early design stage, and the pits continued to pile up at Pantex, to be stored in World War Two bunkers with little or no temperature or humidity controls.

The pits remain at Pantex, having aged another twenty five years. Pantex will only be involved in this disposition debate if no action is taken and more prolonged plutonium pit storage is required.

This time around, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, the “semi-autonomous” sub-agency which began controlling DOE”s downsized nuclear weapons production complex in 2002, has admitted that, at one-tenth the size of SRS and lacking in waste management infrastructure, Pantex is a poor candidate for plutonium processing—-although NNSA has still not admitted that it is a bad idea to process plutonium within a half mile to a mile of productive farmland.


Next: “Plutonium is Not for Amateurs” Pt 2: What will the Chambers of Commerce say after $billions in SRS worker compensation claims?

(1) Announcement and Opportunity to Comment.



The Draft EIS, Federal Register Notice, meeting materials, and listing of public comment opportunities is at https://www.energy.gov/nepa/doeeis-0549-surplus-plutonium-disposition-program


December 2022, Offsite Insights, Savannah River Site

Feds Propose ~27 to 34 More Tons of Plutonium for Processing at Savannah River Site

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Texas to New Mexico to South Carolina to New Mexico is Proposed Pathway for Remaining Surplus Plutonium.

by Don Moniak

December 16, 2022

Plutonium-239 is a man-made radioactive element that is acutely deadly at the scale of milligrams, chronically toxic at the scale of micrograms, decays into more intensely radioactive elements and isotopes, and is useable in nuclear explosives of mass destruction at the scale of kilograms. It has been described as “a physicist’s dream and an engineer’s nightmare.”

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS, formerly Savannah River Plant) produced an estimated 36 tons of the material from the 1950’s to late 1980’s for the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Processing of the resulting unstable, radioactive liquid waste into a relatively stable form has been ongoing since the 1990’s and is expected to continue into the 2040’s. When production ceased in 1990, two tons of plutonium remained in storage, of which approximately 1.5 tons was eventually declared surplus.

Today there is an estimated 11.0 to 11.5 tons of plutonium presently stored at the site, which encompasses parts of Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale counties in South Carolina. Of this total, 9.5 tons was transferred from other nuclear weapons material and parts production sites—most notably Rocky Flats, Hanford, and Los Alamos—following DOE’s 1997 decision to centralize storage of weapons plutonium.

Two years ago the State of South Carolina reached a $600 million settlement with the federal government over the 9.5 tons of military-grade, surplus plutonium transferred to SRS. Today, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administriation (NNSA) published a proposal to ship upwards of 27 additional tons of surplus military-grade plutonium to SRS for processing into a waste form through a process called “dilute and dispose”(1).

The proposal was revealed today in a Federal Register notice announcing a sixty-day public comment period for the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (SPDP EIS). The impact statement is the latest National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) document addressing the future of 34 metric tonnes (MT) (2) of plutonium that has been deemed surplus to U.S. defense needs since the early 1990s.

The basic dichotomy for the surplus plutonium begins with:

a. relatively “clean” and pure plutonium within nuclear explosive components known as “pits.” There were presently an estimated 14,000 plutonium pits stored at DOE/NNSA’s Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant near Amarillo, Texas; of which approximately 10,000 are deemed surplus and 4,000 are “strategic reserve.” Each pit averages There is ~3 kg of plutonium.

b. plutonium not within pits, with highly variable purity levels, most of which is now stored at SRS.

The exact figures for each category are distorted and confused by classification methods, as DOE/NNSA has never revealed precise quantities contained in pit plutonium. However, since the 1990’s the general accepted total of surplus plutonium metal contained in pit form is approximately 25-27 tons.

From: Plutonium, the Last Five Years, Part 2. The two categories to the right constitute the 34 tons currently being analyzed.



Since the 1990’s military nuclear weapons complex agencies have conducted multiple environmental impact statements. Efforts to convert 34 metric tonnes of military plutonium into either a waste form or into commercial, mixed-oxide (Pu/MOX) nuclear fuel moved forward, then faltered, and finally failed by 2018, eventually leading to the plutonium settlement between DOE and South Carolina. Less than one ton of the higher purity plutonium constituting the surplus stockpile has been converted to a waste form in twenty-five years, and an estimated quarter-ton was processed in the past year.

The Department of Energy has been shuffling disposition options for surplus, non-pit plutonium since the mid 1990’s.  As Ed Lyman reported in his definitive report of DOE/NNSA’s programmatic failures, Surplus Plutonium Disposition: The Failure of MOX and the Promise of Its Alternatives, DOE/NNSA changed its treatment preferences for 13.1 tons of non-pit surplus plutonium eight times in a thirteen year period. The chronic indecision was a contributing factor to the huge cost overruns that helped to end the Pu/MOX fuel fabrication alternative. 

The shifting plans for surplus, non-pit plutonium. From: The Failure of MOX and the Promise of its Alternatives,

After abandoning efforts to convert military plutonium designed for use as nuclear explosives into Pu/MOX fuel, weapons complex agencies moved forward with a disposition method known as “dilute and dispose.” Simply put, “dilute and dispose” involves mixing very small amounts of plutonium (1-3%) with large amounts of a classified mix of materials to create a waste form for permanent disposal.

The only disposal site in the U.S. approved to accept this waste is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Southeastern New Mexico. There remains intense opposition to importing any more plutonium-laden waste into the state than what was originally planned during its design and approval stages in the 1990’s.

In today’s announcement, the NNSA stated its preferred alternative is to pursue the “dilute and dispose strategy for 34 MT of surplus plutonium,” a process involving several steps for plutonium not already at SRS:

  • Ship up to 27 tons (3) of plutonium from the Pantex nuclear weapons plant in the Texas Panhandle to the Los Alamos National Laboratory near Sante Fe, New Mexico. 
  • Disassemble plutonium pits, separate the plutonium from other parts (4) and convert the plutonium metal within to  plutonium oxide powder.
  • Ship the plutonium oxide powder to Savannah River Site near Aiken and Barnwell, South Carolina for dilution into a waste form. 
  • Ship the waste to the WIPP near Carlsbad, New Mexico for disposal. 

    Three alternatives to the preferred alternative are:

  • Ship plutonium pits to SRS for disassembly and conversion of the plutonium metal to plutonium oxide powder, followed by the dilute and disposal pathway.  This option probably ties in with the proposed new plutonium pit fabrication plant at SRS.
  • Perform the dilute and disposal pathway at Los Alamos and keep the entire process in New Mexico. 
  • The No-Action alternative, which would leave the plutonium pits in long term storage and avoid unnecessary shipping, processing, and increased plutonium waste dumping at WIPP. 

Not included among the alternatives is the option of demilitarizing plutonium pits by “stuffing” them with inert materials, a proposal first floated in the late 1990’s. Plutonium pits are designed for long-term storage in the nuclear warhead, and can remain stored without expensive shipment and processing.

After years of South Carolina officials declaring that the state could become a permanent plutonium dumping ground, the state is now facing the renewed prospect of SRS processing three times the plutonium presently stored onsite and awaiting dilution and repackaging; as well as fabricating 80 or more new plutonium pits for new nuclear weapon designs at a plutonium pit production plant being designed for production beginning in the early 2030’s.

As reported in Offsite Insight 2022-1, nuclear watchdog Tom Clements informed the SRS Citizen’s Advisory Board about this prospect at their July, 2022, meeting, at which he distinguished between the plutonium already at SRS and the plutonium potentially headed there:

“The number was given as 9.5 MT in the agreement with the state. But there is 11.5 ton onsite because 2.0 tons were already there. But the amount of plutonium to be disposed of is up to 34 tons….We are looking at a tremendous amount of plutonium coming into the site. The CAB will have a very important role in insuring more material is not stranded here.” 

Next story: “Plutonium is Not for Amateurs, Part I.”

Residents in the Central Savannah River Area (CSRA) that surrounds the Savannah River Site have the opportunity to comment on the latest proposal either in person or in writing. DOE/NNSA will hold a public meeting upriver from SRS at North Augusta City Hall, 100 Georgia Avenue, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on January 19, 2023. A virtual hearing will be held on January 30, 2023, and comments may be submitted to SPDP-EIS@nnsa.doe.gov.

The Draft EIS, Federal Register Notice, meeting materials, and listing of public comment opportunities is at https://www.energy.gov/nepa/doeeis-0549-surplus-plutonium-disposition-program

and the Draft EIS is at:

https://www.energy.gov/nepa/articles/doeeis-0549-draft-environmental-impact-statement-december-2022


Footnotes

(1) Information regarding the program can be found at:

Presentation material for 3013 Cans and K Area Storage and Processing:

Click to access DOE3013ContainerProgram.pdf

Click to access StorageandDownblend.pdf

A DOE presentation to the National Academy of Sciences in 2018 provides more details: 

Click to access McAlhany-SurplusPuDisp_Jun2018.pdf

(2) A metric ton is 1,000 kilograms, equal to 2200 pounds or 1.1 tons.

(3) The DOE/NNSA announcement states that up to 34 MT could be shipped from Pantex, but no documentation exists suggesting there is 34 MT of surplus plutonium within pits, and Pantex presently stores less than one ton of plutonium not within pits. The EIS will, however, analyze the movement of 34 tons from Pantex.

(4) Highly Enriched Uranium within plutonium pits will also be separated and shipped to the Y-12 nuclear weapons material plant near Oak Ridge, Tennessee.




October 2022, Savannah River Site

SRS Watch News Release: October 27, 2022: Delay at SRS Plutonium Bomb Plant

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The watchdog organization Savannah River Site Watch issued the following news release today detailing the status of the proposed Plutonium Pit Fabrication Plant at the Savannah River Site, located south of Aiken, SC and west of Barnwell, SC. Plutonium pits are nuclear weapon components composed of machined plutonium and other essential parts; and form the core of the primary nuclear explosive in advanced modern weapons. They are surrounded by high explosives and function to trigger the nuclear blast in most nuclear explosives.

DOE Official Reveals Costly 6-Month Delay in Proposed SRS Plutonium Bomb Plant (PBP); As Russia, U.S. Threaten Nuclear War $11.5 Billion Pit Plant Key to New U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Irresponsible Planning for Full-Scale Nuclear War

For Immediate Release
October 27, 2022
Contact: Tom Clements, srswatch@gmail.com, tel. 803-834-3084

DOE Official Heightens Concerns about Controversial Plutonium Bomb Plant at Savannah River Site by Admitting an Additional 6-Month Delay in the Project; Cost Could Jump $375 Million, to $11.5 Billion

As Russia and the U.S. Recklessly Flirt with Nuclear War, the Plutonium “Pit” Facility in South Carolina Would Play Key Role in New Nuclear Weapons Integral to Planning for Nuclear War

Full SRS Watch news release:   news pit plant delay Oct 27 2022 SRS Watch

Offsite Insights, Plutonium Settlement, Savannah River Site, September 2022

Offsite Insights 2022-2: SRS CAB Might Quit Snubbing Barnwell and Allendale Counties

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by Don Moniak
September 16, 2022

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) is an official federal advisory committee formed in the 1990s during a short-lived period of government “openness.” According to its mission statement, the SRS CAB “will provide” the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) office with “information, advice, and recommendations concerning issues affecting the EM program at SRS.” The Board also functions to provide offsite communities and its citizens one of the sole information and communications path to a mammoth government and corporate bureaucracy. 

For the past two decades, when choosing bi-monthly meeting venues, the Citizens Advisory Board has snubbed poorer, rural communities that are closest downriver and downwind to SRS. These include Allendale and Barnwell Counties on the South Carolina side of the river; and Burke and Screven counties on the Georgia side of the river. The last Citizens Advisory Board meeting held in Barnwell County was in 2000; and no meeting has ever been held in Allendale, Burke, or Screven Counties. 

The snubbing of Barnwell and Allendale counties is particularly relevant today in light of the plutonium settlement of 2020. The situation could change in 2023.

Aiken, Allendale, Barnwell Counties and The Plutonium Settlement 

On August 31, 2020, the State of South Carolina and the Department of Energy (DOE) signed a $600 million settlement agreement (1) related to the decades long mismanagement of DOE’s plutonium storage and surplus disposition program. Central to the settlement is the presence of, and fate after the year 2037, of 9.5 out of the more than 11.0 tons of plutonium in long-term (up to fifty years) storage at the Savannah River Site’s (SRS) converted K-Reactor building. 

During the years of litigation and negotiation, South Carolina politicians normally enamored with all nuclear developments and national defense missions began to describe plutonium storage as a nuclear dumping scheme. For example, Governor Nicki Haley told the Post and Courier newspaper in 2016: 

“We will not back down: South Carolina will not be a permanent dumping ground for nuclear waste.” 

This was in spite of the fact that all plutonium storage is above-ground; and the materials are closely monitored and retrievable. 

(Plutonium storage at K-Area, Savannah River Site. DOE Photo)

According to the settlement agreement, the primary intent was to resolve economic impact and assistance payments related to the plutonium presence, the lack of progress in the disposition program, and the demand for a timeline to remove surplus plutonium. There is no intent in the agreement to end the storage and processing of plutonium at SRS—which is presently preparing for decades of producing nuclear weapon components called “plutonium pits.” 

“The parties intend that this agreement will resolve all claims relating to economic and assistance payments or removal of plutonium, or will arise, between 2016 and the date on which the Department of Energy completes removal of the subject 9.5 metric tons of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials.” (Settlement Agreement, Paragraph 13)

Local officials and media immediately angled for the prime cut of funding, citing Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties as most impacted and most worthy. Congressman Joe Wilson, whose district encompasses SRS, stated the day of the settlement that: 

“These funds should go directly to the counties of Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell were most impacted by the 1,700 jobs lost due to the DOE’s abandonment of MOX.” (WXLT-News) 

On September 5th, the Aiken Standard’s editorial board wrote 

“It’s time to financially assist those of us who have been most impacted by the economic ebb and flow surrounding the Savannah River Site, the shuttered MOX facility and its workforce.” 

The Aiken Municipal Development Commission (AMDC) made a splash a few weeks later when it sent letters to various local and state elected officials that advocated for the entire settlement, after legal fees, go to the three South Carolina counties surrounding SRS: Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell. The AMDC wrote: 

The risk of SRS operations and shipping/storing plutonium rests squarely within these three counties.

The letter’s author was AMDC Chairman Keith Wood, whose day job is Vice-President of Marketing and Communications for the National Security Group of Savannah River Site contractor Amentum Corporation. Other commissioner signatories included: 

  • Stuart McVean, the Chief Executive Officer of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, the primary SRS operating contractor; and 
  • J. David Jameson, President of the Aiken Chamber of Commerce. 

The letter may have marked the first time in SRS history that top SRS contract officials and the Aiken Chamber of Commerce collectively presented threats from past and present site operations in such a public light. 

From: September 17, 2020 AMDC Letter to State Senator Tom Young and sixteen other elected officials.

Governor Henry McMaster concurred, and by the end of the 2020 issued a proposal advocating for all of the remaining $525 milllion to be allocated to the three counties, writing: 

It is my belief that the communities surrounding SRS should be the prime beneficiaries of these settlement funds.

SRS CAB Meetings: Everywhere but Barnwell and Allendale

On September 26th, two years after the plutonium settlement was announced, the Savannah River Site (SRS) Citizen’s Advisory Board (SRS CAB) will meet at the Embassy Suites by Hilton in the historic district of Savannah, GA. The meeting marks the seventh time in the past ten years of in-person meetings the Board has met in upscale hotels in Savannah. 

(The Embassy Suites by Hilton, Savannah, GA). 

During that time it has met twelve other times along the coast: 

  • seven times at Hilton Head Island, whose water supply originates from the Savannah River; 
  • four times in Charleston, where the Port of Charleston accepts shipments of foreign nuclear waste and materials of U.S. origin; 
  • and once in Beaufort, where the primary water source is also the Savannah River. 

While all of these cities have a strong vested interest in the safety of the Savannah River Site, Barnwell and Allendale Counties are adjacent to, generally closest downwind from, and always the closest downriver South Carolina communities. The Town of Barnwell is only eight miles from the SRS boundary, the closest county seat to the sprawling complex of nuclear weapons materials processing and cleanup sites. 

Allendale County has never been selected for a Board Meeting. Barnwell County has not hosted an SRS CAB meeting since the September, 2000, when the last one occurred at Barnwell State Park—which still boasts a “large meeting facility and five vacation cabins.” 

The Board did meet in Barnwell County three times between 1996 and 2000—the same year it also convened at luxurious Kiawah Island. The years 2015 and 2016 marked a sea change in meeting venues, with Board meetings held for a full year (2015) at the New Ellenton Community Center. Two more meetings were held in the small town bordering SRS in 2016, along with a pair of meetings at the nearby Applied Research Center in 2016 and 2017. 

But only since July 24, 2017 has a Board meeting convened within fifteen miles of the site boundary, during a meeting in downtown Aiken twelve miles from the site boundary. 

During this period meeting venues have been dominated by a rotation of upscale locations: Hyatt House, Sonesta, Double Tree, Crown Plaza, and the Hilton Garden Inns—-with the exception being nearly two years of virtual meetings due to COVID-19 guidelines and restrictions. 

SRS CAB MEETINGS July, 2017 to November 2022. 

Month/Year LocationCity
July 2017Applied Research CenterAiken County, New Ellenton
September 2017Courtyard HiltonCharleston, SC
November 2017Hilton GardenAugusta, GA
January 2018Beach House HotelHilton Head Island, SC
March 2018North Augusta Municipal CtrNorth Augusta, SC
May 2018 Hyatt RegencySavannah, GA 
September 2018Double Tree InnColumbia, SC
November 2018Partridge InnAugusta, GA
January 2019Sonesta HotelHilton Head, SC
March 2019Savannah Rapids PavillionMartinez, GA
May 2019Hyatt RegencySavannah, GA
July 2019Municipal BuildingNorth Augusta, SC
September 2019Frances Marion HouseCharleston, SC
November 2019Hyatt HouseAugusta, GA
Jan 2020 to Sept 2021Virtual Meetings 
November, 2021Holiday Inn Beach HouseHilton Head, SC
January 2022Aiken Municipal BuildingAiken, SC
March 2022Crown PlazaNorth Augusta, SC
May 2022Columbia Convention CtrColumbia, SC
July 2022Double Tree HotelAugusta, GA
September 2022Embassy Suites-HiltonSavannah, GA
November 2022Augusta UniversityAugusta, GA 

SRS CAB MEETINGS July, 2017 to November 2022. 
Barnwell and/or Allendale in 2023?

The snubbing of Barnwell and Allendale by the Citizen’s Advisory Board could be ending soon. The issue of a change in venue was raised at the last SRS CAB meeting, convened on July 26-27, 2022, at the Double Tree Inn in West Augusta twenty-five miles upriver and generally upwind from SRS.

At the meeting, I asked SRS officials and the CAB about the absence of Barnwell and Allendale Counties from the Board’s meeting locations and agendas. SRS Public Affairs specialist Amy Boyette informed me, with DOE SRS Manager Michael Budney listening, that Barnwell and Allendale lacked the necessary facilities to host a CAB meeting. I followed up a day later with an email, writing: 

“You expressed the opinion that Barnwell and Allendale Counties are not feasible for CAB meetings due to a lack of suitable meeting space and equipment. And Mr Budney was standing there and did not disagree. 

Are there any other reasons why full monthly Board meetings are not held in the two counties parochially identified by every SC elected officials at every level as the three most affected by SRS past and present operations?”

Ms. Boyette replied: 

We do not have full Board meetings monthly. There are 6 full Board meetings per year. These meetings are of/for the Citizens Advisory Board and they are also open to the public to observe. We have meetings both locally and in downstream communities. When selecting meeting venues, the primary factors, as I told you on Tuesday, are appropriate meeting space (large room, plenty of parking, food options nearby), dependable utilities (reliable WiFi and IT systems that can support virtual meetings/Live streaming, etc) and suitable overnight accommodations for those to have to travel to attend.

That said, your comments have made me want to double check Barnwell and Allendale. It has been a while since we visited those areas in person (we look online every year) to  scope out possible venues and accommodations. I have asked my staff to reconsider those areas and determine if holding at least one meeting there is feasible.

Conclusions

The Sonesta Hotel in Hilton Head boasts 23,000 square feet of indoor and outdoor meeting space able to accommodate 1,100 people. But the meeting facilities there and every other venue the Board rents look nearly identical to this SRS CAB meeting scene at the Crown Plaza Hotel in North Augusta in March, 2022. 

The SRS CAB has 25 members and a small support staff during meetings. Does the notion that places like Barnwell, Allendale or other small rural communities cannot accomodate such a small contingent reflect an institutional class bias? Or could another issue be that membership on the Savannah River Site Citizen’s Advisory Board presents opportunities to spend some time at government sponsored meetings at posh resorts and upscale hotels? 

The Sonesta Resort on Hilton Head Island, scene of the January 2109 CAB Meeting. 

________________

REFERENCES

(1) https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/South-Carolina-Settlement-Agreement-Final-signed-8-28-20.pdf

(2) 

https://www.wltx.com/article/news/politics/southcarolina-wins-federal-lawsuit-remove-plutonium-from-savannah-river-site-by-2037/101-2728bd82-4a77-47ec-8df2-2c412517c1f1

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