How the Department of Energy addressed Governor McMaster’s and Attorney General Alan Wilson’s conflicting and sometimes harsh opinions regarding the future of surplus plutonium.
by Don Moniak
January 22, 2024
The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (SPDEIS) was completed last month and announced in the Federal Register this past Friday, January 19th. A Record of Decision (ROD) is expected sometime in February, although that ROD might not result in any actual plans.
The Final SPDEIS is the fifth National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis addressing all or parts of 61.5 metric tons (MT) of surplus plutonium that has been conducted in the past three decades. During that time, the DOE/NNSA’s various contractors have processed and disposed of less than five tons of the surplus stockpile, and spent billions of dollars on a failed plutonium/Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel factory originally intended to handle up to eighty percent of the surplus material. Major changes in plans have occurred at least five times.
The latest analysis was released almost twenty-seven years to the day of the the 1997 Record of Decision to consolidate all surplus, “non-pit” plutonium at DOE’s Savannah River Site (SRS) for up to fifty years; nearly sixteen tons at the time but later reduced to about twelve tons. Less than a ton of surplus plutonium has since been removed from the site.
Controversy over the storage decision began in 2002, and eventually resulted in the $600 million settlement between the federal government and the State of South Carolina in August 2020. That settlement requires DOE/NNSA to remove 9.5 metric tons from SRS by 2037. If the recent rate of transfer of plutonium waste from SRS to WIPP continues, that task will not be completed until well after 2040.
In the meantime, more than forty additional tons could be imported into South Carolina, stored, and then processed into waste over the next three to four decades. Several more tons of non-surplus plutonium is scheduled to be transported to SRS for the job of producing new plutonium pits for the weapons arsenal.
The Final SPDEIS nearly mirrors the Draft SPDEIS released in January 2023; summarized in Feds Propose 27 More Tons of Plutonium for Processing at Savannah River Site. The preferred alternative and associated sub-alternatives remains the same: Use some combination of capabilities at SRS and Los Alamos to convert upwards of 34 metric tons (MT) of surplus military grade plutonium to plutonium oxide powder, dilute the plutonium into a less easily retrievable waste form, and dispose of that waste in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).
The proposed action (Figure 1) does not commit to a specific plan. SRS could be assigned the whole job, part of the job, or very little of the job.
Since January 2023, sixteen changes were made to the nearly one-thousand-page record, in response to 121 written comments submitted during the two month public comment period, and 53 oral comments made during three in-person public meetings and one Zoom call. The public comment process was incredibly subdued in comparison to the competitive spirit between weapons communities in the late 1990s; when thousands of comments were submitted, hundreds spoke at public hearings, and Senator Strom Thurmond described weapons workers in Texas as “amateurs.” (Comments and responses are contained in Volume III of the SPDEIS.)
Three of the submitted comments were from the South Carolina Congressional Delegation, Governor Henry McMaster, and Attorney General Alan Wilson.
The comments and concerns from our elected representatives had several contradictory themes:
- An obsession with long-term plutonium storage, but a near absence of concern about the most pivotal aspect of the program—the future availability of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal of the final plutonium wastes produced at SRS (most likely) or LANL (least likely).
- Skepticism to outright hostility towards DOE/NNSA, but strong support for the DOE’s Savannah River Site and its contract workforce.
- Support for the more dangerous task of importing and processing more than forty tons of plutonium at SRS, but opposition to the more benign task of long-term storage. This is in keeping with the nearly decade-old tradition of South Carolina political leaders of welcoming plutonium into the state, but terming above-ground, long-term plutonium storage as “plutonium dumping.”
DOE/NNSA’s responses to the comments from SC elected officials were uniformly finalized as:
“These comments did not result in a modification in the Final EIS.”
The most strident comments (Figure 2) were made by Attorney General Wilson, which included, in bold type, that:
“DOE/NNSA has an appalling record of not following through on its promises or projects. Its project management is abysmal, and South Carolina’s pessimism of DOE/NNA’s ability to implement any proposed alternative is well earned.”
Wilson also wrote that, “DOE/NNNSA must be committed to removing the weapons grade plutonium on a schedule that ensures that South Carolina is not the dumping ground for such plutonium.” DOE/NNSA did not commit to any schedule, and Wilson’s comments “did not result in a modification to the Final EIS.”
Wilson’s most harsh comment was lumped into the response category of “General Opposition to SPDP and NNSA/DOE.” In other words, AG Wilson’s comments were not well accepted by the federal government.
Such objections in the past have resulted in thinly veiled threats from NNSA. In 2018, a State of South Carolina lawsuit led by Wilson that opposed NNSA’s decision to terminate the MOX program resulted in the prospect to move tritium production operations from SRS:
“In light of this injunction, NNSA must reevaluate the viability to execute enduring missions at the Savannah River Site.”
Comments from the Governor’s office were more tactful. Governor McMaster wrote that his support for decades of more plutonium processing at SRS should “not be construed as support for long-term storage of surplus plutonium in South Carolina.” Because of his concern that “South Carolina not become a permanent plutonium repository,” McMaster asked NNSA to “conduct regular, direct, and detailed briefings with me and members of my staff.” (Page 229 of comments)
To this request, the DOE/NNSA merely responded that “NNSA has committed to periodic briefings on progress toward meeting the removal commitment to the Governor and the Attorney General of South Carolina.”
Of course, the Governor’s comments “did not result in a modification in the Final EIS.”
The Congressional Delegation’s joint letter was the least combative and most diplomatic, stating only that “NNSA does not have the greatest track-record with the State regarding a follow-through on commitments.” The delegation also asked for updates, continued operation of WIPP, compliance with legal obligations, and “maximum possible transparency;” while stating “ we are not supportive of long-term storage of surplus plutonium storage in South Carolina.” (Page 223).
Overall, DOE/NNSA issued platitudes to South Carolina’s highest elected officials, committed only to a minimal level of compliance and token updates on its progress, and refused to set a hard schedule for removal of plutonium. Again, there were no modifications of the Final EIS as a result of the delegation’s concerns.
DOE/NNSA’s responses are to be expected when, on the one hand, political leaders express full support for Savannah River Site, its corporate contractors, and the prospect of importing and processing more than forty additional tons of plutonium (Figure 3) into South Carolina; while on the other hand expressing distrust in the same federal cabinet agency that owns and oversees the Savannah River Site to merely store the material during the same time period.
Footnotes
(1) Regarding the DOE/NNSA response methodology.
In the past, DOE printed individual comments with responses on an opposing column on the same page. Concerned parties who took the time to comment on matters affecting their communities and their constituents could see responses to their concerns without exerting any additional effort.
In Volume III of the Final SPDEIS, DOE employed a torturous response method. The agency’s contractor first sorted all comments into nearly thirty categories. These were followed by the actual comments. Determining DOE’s response to individual comments requires the concerned party to backtrack to the category of concern. For example, Attorney General Wilson would have to refer
For example, to determine DOE’s response to comments by Attorney General Alan Wilson published on page 255 of the comment section, the AG’s office would have to backtrack to five different response groupings on five separate pages.
The system is symbolic of the general attitude of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Agency; that “you the people” work for “us the government.”
(2) The plan does not involve changing the isotopic composition for the plutonium to make it less attractive for re-use in the nation’s nuclear arsenal.
