Tag Archives: Plutonium

“Plutonium is not for Amateurs.” Part 2:

Offsite Insight 2023-2: What will the Chamber of Commerce say after $Billions in SRS worker claims?

by Don Moniak

January 19, 2023

The lively plutonium (Pu) disposition debates in the 1990’s, which at one point included Senator Strom Thurmond describing Texas nuclear weapons workers as “amateurs,” were very different from today’s muted discourse. The most dramatic change might be the quiet acceptance that hundreds of thousands of nuclear weapons workers, uranium miners, and nuclear testing downwinders suffered harm during the Cold War, when safety was often secondary to production. A second change in South Carolina involves an erosion of public trust in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) among its strongest supporters.

In the early 1990’s, more than fifty tons of military plutonium resulting from the end of Cold War plutonium production, coupled with the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons under the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), was declared surplus to national security needs. An international effort to dispose of excess plutonium to prevent it from being used in future nuclear weaponry coalesced in both the U.S. and Russia in the early 1990’s. The debate over how to pursue disposition was long and contentious, and has remerged following decades of failed and stalled efforts.

While the surplus weapons plutonium was viewed as a threat by nuclear nonproliferation advocates, it was also viewed as an economic opportunity by communities in the shadows of some traditional nuclear weapons production industrial sites like the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, the Pantex Plant in Texas, and the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory in Idaho. In Carlsbad, New Mexico, the prospect of jobs for disposing the tremendous volumes of plutonium-contaminated Cold War waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) created a new community ally for Department of Energy (DOE) disposition schemes.

Prior to disposition, surplus plutonium needed to be stored. In the Central Savannah River Area (CSRA), SRS community boosters accepted the proposal to centralize surplus plutonium storage for up to fifty years at the site. But the local expectation in exchange for this acceptance of mere storage included operational jobs, mostly in the form of a plutonium fuel production plant that would convert the excess plutonium into commercial fuel for nuclear power plants.

This form of plutonium fuel is called Mixed Oxide fuel, or MOX, because it mixed plutonium and uranium oxides. In the 1990’s and through the early 2010’s, MOX was viewed as a “sword to plowshares” program by the Atoms For Peace lobby that began in the early 1950’s.

The Pu/MOX fuel plant was one of many promised by the Department of Energy (DOE), and SRS boosters wanted the whole package. In addition to the MOX fuel plant, which was most coveted, DOE dangled three other facilities in its plutonium storage and processing bonanza package:

  • An Actinide Packaging and Stabilization Facility (APSF) to store non-pit plutonium including metals, alloys, and powders; and provide a means of stabilization if necessary.
  • A Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) that would dilute the plutonium with inert materials and isolate it within the massive stainless steel canisters of glassified waste at SRS’s Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). The glassified, or vitrified, waste at DWPF is the end product from the conversion of unstable, highly radioactive sludge contained in dozens of underground, million gallon waste tanks housing decades of waste generated by plutonium production.
  • A Plutonium Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) to disassemble sealed plutonium pits, separate the classified pit parts, and convert the plutonium within to an declassified, powdered oxide form.

    Across the CSRA, every local government body issued resolutions in support of plutonium missions at SRS. Rallies were held and mail-in post card campaigns drew thousands of participants. Some regional opposition to these 21st century plutonium central proposals existed in distant environs such as Columbia, Savannah, and Atlanta, but local dissent was largely viewed and treated as heresy.

    Local Chambers of Commerce predictably joined forces to issue a unified message in support of SRS, and other groups ranging from the local NAACP to the North Augusta City Council followed their lead and endorsed identical resolutions. Within their resolutions endorsing “major plutonium missions for the Savannah River Site,” the Aiken and North Augusta Chambers of Commerce included one statement that is unlikely to be repeated today:

    “…the Savannah River Site has produced approximately 40 percent of all the US weapons grade plutonium over the last 45 years and has safety handle plutonium in glovebox processing equipment with no adverse impact on workers, the public, or the environment.”
1998 Aiken Chamber of Commerce resolution in support of plutonium work at Savannah River Site.. Identical resolutions were adopted by the North Augusta Chamber of Commerce, Aiken Chapter of the NAACP, Aiken County Council on Technical Education, Barnwell County Council, the Lower Savannah Council of Industry, North Augusta City Council, and the Savannah River Regional Diversification Initiative


Whereas comments of support from U.S. Senators Strom Thurmond and Fritz Hollings and Aiken County Council cited a the history of “safe” plutonium operations at SRS—without every defining “safe”—the Chamber of Commerce resolution took the further step of claiming no harm to workers, people outside the gates, or our environment.

Much has changed since 1998. CSRA communities and the State of South Carolina became increasingly wary of DOE’s plans after the cancellation of the APSF (2000), the PIP (2002), the PDCF (2007), and finally the treasured MOX plant (2018). Instead of modern buildings, SRS was left with operational facilities that are now nearly seventy years old, and an unfinished plutonium/MOX fuel plant.

DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which took over the management of the remaining nuclear weapons program at the turn of the century, salvaged much of the lost goodwill by promising to convert the unfinished plutonium/MOX plant into a new plutonium pit production facility. The plan is to make 50 new plutonium pits per year, mostly for new nuclear weapon designs, even as DOE/NNSA proposes to discard ~500 pits per year for the next twenty years.

Even with the prospect of pit production, the loss of the MOX plant was the last straw at the Capitol, and the loss of production work soured the taste of top officials for the relatively benign mission of long-term plutonium storage. As described in SRS CAB Might Stop Snubbing Barnwell and Allendale Counties, in the years of litigation and lobbying that resulted in the the state’s $600 million plutonium settlement with DOE, politicians who rarely uttered a negative word about SRS suddenly expressed trepidations about the prospects of becoming a “plutonium dump.”

In pursuit of the largest slice of the plutonium settlement pie, the Aiken Municipal Development Commission, which included Aiken Chamber of Commerce President David Jameson, sent letters to the Aiken state legislative delegation suggesting there was harm done from seventy years of special nuclear materials work at SRS:

There is no debate that due to 70 years of SRS operations, Aiken County and the City of Aiken share the greatest impact and risk in South Carolina. Aiken County serves as the home of virtually all the 35 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste which is a result of the production of nuclear materials such as plutonium. The liquid waste is stored in large carbon steel tanks and serves as the State of South Carolina’s #1 environnmental risk and will impact our community for decades.”

This statement provides a sharp contrast in perspectives in the two decades since local Chambers and their allies claimed no harm—a false claim DOE and its SRS contractors chose not to dispute. But it pales in comparison to the second change since 1998: the steady cascade of worker illness claims following the passage of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) in 2000. The act was passed to:

Compensate current or former employees (or their survivors) of the Department of Energy (DOE), its predecessor agencies, and certain of its vendors, contractors and subcontractors, who were diagnosed with a radiogenic cancer, chronic beryllium disease, beryllium sensitivity, or chronic silicosis, as a result of exposure to radiation, beryllium, or silica while employed at covered facilities.

The compensation act created new sub-bureaucracies within the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services to handle the flood of claims from former workers from across the former and current nuclear weapons complex, including SRS workers. To help navigate the bureaucracy and the complexities of radiation and toxic substance dose reconstruction, a cottage industry of health care providers emerged that promised assistance for former workers whose illnesses qualified for the program, and law firms followed suit.

The nuclear weapons workers health care companies advertise on local television stations and send out mass mailings to former employees. Some companies even set up not for profit organizations to complement their efforts, such as the now ubiquitious Cold War Patriots.

Cover for a publication from Nuclear Care Partners http://nuclearcarepartners.com, an EEOICPA specialist firm.



Since the passage of the compensation program, former SRS workers have been awarded nearly two billion dollars in claims involving more than 20,000 cases and 12, 385 workers:

As of 01/08/2023, the total compensation paid under Parts B and E of the EEOICPA, including medical compensation, for workers suffering from the effects of having worked at the Savannah River Site is $1,913,612,814. “ (Stephens and Stephens law firm, citing Department of Labor statistics).

Department of Labor statistics for SRS compensation claims under EEOICPA.


While the nuclear weapons worker compensation program created a new business opportunity in former and current nuclear weapons complex communities, the proclamation of “no harm” by the local Chambers of Commerce was known to be false at the time.

While not well publicized, SRS and other plutonium sites medically treated workers who inhaled plutonium with a chelating agent known as Diethylene Pentacetate (DTPA). According to a 1980’s DuPont medical department pamphlet, between 1965 and 1985 “more than 235 people received more than 650 doses of DTPA” at SRS, then known as Savannah River Plant (SRP).

Savannah River Plant medical department pamphlet, circa 1985.


In other words, people were harmed on the job and had to seek medical treatment. Strom Thurmond was right when he stated, “plutonium is not a material to be handled by amateurs,” but wrong to have implied Pantex weapons workers were amateurs. Two days after the uproar in Amarillo over his comments, Senator Thurmond’s office sent a letter to SRS Manager Greg Rudy that left out the “amateurs” charge:

Plutonium is far too volatile a material to be handled by individuals or facilities that have no experience in dealing with it.”

August 13, 1998 letter. Red block shows change in language from June 23, 1998 letter.


The local Chambers of Commerce never admitted how wrong their assertion of “no harm” was. What will the Chambers say this time as SRS is back on the docket for a proposal to import another 25-35 tons of plutonium for processing into a diluted waste.

Plutonium is Not For Amateurs.” Part I.

————————————————————————————————————

*Disclosure : Don Moniak was a paid organizer, writer, and researcher from 1997 to 2003 for two non governmental organizations working on the plutonium disposition issue:
Serious Texans Against Nuclear Dumping, Amarillo, Texas (1997-2000); and Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (2000-2003).












“Plutonium is Not For Amateurs” Pt 1.

Offsite Insights 2023-1:
Revisiting the 1998 plutonium pit debate and the day Senator Strom Thurmond insulted nuclear weapon workers in Texas.

by Don Moniak

January 18, 2023

For the first time in nearly twenty-five years, the U.S. Department of Energy is holding hearings to discuss the future of more than 12,000 “surplus” plutonium “pits” that remain in storage at the 18,000 acre Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant near Amarillo, Texas. (1).

Plutonium pits form the primary nuclear explosives in the the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Pits are complex, sealed pressure vessels designed to withstand hundreds of pounds per square inch of gaseous pressures without explosive tritium booster gas leaking. Within beryllium, stainless steel, aluminium, or vanadium cladding is a nested shell of materials, most notably a generally spherical, hollow ring of one to six kilograms of military grade plutonium in a subcritical configuration.

The term “pit” is a wry, Cold War term given to the sealed core of the primary nuclear explosive that is surrounded by carefully machined high explosive spheres, which, when detonated, cause the plutonium to compress, implode, go critical, and trigger a nuclear detonation. Early weapon designers compared the pit to the dry core of a fleshy fruit, as if their creations were living things providing vital sustenance.

The last time the future of surplus pits was under discussion, the Department of Energy had set off a contentious debate between two of its remaining nuclear weapons sites, the 18,000-acre Pantex plant on the open prairie of the Texas Panhandle, and the 200,000-acre Savannah River Site (SRS) hidden within extensive forestland in Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale Counties, South Carolina. At stake were hundreds of operational jobs in a plutonium pit disassembly and conversion (PDCF) facility, and thousands of construction jobs preceding operation. Also at stake was the prospect of more radioactive, toxic waste generation and environmental contamination.

It was in this context that long-time South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond set off a tempest by describing Pantex workers as “amateurs.” On June 23, 1998, Thurmond’s office released a press release in which the Senator stated the obvious:

Plutonium is not a material to be handled by amateurs.”

Part of a Press Release from the office of Senator Strom Thurmond, June 23, 1998.


The “amateurs” statement was a clear reference to the Pantex plant, where plutonium had only been handled in “pit” form—sealed containers containing plutonium-gallium alloy designed for both malleability and long term stability. Pantex had handled plutonium in its most toxic and difficult powder form only in the case of a rare accident involving a cracked pit.

The statement was also made in the context that it was unwise to introduce plutonium processing to a facility with no plutonium processing infrastructure, expertise, or existing plutonium contamination, but that nuance was lost. Pantex workers heard “amateurs” and responded as expected, with righteous anger.

To say that Pantex weapon workers were no strangers to dangerous operations is a grave understatement. Pantex is the nation’s only nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly site, and also is the primary production site for the high explosives (HE) used in the arsenal. In 1977 an accidental detonation of HE killed three workers, an explosion that also catalyzed another round of scientific research and development into less sensitive HE.

Workers who disassembled and assembled nuclear warheads are responsible for separating or joining—or “mating”—the high explosives and the pit. This is considered the only procedure during nuclear weapons production or disarmament involving the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation—even if the risk was remote. The work is conducted in clean rooms in groups of three, one worker reading procedures and the other two workers methodically carrying the the instructions.

More probable is an accidental detonation of high explosives that would scatter radioactive debris. For this reason weapons assembly and disassembly work is conducted in massive, domed, “gravel gerties” designed to collapse if the explosion involved more than 106 pounds of high explosive and thus contain much of the dispersal of radioactive materials—-a design that meant workers would be buried alive under even if they somehow survived the explosion.

Gravel Gerties at Pantex. From Department of Energy files.
DOE file photo of nuclear weapon disassembly work at Pantex. A small electrostatic discharge during a disassembly operation in 1989 activated a tritium canister part, resulting in a release of 40,000 curies of tritium that harmed three workers and compelled DOE to shut the facility.


Pantex workers learned of Thurmond’s contemptuous barb in the days before a scheduled plutonium disposition hearing in Amarillo. On the day of the hearing, August 11, 1998, workers set up a booth where hastily made picket signs and cheap plastic buttons saying “Site PDCF at Pantex” were distributed. The table contained two handouts—a pro-Pantex letter from Amarillo Chamber of Commerce President Gary Mohlberg and the news release from Strom Thurmond’s office.

Normally more reserved, Pantex workers dominated the hearing that day, waving picket signs like it was a political convention, and taking turns at the podium. It was unlike anything ever before seen in Amarillo, all courtesy of The Department of Energy’s cynical strategy of pitting nuclear weapons production communities against each other over jobs; as well as Strom Thurmond’s fierce defense of the Savannah River Site, which received his legislative largesse for more than four decades.

Ultimately, the job of Pit Disassembly and Conversion went to SRS, as expected. But the prize was short-lived. The PDCF never progressed past the early design stage, and the pits continued to pile up at Pantex, to be stored in World War Two bunkers with little or no temperature or humidity controls.

The pits remain at Pantex, having aged another twenty five years. Pantex will only be involved in this disposition debate if no action is taken and more prolonged plutonium pit storage is required.

This time around, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, the “semi-autonomous” sub-agency which began controlling DOE”s downsized nuclear weapons production complex in 2002, has admitted that, at one-tenth the size of SRS and lacking in waste management infrastructure, Pantex is a poor candidate for plutonium processing—-although NNSA has still not admitted that it is a bad idea to process plutonium within a half mile to a mile of productive farmland.


Next: “Plutonium is Not for Amateurs” Pt 2: What will the Chambers of Commerce say after $billions in SRS worker compensation claims?

(1) Announcement and Opportunity to Comment.



The Draft EIS, Federal Register Notice, meeting materials, and listing of public comment opportunities is at https://www.energy.gov/nepa/doeeis-0549-surplus-plutonium-disposition-program


Feds Propose ~27 to 34 More Tons of Plutonium for Processing at Savannah River Site

Texas to New Mexico to South Carolina to New Mexico is Proposed Pathway for Remaining Surplus Plutonium.

by Don Moniak

December 16, 2022

Plutonium-239 is a man-made radioactive element that is acutely deadly at the scale of milligrams, chronically toxic at the scale of micrograms, decays into more intensely radioactive elements and isotopes, and is useable in nuclear explosives of mass destruction at the scale of kilograms. It has been described as “a physicist’s dream and an engineer’s nightmare.”

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS, formerly Savannah River Plant) produced an estimated 36 tons of the material from the 1950’s to late 1980’s for the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Processing of the resulting unstable, radioactive liquid waste into a relatively stable form has been ongoing since the 1990’s and is expected to continue into the 2040’s. When production ceased in 1990, two tons of plutonium remained in storage, of which approximately 1.5 tons was eventually declared surplus.

Today there is an estimated 11.0 to 11.5 tons of plutonium presently stored at the site, which encompasses parts of Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale counties in South Carolina. Of this total, 9.5 tons was transferred from other nuclear weapons material and parts production sites—most notably Rocky Flats, Hanford, and Los Alamos—following DOE’s 1997 decision to centralize storage of weapons plutonium.

Two years ago the State of South Carolina reached a $600 million settlement with the federal government over the 9.5 tons of military-grade, surplus plutonium transferred to SRS. Today, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administriation (NNSA) published a proposal to ship upwards of 27 additional tons of surplus military-grade plutonium to SRS for processing into a waste form through a process called “dilute and dispose”(1).

The proposal was revealed today in a Federal Register notice announcing a sixty-day public comment period for the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (SPDP EIS). The impact statement is the latest National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) document addressing the future of 34 metric tonnes (MT) (2) of plutonium that has been deemed surplus to U.S. defense needs since the early 1990s.

The basic dichotomy for the surplus plutonium begins with:

a. relatively “clean” and pure plutonium within nuclear explosive components known as “pits.” There were presently an estimated 14,000 plutonium pits stored at DOE/NNSA’s Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant near Amarillo, Texas; of which approximately 10,000 are deemed surplus and 4,000 are “strategic reserve.” Each pit averages There is ~3 kg of plutonium.

b. plutonium not within pits, with highly variable purity levels, most of which is now stored at SRS.

The exact figures for each category are distorted and confused by classification methods, as DOE/NNSA has never revealed precise quantities contained in pit plutonium. However, since the 1990’s the general accepted total of surplus plutonium metal contained in pit form is approximately 25-27 tons.

From: Plutonium, the Last Five Years, Part 2. The two categories to the right constitute the 34 tons currently being analyzed.



Since the 1990’s military nuclear weapons complex agencies have conducted multiple environmental impact statements. Efforts to convert 34 metric tonnes of military plutonium into either a waste form or into commercial, mixed-oxide (Pu/MOX) nuclear fuel moved forward, then faltered, and finally failed by 2018, eventually leading to the plutonium settlement between DOE and South Carolina. Less than one ton of the higher purity plutonium constituting the surplus stockpile has been converted to a waste form in twenty-five years, and an estimated quarter-ton was processed in the past year.

The Department of Energy has been shuffling disposition options for surplus, non-pit plutonium since the mid 1990’s.  As Ed Lyman reported in his definitive report of DOE/NNSA’s programmatic failures, Surplus Plutonium Disposition: The Failure of MOX and the Promise of Its Alternatives, DOE/NNSA changed its treatment preferences for 13.1 tons of non-pit surplus plutonium eight times in a thirteen year period. The chronic indecision was a contributing factor to the huge cost overruns that helped to end the Pu/MOX fuel fabrication alternative. 

The shifting plans for surplus, non-pit plutonium. From: The Failure of MOX and the Promise of its Alternatives,

After abandoning efforts to convert military plutonium designed for use as nuclear explosives into Pu/MOX fuel, weapons complex agencies moved forward with a disposition method known as “dilute and dispose.” Simply put, “dilute and dispose” involves mixing very small amounts of plutonium (1-3%) with large amounts of a classified mix of materials to create a waste form for permanent disposal.

The only disposal site in the U.S. approved to accept this waste is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Southeastern New Mexico. There remains intense opposition to importing any more plutonium-laden waste into the state than what was originally planned during its design and approval stages in the 1990’s.

In today’s announcement, the NNSA stated its preferred alternative is to pursue the “dilute and dispose strategy for 34 MT of surplus plutonium,” a process involving several steps for plutonium not already at SRS:

  • Ship up to 27 tons (3) of plutonium from the Pantex nuclear weapons plant in the Texas Panhandle to the Los Alamos National Laboratory near Sante Fe, New Mexico. 
  • Disassemble plutonium pits, separate the plutonium from other parts (4) and convert the plutonium metal within to  plutonium oxide powder.
  • Ship the plutonium oxide powder to Savannah River Site near Aiken and Barnwell, South Carolina for dilution into a waste form. 
  • Ship the waste to the WIPP near Carlsbad, New Mexico for disposal. 

    Three alternatives to the preferred alternative are:

  • Ship plutonium pits to SRS for disassembly and conversion of the plutonium metal to plutonium oxide powder, followed by the dilute and disposal pathway.  This option probably ties in with the proposed new plutonium pit fabrication plant at SRS.
  • Perform the dilute and disposal pathway at Los Alamos and keep the entire process in New Mexico. 
  • The No-Action alternative, which would leave the plutonium pits in long term storage and avoid unnecessary shipping, processing, and increased plutonium waste dumping at WIPP. 

Not included among the alternatives is the option of demilitarizing plutonium pits by “stuffing” them with inert materials, a proposal first floated in the late 1990’s. Plutonium pits are designed for long-term storage in the nuclear warhead, and can remain stored without expensive shipment and processing.

After years of South Carolina officials declaring that the state could become a permanent plutonium dumping ground, the state is now facing the renewed prospect of SRS processing three times the plutonium presently stored onsite and awaiting dilution and repackaging; as well as fabricating 80 or more new plutonium pits for new nuclear weapon designs at a plutonium pit production plant being designed for production beginning in the early 2030’s.

As reported in Offsite Insight 2022-1, nuclear watchdog Tom Clements informed the SRS Citizen’s Advisory Board about this prospect at their July, 2022, meeting, at which he distinguished between the plutonium already at SRS and the plutonium potentially headed there:

The number was given as 9.5 MT in the agreement with the state. But there is 11.5 ton onsite because 2.0 tons were already there. But the amount of plutonium to be disposed of is up to 34 tons….We are looking at a tremendous amount of plutonium coming into the site. The CAB will have a very important role in insuring more material is not stranded here.” 

Next story: “Plutonium is Not for Amateurs, Part I.”

Residents in the Central Savannah River Area (CSRA) that surrounds the Savannah River Site have the opportunity to comment on the latest proposal either in person or in writing. DOE/NNSA will hold a public meeting upriver from SRS at North Augusta City Hall, 100 Georgia Avenue, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on January 19, 2023. A virtual hearing will be held on January 30, 2023, and comments may be submitted to SPDP-EIS@nnsa.doe.gov.

The Draft EIS, Federal Register Notice, meeting materials, and listing of public comment opportunities is at https://www.energy.gov/nepa/doeeis-0549-surplus-plutonium-disposition-program

and the Draft EIS is at:

https://www.energy.gov/nepa/articles/doeeis-0549-draft-environmental-impact-statement-december-2022


Footnotes

(1) Information regarding the program can be found at:

Presentation material for 3013 Cans and K Area Storage and Processing:

Click to access DOE3013ContainerProgram.pdf

Click to access StorageandDownblend.pdf

A DOE presentation to the National Academy of Sciences in 2018 provides more details: 

Click to access McAlhany-SurplusPuDisp_Jun2018.pdf

(2) A metric ton is 1,000 kilograms, equal to 2200 pounds or 1.1 tons.

(3) The DOE/NNSA announcement states that up to 34 MT could be shipped from Pantex, but no documentation exists suggesting there is 34 MT of surplus plutonium within pits, and Pantex presently stores less than one ton of plutonium not within pits. The EIS will, however, analyze the movement of 34 tons from Pantex.

(4) Highly Enriched Uranium within plutonium pits will also be separated and shipped to the Y-12 nuclear weapons material plant near Oak Ridge, Tennessee.




SRS Watch News Release: October 27, 2022: Delay at SRS Plutonium Bomb Plant

The watchdog organization Savannah River Site Watch issued the following news release today detailing the status of the proposed Plutonium Pit Fabrication Plant at the Savannah River Site, located south of Aiken, SC and west of Barnwell, SC. Plutonium pits are nuclear weapon components composed of machined plutonium and other essential parts; and form the core of the primary nuclear explosive in advanced modern weapons. They are surrounded by high explosives and function to trigger the nuclear blast in most nuclear explosives.

DOE Official Reveals Costly 6-Month Delay in Proposed SRS Plutonium Bomb Plant (PBP); As Russia, U.S. Threaten Nuclear War $11.5 Billion Pit Plant Key to New U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Irresponsible Planning for Full-Scale Nuclear War

For Immediate Release
October 27, 2022
Contact: Tom Clements, srswatch@gmail.com, tel. 803-834-3084

DOE Official Heightens Concerns about Controversial Plutonium Bomb Plant at Savannah River Site by Admitting an Additional 6-Month Delay in the Project; Cost Could Jump $375 Million, to $11.5 Billion

As Russia and the U.S. Recklessly Flirt with Nuclear War, the Plutonium “Pit” Facility in South Carolina Would Play Key Role in New Nuclear Weapons Integral to Planning for Nuclear War

Full SRS Watch news release:   news pit plant delay Oct 27 2022 SRS Watch

Offsite Insights (2022:1)

by Don Moniak

July 28, 2022 (Updated November 5, 2022).

SRS Annually Converting Approximately 1/5 of a metric ton of Plutonium into a Waste Form. 

DOE’s Rhetorical Duck and Cover Surrounding Savannah River Site Plutonium

Who is trying to keep more radioactive waste out of South Carolina? (hint: it is not Attorney General Alan Wilson)

July 26, 2022: Hilton Double Tree Hotel; Augusta, Georgia.

Citizen: “How much weapon grade plutonium is being downgraded and how many shifts are working on a regular basis?” 

Government contractor: “I wont get into specifics but it is at magnitude of one hundred 3013 cans a year.” 

The government contractor did not offer a “cans to kilograms” conversion. 

The question was posed by citizen representative Narinda P.S. Malik, a retired former environmental compliance and quality assurance worker at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The answer was provided by Lee Sims, the “K-Area Complex Facility Manager.” K-Area is where plutonium is stored in thirty pound stainless steel “3013” containers, within larger four hundred pound “9975” shipping containers, which are stacked on pallets three high within Building 105-K in the former K Nuclear Reactor, several miles from the Savannah River. 

Click image for larger view

In short, the approximately 11.5 tons of plutonium stored there is very gradually being converted to a waste form in a process called “Dilute and Dispose.” Plutonium is taken out of the 3013 cans; and anywhere from 175 to 400 grams is mixed with an “adulterant” containing a classified mix of materials, and placed into a “critical container overpack (COC). The COC’s are then stored pending shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Southeast New Mexico, where it is scheduled, barring preventative litigation, to be entombed in deep salt caverns over the objections of most New Mexican citizens. (1)

A 3013 can is the container holding plutonium (Pu) metal or oxide powder. There is an approximate average range of 3.0 to 3.5 kilograms (kg) of Pu in each can. At a rate of 100 cans per year, the amount of plutonium is approximately 300 to 350 kg a year, or about one-third of a metric ton. The first plutonium based nuclear explosives reportedly involved six kilograms of Pu. Today, only one kilogram of Pu is necessary for use in a nuclear explosive of mass destruction, although the general usage in modern weapons is three to five kg. 

{Correction: On August 11, 2022, DOE Director of External Affairs provided this new information:

Per our subject matter experts, we are working to reach steady state in the existing glovebox which we believe could be up to 500 Kg/year of plutonium. Currently throughput is around 100 3013s/year but continues to increase. The 3013 plutonium content varies as presented in the CAB meeting depending on the source of the material.  We are processing a mixture of Fuels Grade and Weapons Grade material, and as such, the answer on a KG basis of Weapons Grade Pu is variable.  The average for a 3013 stored in K-area presented in the email is incorrect.  The average 3013 plutonium content in K-Area is 2.1 Kg.”

So a more correct answer to Mr. Malik’s question would be: “about 300 to 350 kilograms a year, or one-third of a ton.” 

[Correction. The updated estimate is 210 kilograms, or 0.21 metric tons; or 0.23 U.S. tons).

DOE’s Rhetorical Duck and Cover Surrounding Savannah River Site 

This question and answer exchange typified the dialogue held in a spacious conference room at the Hilton Double Tree Hotel in West Augusta, GA.  The Hilton Double Tree is more than twenty miles upriver and upwind from the sprawling nuclear weapons materials production complex formerly known as the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Plant,, and referred to as the Savannah River Site (SRS) since 1990.(2)

July 2022 SRS CAB Board Meeting held in the Grand Ballroom of the Hilton Double Tree Inn in Augusta, GA

The federal government was represented by the DOE-SRS’ Environmental Management (EM) office and its primary contractors (3). DOE is one of the bureaucratic descendants of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which had a long tradition of manipulating public perceptions with evasive, fuzzy answers to even the most pointed questions, a tradition continued to this day. 

Citizens were represented by the Savannah River Site (SRS) Citizens Advisory Board (CAB or Board), an official federal advisory committee formed in the 1990s during a short-lived period of government “openness.” According to its mission statement, the SRS CAB “will provide” the DOE’s Assistant EM Secretary with “information, advice, and recommendations concerning issues affecting the EM program at SRS.” 

Click image for larger view

Board meetings are dominated by presentations from DOE or its contractors. Each presentation is followed by a question and answer session, during which public questions and comments are now prohibited. However, citizens not seated on the CAB are actually encouraged to speak with with officials outside the meeting room, meaning the Board does not receive the benefit of answers to public inquiries. Only DOE, its contractors, or state or federal regulators can answer questions. 

Unless it seeks information from another source, the Board must then use the contractor provided information to forward any advice and recommendations; which DOE can then accept or reject (3). 

Candor was in even shorter supply during two presentations regarding storage and processing of 9.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium “surplus” to U.S. military needs. This plutonium was shipped to SRS in the early 2000’s from various DOE nuclear explosives materials and parts production sites within its vast nuclear explosives and weapons production complex. 

The Board has no authority to address the nuclear materials production and management side managed by DOE’s highly secretive National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). NNSA officials are notoriously tight-lipped and, while certainly present, have minimal participation in CAB dialogue. So plutonium issues are and will be plagued by guarded discussions far more reminiscent of Cold War days than post Cold War “openness.” 

The Board was informed that 5.5 MT of Pu is controlled by the NNSA and 4.0 MT is controlled by EM. Therefore, the Board could be privy to discussions about the future of storage and processing of surplus plutonium at SRS, but not to discussion involving production of new nuclear explosive parts called “plutonium pits.” 

The 9.5 MT of plutonium is the amount to be removed from SRS by 2037 under the terms of an August 31, 2020 legal settlement between the State of South Carolina (the State) and the DOE (4). The highlight of the settlement was a $600,000,000 (six hundred million) payment to the State, to be divided up in any manner proscribed by the state’s legislature. The root cause of the settlement is DOE’s history of misinformation and bait and switch tactics that ultimately led to, in the words of the SC Attorney General’s office:

The highly contentious a battle that involved multiple federal and state administrations and threatened to paralyze the country’s (nuclear weapons) industrial complex and pit the state against the federal government for decades.” (“Nuclear weapons” added for clarity, since the overall military industrial complex as well as general industry was not threatened in any way by the battle over plutonium storage and disposition.) 

This battle also led the state’s top elected officials to increasingly (and cynically) portray South Carolina as a plutonium dumping ground—a term first coined in 2002 by former Governor Jim Hodges. Although above ground plutonium storage within robust, sealed containers within hardened nuclear facilities was approved for up to 50 years at SRS in a legal 1997 DOE record of decision (ROD), Attorney General Alan Wilson stated: 

This settlement is the single largest settlement in South Carolina’s history. It is important to me that the people of South Carolina know of our long-term commitment to preventing South Carolina from becoming a dumping ground for nuclear waste”

Who is trying to keep more radioactive waste out of South Carolina? (hint: it is not Attorney General Alan Wilson)

In spite of the record six hundred million dollar payment and the threat of future litigation, DOE and its contractors continue to evade questions and refrain from offering any more information than it deems necessary. Neither the SC Attorney General’s Office or Governor was present at the meeting. It was not until the public comment period at 4 p.m., nearly two hours after the plutonium presentations, that citizen and long-time nuclear watchdog Tom Clements informed the Board about an issue in which they had been uninformed: 

The number was given as 9.5 MT in the agreement with the state. But there is 11.5 ton onsite because 2.0 tons were already there. But the amount of plutonium to be disposed of is up to 34 tons….We are looking at a tremendous amount of plutonium coming into the site. The CAB will have a very important role in insuring more material is not stranded here.” 

Tom Clements speaking at the July 26, 2022 CAB meeting

Even when a simple, direct question cutting to an essential safety and environmental matter is posed, DOE and its contractors offer a minimal of information. A prime example involved the exchange between Board member Kandace Cave, who also serves as Aiken County’s Keep Aiken County Beautiful program coordinator, and K-Area manager Lee Sims from the contractor Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Ms. Cave asked: 

Is there a difference in how you treat weapons grade plutonium versus other plutonium?” 

The question was in reference to the fact that of the 9.5 tons, “about 1/3 of the inventory contains fuel grade plutonium (higher radiation dose and heat load).” 

Mr. Sims answered: 

“We do have some of our higher dose material stored separately, but there is a mixture” of materials being processed.” 

Omitted from that partial answer was the presence of Americium-241, a radioactive decay product of Plutonium-241; which in turn is present at single digit percentages in militarily preferred “weapons-grade” plutonium, and in double digit percentages in weapons-usable, “fuel-grade” plutonium. Americium-241 is an intense gamma radiation emitter with a radioactive half-life of seventy five years and is considered one hundred times more toxic than plutonium-239. 

Click image for larger view

Weapons plutonium was routinely purified to eliminate americium, which of course produced stockpiles of it, some of which went into consumer products like smoke detectors as part of the nation’s “Atoms For Peace” program. Since plutonium decay has been allowed to run its course since 1990, Americium-241 levels in plutonium stored in weapons, and at DOE sites like SRS have steadily increased but still not peaked. 

There is no mention of Americium-241 in either of the two plutonium storage and processing handouts, no mention made during the presentations, and no mention made during an eight minute promotional You Tube video about K-Area shown to the Board. 

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Next Up in “Offsite Insights:” 

More Pu Duck and Cover

Keeping German Nuclear Waste Out of South Carolina

Barnwell and Allendale Counties: Downriver, Downwind, and Unfeasible for Public Meetings

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(1) Presentation material for 3013 Cans and K Area Storage and Processing: 

A DOE presentation to the National Academy of Sciences in 2018 provides more details: 

(2) The name changed when the DuPont corporation pulled up its stakes at the end of the Cold War after a nearly forty year run as the operating contractor, first for the AEC then for its successor the Department of Energy (DOE). Since the year 2000, the nuclear weapons branch of DOE has been ruled by the “semi-autonomous” National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). The NNSA certifies the reliability and safety of the nuclear weapons it delivers to Department of Defense. 

(3) The primary contractors at present are Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) and Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). 

(4) For more information on the SRS CAB and its mission, go to: 

https://cab.srs.gov/srs-cab.html

SRS CAB Board Meeting, Day 2, July 26, 2022

SRS CAB meeting second half July 26, 2022

SRS Promotional Video: K Area

(4) For more information on the Plutonium Settlement including links to the Settlement, see: