Category Archives: Savannah River Site

Feds Propose ~27 to 34 More Tons of Plutonium for Processing at Savannah River Site

Texas to New Mexico to South Carolina to New Mexico is Proposed Pathway for Remaining Surplus Plutonium.

by Don Moniak

December 16, 2022

Plutonium-239 is a man-made radioactive element that is acutely deadly at the scale of milligrams, chronically toxic at the scale of micrograms, decays into more intensely radioactive elements and isotopes, and is useable in nuclear explosives of mass destruction at the scale of kilograms. It has been described as “a physicist’s dream and an engineer’s nightmare.”

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS, formerly Savannah River Plant) produced an estimated 36 tons of the material from the 1950’s to late 1980’s for the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Processing of the resulting unstable, radioactive liquid waste into a relatively stable form has been ongoing since the 1990’s and is expected to continue into the 2040’s. When production ceased in 1990, two tons of plutonium remained in storage, of which approximately 1.5 tons was eventually declared surplus.

Today there is an estimated 11.0 to 11.5 tons of plutonium presently stored at the site, which encompasses parts of Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale counties in South Carolina. Of this total, 9.5 tons was transferred from other nuclear weapons material and parts production sites—most notably Rocky Flats, Hanford, and Los Alamos—following DOE’s 1997 decision to centralize storage of weapons plutonium.

Two years ago the State of South Carolina reached a $600 million settlement with the federal government over the 9.5 tons of military-grade, surplus plutonium transferred to SRS. Today, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administriation (NNSA) published a proposal to ship upwards of 27 additional tons of surplus military-grade plutonium to SRS for processing into a waste form through a process called “dilute and dispose”(1).

The proposal was revealed today in a Federal Register notice announcing a sixty-day public comment period for the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (SPDP EIS). The impact statement is the latest National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) document addressing the future of 34 metric tonnes (MT) (2) of plutonium that has been deemed surplus to U.S. defense needs since the early 1990s.

The basic dichotomy for the surplus plutonium begins with:

a. relatively “clean” and pure plutonium within nuclear explosive components known as “pits.” There were presently an estimated 14,000 plutonium pits stored at DOE/NNSA’s Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant near Amarillo, Texas; of which approximately 10,000 are deemed surplus and 4,000 are “strategic reserve.” Each pit averages There is ~3 kg of plutonium.

b. plutonium not within pits, with highly variable purity levels, most of which is now stored at SRS.

The exact figures for each category are distorted and confused by classification methods, as DOE/NNSA has never revealed precise quantities contained in pit plutonium. However, since the 1990’s the general accepted total of surplus plutonium metal contained in pit form is approximately 25-27 tons.

From: Plutonium, the Last Five Years, Part 2. The two categories to the right constitute the 34 tons currently being analyzed.



Since the 1990’s military nuclear weapons complex agencies have conducted multiple environmental impact statements. Efforts to convert 34 metric tonnes of military plutonium into either a waste form or into commercial, mixed-oxide (Pu/MOX) nuclear fuel moved forward, then faltered, and finally failed by 2018, eventually leading to the plutonium settlement between DOE and South Carolina. Less than one ton of the higher purity plutonium constituting the surplus stockpile has been converted to a waste form in twenty-five years, and an estimated quarter-ton was processed in the past year.

The Department of Energy has been shuffling disposition options for surplus, non-pit plutonium since the mid 1990’s.  As Ed Lyman reported in his definitive report of DOE/NNSA’s programmatic failures, Surplus Plutonium Disposition: The Failure of MOX and the Promise of Its Alternatives, DOE/NNSA changed its treatment preferences for 13.1 tons of non-pit surplus plutonium eight times in a thirteen year period. The chronic indecision was a contributing factor to the huge cost overruns that helped to end the Pu/MOX fuel fabrication alternative. 

The shifting plans for surplus, non-pit plutonium. From: The Failure of MOX and the Promise of its Alternatives,

After abandoning efforts to convert military plutonium designed for use as nuclear explosives into Pu/MOX fuel, weapons complex agencies moved forward with a disposition method known as “dilute and dispose.” Simply put, “dilute and dispose” involves mixing very small amounts of plutonium (1-3%) with large amounts of a classified mix of materials to create a waste form for permanent disposal.

The only disposal site in the U.S. approved to accept this waste is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Southeastern New Mexico. There remains intense opposition to importing any more plutonium-laden waste into the state than what was originally planned during its design and approval stages in the 1990’s.

In today’s announcement, the NNSA stated its preferred alternative is to pursue the “dilute and dispose strategy for 34 MT of surplus plutonium,” a process involving several steps for plutonium not already at SRS:

  • Ship up to 27 tons (3) of plutonium from the Pantex nuclear weapons plant in the Texas Panhandle to the Los Alamos National Laboratory near Sante Fe, New Mexico. 
  • Disassemble plutonium pits, separate the plutonium from other parts (4) and convert the plutonium metal within to  plutonium oxide powder.
  • Ship the plutonium oxide powder to Savannah River Site near Aiken and Barnwell, South Carolina for dilution into a waste form. 
  • Ship the waste to the WIPP near Carlsbad, New Mexico for disposal. 

    Three alternatives to the preferred alternative are:

  • Ship plutonium pits to SRS for disassembly and conversion of the plutonium metal to plutonium oxide powder, followed by the dilute and disposal pathway.  This option probably ties in with the proposed new plutonium pit fabrication plant at SRS.
  • Perform the dilute and disposal pathway at Los Alamos and keep the entire process in New Mexico. 
  • The No-Action alternative, which would leave the plutonium pits in long term storage and avoid unnecessary shipping, processing, and increased plutonium waste dumping at WIPP. 

Not included among the alternatives is the option of demilitarizing plutonium pits by “stuffing” them with inert materials, a proposal first floated in the late 1990’s. Plutonium pits are designed for long-term storage in the nuclear warhead, and can remain stored without expensive shipment and processing.

After years of South Carolina officials declaring that the state could become a permanent plutonium dumping ground, the state is now facing the renewed prospect of SRS processing three times the plutonium presently stored onsite and awaiting dilution and repackaging; as well as fabricating 80 or more new plutonium pits for new nuclear weapon designs at a plutonium pit production plant being designed for production beginning in the early 2030’s.

As reported in Offsite Insight 2022-1, nuclear watchdog Tom Clements informed the SRS Citizen’s Advisory Board about this prospect at their July, 2022, meeting, at which he distinguished between the plutonium already at SRS and the plutonium potentially headed there:

The number was given as 9.5 MT in the agreement with the state. But there is 11.5 ton onsite because 2.0 tons were already there. But the amount of plutonium to be disposed of is up to 34 tons….We are looking at a tremendous amount of plutonium coming into the site. The CAB will have a very important role in insuring more material is not stranded here.” 

Next story: “Plutonium is Not for Amateurs, Part I.”

Residents in the Central Savannah River Area (CSRA) that surrounds the Savannah River Site have the opportunity to comment on the latest proposal either in person or in writing. DOE/NNSA will hold a public meeting upriver from SRS at North Augusta City Hall, 100 Georgia Avenue, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on January 19, 2023. A virtual hearing will be held on January 30, 2023, and comments may be submitted to SPDP-EIS@nnsa.doe.gov.

The Draft EIS, Federal Register Notice, meeting materials, and listing of public comment opportunities is at https://www.energy.gov/nepa/doeeis-0549-surplus-plutonium-disposition-program

and the Draft EIS is at:

https://www.energy.gov/nepa/articles/doeeis-0549-draft-environmental-impact-statement-december-2022


Footnotes

(1) Information regarding the program can be found at:

Presentation material for 3013 Cans and K Area Storage and Processing:

Click to access DOE3013ContainerProgram.pdf

Click to access StorageandDownblend.pdf

A DOE presentation to the National Academy of Sciences in 2018 provides more details: 

Click to access McAlhany-SurplusPuDisp_Jun2018.pdf

(2) A metric ton is 1,000 kilograms, equal to 2200 pounds or 1.1 tons.

(3) The DOE/NNSA announcement states that up to 34 MT could be shipped from Pantex, but no documentation exists suggesting there is 34 MT of surplus plutonium within pits, and Pantex presently stores less than one ton of plutonium not within pits. The EIS will, however, analyze the movement of 34 tons from Pantex.

(4) Highly Enriched Uranium within plutonium pits will also be separated and shipped to the Y-12 nuclear weapons material plant near Oak Ridge, Tennessee.




SRS Watch News Release: October 27, 2022: Delay at SRS Plutonium Bomb Plant

The watchdog organization Savannah River Site Watch issued the following news release today detailing the status of the proposed Plutonium Pit Fabrication Plant at the Savannah River Site, located south of Aiken, SC and west of Barnwell, SC. Plutonium pits are nuclear weapon components composed of machined plutonium and other essential parts; and form the core of the primary nuclear explosive in advanced modern weapons. They are surrounded by high explosives and function to trigger the nuclear blast in most nuclear explosives.

DOE Official Reveals Costly 6-Month Delay in Proposed SRS Plutonium Bomb Plant (PBP); As Russia, U.S. Threaten Nuclear War $11.5 Billion Pit Plant Key to New U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Irresponsible Planning for Full-Scale Nuclear War

For Immediate Release
October 27, 2022
Contact: Tom Clements, srswatch@gmail.com, tel. 803-834-3084

DOE Official Heightens Concerns about Controversial Plutonium Bomb Plant at Savannah River Site by Admitting an Additional 6-Month Delay in the Project; Cost Could Jump $375 Million, to $11.5 Billion

As Russia and the U.S. Recklessly Flirt with Nuclear War, the Plutonium “Pit” Facility in South Carolina Would Play Key Role in New Nuclear Weapons Integral to Planning for Nuclear War

Full SRS Watch news release:   news pit plant delay Oct 27 2022 SRS Watch

How Safe were “Millions of Safe Hours?”

Offsite Insights 2022-3

by Don Moniak
October 21, 2022

A Savannah River Site (SRS) work place safety record may have ended this past August, shortly after an SRS contractor publicized the accomplishment.

On June 29, 2022 Savannah River Mission Completion’s (SRMC) public relations office issued a news release stating “Over the past 24 years and spanning three liquid waste contractors, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management’s (EM) construction team at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has achieved 35 million safe hours without injury resulting in a missed day of work.

According to a September 18, 2022, Savannah River Site (SRS) Occurrence Report, the record could be over. On August 9, 2022, an SRMC construction carpenter tripped on a scaffold pole and fell on the asphalt. The injured worker was diagnosed by a nurse and doctor at the contractor’s onsite Health Services as having “a small abrasion to the left elbow and a right shoulder strain,” treated with an anitbiotic ointment and a bandaid, and was released for work. 

At a follow up visit nine days later the worker complained of pain and discomfort in the injured shoulder, was referred to an offsite orthopedist, and diagnosed with a torn rotator cuff. A month after the accident, the carpenter underwent surgery to repair the right torn rotator cuff. On the day of the surgery, the accident finally made it into DOE’s Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS); which is designed to provide “timely notification to the DOE complex of events that could adversely affect: public or DOE worker health and safety, the environment, national security, DOE’s safeguards and security interests, functioning of DOE facilities, or the Department’s reputation.”

The accident raises questions about the site’s claim to 35 million hours without a lost day of work in the liquid radioactive waste management’s construction program; as well as safety claims made across the rest of the site. OSHA regulations regarding recordable injuries are filled with frequently asked questions and specific scenarios about what constitutes a lost day.

Companies constantly strive to reach accomplishments on paper that may not accurately reflect actual safety records. There is no shortage of stories involving injured workers being pressured and harassed to return to work. Whether there was pressure to return to work in this case is unknown. SRS officials at both the contractor’s and Department of Energy’s public affairs offices were asked (1) about this specific event and chose to ignore the inquiry.

What is known is that serious workplace injuries and accidents are more common at Savannah River Site than the polished record presented by public relations offices of both DOE and its contractors. A news release with an asterisk such as “only construction workers” can easily be misunderstood as “all workers” by a casual reader.

Just a few of the reportable accidents that met the reporting thresholds in the ORPS program during this calendar year include:

On January 27, 2022, a worker supporting “disassembly of a roofing support shoring tower” at a radioactive waste disposal site was struck by the tower frame, lost consciousness, and was transported to Augusta University Hospital. The diagnosis was a temporal bone fracture, a laceration requiring seven sutures, and a concussion. This accident within the liquid radioactive waste program occurred six months before the SRMC’s “35 Million Safe Hours” new release; casting further doubts on the validity of the claim.

On Friday July 22, 2022, a Savannah River Ecology Lab (SREL) researcher suffered a snakebite on the hand from a Copperhead while “attempting to retrieve a radio tracked gopher frog in a remote area.” The worker was transported to AU Medical Center and was treated for more than 48 hours.

Lessons Learned From Occurrence Report EM-SR–GOSR-GOSR-2022-0003


On September 8, 2022, “while performing valving inside of the contamination area for the Acid Recovery Unit, an operator tripped over a piece of plywood and fell backwards, resulting in a back injury.” A day later an X-ray showed a fractured vertebrae.

On September 26, 2022, a crane operator exited a 50-ton crane to evaluate the crane placement for an upcoming job. After exiting the crane, the 50-ton crane rolled into a dumpster, pushing the dumpster into a fence causing damage to the crane, dumpster, and fence. There were no injuries and no damage estimates.

On July 2 and 3, 2022, an evacuation occurred at Savannah River National Laboratory due to the failure of portable air compressors for radiological exhaust systems. The portable compressors were being used due to a cooling water outage. Replacement compressors failed seven times before a larger air compressor was employed.

This particular occurrence drew the attention of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) representatives. In their July 8, 2022 weekly report , Resident Inspectors reported “poor (Technical Safety Requirements) administration and weaknesses in the abnormal event response;” and several several safety issues with the exhaust, ventilation, and fire systems.

The inspectors also found several oversights in the lab’s subsequent fact-finding investigation, particularly in the implementation of Limited Conditions of Operation (LCO). The Board reps wrote: “Most egregiously, the logbook indicated not completing two separate LCO required actions within the required completion time.” Defense Board representatives are often understated and seldom employ words like “egregious.”

The incident was entered into the ORPS notification system on July 14, 2022 and the final report, titled “Loss of Instrument Air and failure of associated radiological exhaust,” was not completed until September 21st. Eight corrective actions were noted, suggesting Board representatives properly recognized the seriousness of the incident and the muddled response to it before the lab did.

Corrective Actions for EM-SR–BSRA-SRNL-2022-0006

_________________


Footnotes

(1) The following email was sent to SRMC’s L. Ling and cc’ed to DOE’s Amy Boyette:

Mr. Ling, 

In regard to the story about 35 million hours without a lost workday accident, was this record affected by this accident, EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0005, 

31. HQ Summary:

On August 9, 2022, construction carpenters were disassembling a containment hut in a barricaded work area near Tank 35. Laborers had placed scaffold poles in the storage rack just prior to the incident. During the work evolution, a construction carpenter tripped on a tube-lock scaffold pole that was extending outside of the storage rack and fell on the asphalt (same level fall). The worker was evaluated by a Savannah River Mission Completion Health Services nurse and a site medical physician. The initial diagnosis was a small abrasion to the left elbow and a right shoulder strain. For initial treatment, the abrasion to the left elbow was cleaned, and antibiotic ointment and a band aid was applied. The worker was discharged and returned to work. On August 18, the worker followed up at site medical, where they reported pain and discomfort in their right shoulder. The worker was subsequently referred to an offsite orthopedic physician. On August 23, Safety Reporting was notified that the employee was seen by an orthopedic physician and given prescription medication. A Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) was scheduled, and the worker returned to work with instructions to use their right arm as tolerated. On August 30, the MRI results indicated the worker had a torn rotator cuff. On September 8, the worker had an outpatient arthroscopic procedure where the surgeon confirmed and repaired the right torn rotator cuff.

If not, how often have injuries later turned out to be worse than initially diagnosed? Was this worker pressured to return to work to avoid an OSHA recordable lost-day event? 

This is also a final occurrence report. Can SRMC explain why there were no lessons learned? 

There was no link to news release author Jim Beasley, so I was unable to ask him directly about this. Please forward if necessary. 

Thank You, 

Donald Moniak
Eureka Research, LLC
PO Box 112
Vaucluse, SC 29850
803-617-9736
contributor: aikenchronicles.com

(2) Savannah River Mission Completions Occurrence Reports for 2022.

Report NumberSubject/Title
1)EM-SR–SRMC-FTANK-2022-0001Failure of Tank 3 Purge Ventilation Fan
2)EM-SR–SRMC-FTANK-2022-0002Uncontrolled hazardous energy due to common neutrals L/T FTF-22-38
3)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0001Employee received mild shock while working in 707-H
4)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0003Tk 32 Thermocouple Failure
5)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0004Light Plant Trailer Tongue Failure
6)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-0005Confirmed Rotator Cuff
7)EM-SR–SRMC-HTANK-2022-000650 Ton Crane rolled into Dumpster at HY-1 Laydown Yard
8)EM-SR–SRMC-SWPF-2022-0002Pressure Relief Drain Plug Air Leak
9)EM-SR–SRMC-SWPF-2022-0003Inadvertent Switch Manipulation
10)EM-SR–SRMC-SWPF-2022-0004Failure to Administratively Enter Limiting Condition of Operation
11)EM-SR–SRMC-SWPF-2022-0005Pressure Transmitter Manifold Leak Prevents Surveillance Completion
12)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0001JIT-1140B Performance Degradation and is Inoperable while in Operation Mode
13)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0002DWPF Lab Personnel hit head on a Manipulator Arm
14)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0003PRFT to SRAT Transfer Interlock Due to Low Steam Flow
15)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0004Cell Cover Dropped While Moving With MPC Crane in DWPF
16)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0005DG200 Failure to Start During Surveillance Testing
17)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0006DG200 Inoperable when required
18)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0007Inadvertent Contact with Electrical Cord
19)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0008Local Control System (LCS) 500A Train Loss of Indications
20)EM-SR–SRMC-WVIT-2022-0009511-S Safety Grade Nitroge




Offsite Insights 2022-2: SRS CAB Might Quit Snubbing Barnwell and Allendale Counties

by Don Moniak
September 16, 2022

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) is an official federal advisory committee formed in the 1990s during a short-lived period of government “openness.” According to its mission statement, the SRS CAB “will provide” the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) office with “information, advice, and recommendations concerning issues affecting the EM program at SRS.” The Board also functions to provide offsite communities and its citizens one of the sole information and communications path to a mammoth government and corporate bureaucracy. 

For the past two decades, when choosing bi-monthly meeting venues, the Citizens Advisory Board has snubbed poorer, rural communities that are closest downriver and downwind to SRS. These include Allendale and Barnwell Counties on the South Carolina side of the river; and Burke and Screven counties on the Georgia side of the river. The last Citizens Advisory Board meeting held in Barnwell County was in 2000; and no meeting has ever been held in Allendale, Burke, or Screven Counties. 

The snubbing of Barnwell and Allendale counties is particularly relevant today in light of the plutonium settlement of 2020. The situation could change in 2023.

Aiken, Allendale, Barnwell Counties and The Plutonium Settlement 

On August 31, 2020, the State of South Carolina and the Department of Energy (DOE) signed a $600 million settlement agreement (1) related to the decades long mismanagement of DOE’s plutonium storage and surplus disposition program. Central to the settlement is the presence of, and fate after the year 2037, of 9.5 out of the more than 11.0 tons of plutonium in long-term (up to fifty years) storage at the Savannah River Site’s (SRS) converted K-Reactor building. 

During the years of litigation and negotiation, South Carolina politicians normally enamored with all nuclear developments and national defense missions began to describe plutonium storage as a nuclear dumping scheme. For example, Governor Nicki Haley told the Post and Courier newspaper in 2016: 

We will not back down: South Carolina will not be a permanent dumping ground for nuclear waste.” 

This was in spite of the fact that all plutonium storage is above-ground; and the materials are closely monitored and retrievable. 

(Plutonium storage at K-Area, Savannah River Site. DOE Photo)

According to the settlement agreement, the primary intent was to resolve economic impact and assistance payments related to the plutonium presence, the lack of progress in the disposition program, and the demand for a timeline to remove surplus plutonium. There is no intent in the agreement to end the storage and processing of plutonium at SRS—which is presently preparing for decades of producing nuclear weapon components called “plutonium pits.” 

“The parties intend that this agreement will resolve all claims relating to economic and assistance payments or removal of plutonium, or will arise, between 2016 and the date on which the Department of Energy completes removal of the subject 9.5 metric tons of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials.” (Settlement Agreement, Paragraph 13)

Local officials and media immediately angled for the prime cut of funding, citing Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties as most impacted and most worthy. Congressman Joe Wilson, whose district encompasses SRS, stated the day of the settlement that: 

These funds should go directly to the counties of Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell were most impacted by the 1,700 jobs lost due to the DOE’s abandonment of MOX.” (WXLT-News) 

On September 5th, the Aiken Standard’s editorial board wrote 

It’s time to financially assist those of us who have been most impacted by the economic ebb and flow surrounding the Savannah River Site, the shuttered MOX facility and its workforce.” 

The Aiken Municipal Development Commission (AMDC) made a splash a few weeks later when it sent letters to various local and state elected officials that advocated for the entire settlement, after legal fees, go to the three South Carolina counties surrounding SRS: Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell. The AMDC wrote: 

The risk of SRS operations and shipping/storing plutonium rests squarely within these three counties.

The letter’s author was AMDC Chairman Keith Wood, whose day job is Vice-President of Marketing and Communications for the National Security Group of Savannah River Site contractor Amentum Corporation. Other commissioner signatories included: 

  • Stuart McVean, the Chief Executive Officer of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, the primary SRS operating contractor; and 
  • J. David Jameson, President of the Aiken Chamber of Commerce. 

The letter may have marked the first time in SRS history that top SRS contract officials and the Aiken Chamber of Commerce collectively presented threats from past and present site operations in such a public light. 

From: September 17, 2020 AMDC Letter to State Senator Tom Young and sixteen other elected officials.

Governor Henry McMaster concurred, and by the end of the 2020 issued a proposal advocating for all of the remaining $525 milllion to be allocated to the three counties, writing: 

It is my belief that the communities surrounding SRS should be the prime beneficiaries of these settlement funds.

SRS CAB Meetings: Everywhere but Barnwell and Allendale

On September 26th, two years after the plutonium settlement was announced, the Savannah River Site (SRS) Citizen’s Advisory Board (SRS CAB) will meet at the Embassy Suites by Hilton in the historic district of Savannah, GA. The meeting marks the seventh time in the past ten years of in-person meetings the Board has met in upscale hotels in Savannah. 

(The Embassy Suites by Hilton, Savannah, GA). 

During that time it has met twelve other times along the coast: 

  • seven times at Hilton Head Island, whose water supply originates from the Savannah River; 
  • four times in Charleston, where the Port of Charleston accepts shipments of foreign nuclear waste and materials of U.S. origin; 
  • and once in Beaufort, where the primary water source is also the Savannah River. 

While all of these cities have a strong vested interest in the safety of the Savannah River Site, Barnwell and Allendale Counties are adjacent to, generally closest downwind from, and always the closest downriver South Carolina communities. The Town of Barnwell is only eight miles from the SRS boundary, the closest county seat to the sprawling complex of nuclear weapons materials processing and cleanup sites. 

Allendale County has never been selected for a Board Meeting. Barnwell County has not hosted an SRS CAB meeting since the September, 2000, when the last one occurred at Barnwell State Park—which still boasts a “large meeting facility and five vacation cabins.” 

The Board did meet in Barnwell County three times between 1996 and 2000—the same year it also convened at luxurious Kiawah Island. The years 2015 and 2016 marked a sea change in meeting venues, with Board meetings held for a full year (2015) at the New Ellenton Community Center. Two more meetings were held in the small town bordering SRS in 2016, along with a pair of meetings at the nearby Applied Research Center in 2016 and 2017. 

But only since July 24, 2017 has a Board meeting convened within fifteen miles of the site boundary, during a meeting in downtown Aiken twelve miles from the site boundary. 

During this period meeting venues have been dominated by a rotation of upscale locations: Hyatt House, Sonesta, Double Tree, Crown Plaza, and the Hilton Garden Inns—-with the exception being nearly two years of virtual meetings due to COVID-19 guidelines and restrictions. 

SRS CAB MEETINGS July, 2017 to November 2022. 

Month/Year LocationCity
July 2017Applied Research CenterAiken County, New Ellenton
September 2017Courtyard HiltonCharleston, SC
November 2017Hilton GardenAugusta, GA
January 2018Beach House HotelHilton Head Island, SC
March 2018North Augusta Municipal CtrNorth Augusta, SC
May 2018 Hyatt RegencySavannah, GA 
September 2018Double Tree InnColumbia, SC
November 2018Partridge InnAugusta, GA
January 2019Sonesta HotelHilton Head, SC
March 2019Savannah Rapids PavillionMartinez, GA
May 2019Hyatt RegencySavannah, GA
July 2019Municipal BuildingNorth Augusta, SC
September 2019Frances Marion HouseCharleston, SC
November 2019Hyatt HouseAugusta, GA
Jan 2020 to Sept 2021Virtual Meetings 
November, 2021Holiday Inn Beach HouseHilton Head, SC
January 2022Aiken Municipal BuildingAiken, SC
March 2022Crown PlazaNorth Augusta, SC
May 2022Columbia Convention CtrColumbia, SC
July 2022Double Tree HotelAugusta, GA
September 2022Embassy Suites-HiltonSavannah, GA
November 2022Augusta UniversityAugusta, GA 

SRS CAB MEETINGS July, 2017 to November 2022. 
Barnwell and/or Allendale in 2023?

The snubbing of Barnwell and Allendale by the Citizen’s Advisory Board could be ending soon. The issue of a change in venue was raised at the last SRS CAB meeting, convened on July 26-27, 2022, at the Double Tree Inn in West Augusta twenty-five miles upriver and generally upwind from SRS.

At the meeting, I asked SRS officials and the CAB about the absence of Barnwell and Allendale Counties from the Board’s meeting locations and agendas. SRS Public Affairs specialist Amy Boyette informed me, with DOE SRS Manager Michael Budney listening, that Barnwell and Allendale lacked the necessary facilities to host a CAB meeting. I followed up a day later with an email, writing: 

You expressed the opinion that Barnwell and Allendale Counties are not feasible for CAB meetings due to a lack of suitable meeting space and equipment. And Mr Budney was standing there and did not disagree. 

Are there any other reasons why full monthly Board meetings are not held in the two counties parochially identified by every SC elected officials at every level as the three most affected by SRS past and present operations?”

Ms. Boyette replied: 

We do not have full Board meetings monthly. There are 6 full Board meetings per year. These meetings are of/for the Citizens Advisory Board and they are also open to the public to observe. We have meetings both locally and in downstream communities. When selecting meeting venues, the primary factors, as I told you on Tuesday, are appropriate meeting space (large room, plenty of parking, food options nearby), dependable utilities (reliable WiFi and IT systems that can support virtual meetings/Live streaming, etc) and suitable overnight accommodations for those to have to travel to attend.

That said, your comments have made me want to double check Barnwell and Allendale. It has been a while since we visited those areas in person (we look online every year) to  scope out possible venues and accommodations. I have asked my staff to reconsider those areas and determine if holding at least one meeting there is feasible.

Conclusions

The Sonesta Hotel in Hilton Head boasts 23,000 square feet of indoor and outdoor meeting space able to accommodate 1,100 people. But the meeting facilities there and every other venue the Board rents look nearly identical to this SRS CAB meeting scene at the Crown Plaza Hotel in North Augusta in March, 2022. 

The SRS CAB has 25 members and a small support staff during meetings. Does the notion that places like Barnwell, Allendale or other small rural communities cannot accomodate such a small contingent reflect an institutional class bias? Or could another issue be that membership on the Savannah River Site Citizen’s Advisory Board presents opportunities to spend some time at government sponsored meetings at posh resorts and upscale hotels? 

The Sonesta Resort on Hilton Head Island, scene of the January 2109 CAB Meeting. 

________________

REFERENCES

(1) https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/South-Carolina-Settlement-Agreement-Final-signed-8-28-20.pdf

(2) 

https://www.wltx.com/article/news/politics/southcarolina-wins-federal-lawsuit-remove-plutonium-from-savannah-river-site-by-2037/101-2728bd82-4a77-47ec-8df2-2c412517c1f1

Sent from my iPad

Offsite Insights (2022:1)

by Don Moniak

July 28, 2022 (Updated November 5, 2022).

SRS Annually Converting Approximately 1/5 of a metric ton of Plutonium into a Waste Form. 

DOE’s Rhetorical Duck and Cover Surrounding Savannah River Site Plutonium

Who is trying to keep more radioactive waste out of South Carolina? (hint: it is not Attorney General Alan Wilson)

July 26, 2022: Hilton Double Tree Hotel; Augusta, Georgia.

Citizen: “How much weapon grade plutonium is being downgraded and how many shifts are working on a regular basis?” 

Government contractor: “I wont get into specifics but it is at magnitude of one hundred 3013 cans a year.” 

The government contractor did not offer a “cans to kilograms” conversion. 

The question was posed by citizen representative Narinda P.S. Malik, a retired former environmental compliance and quality assurance worker at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The answer was provided by Lee Sims, the “K-Area Complex Facility Manager.” K-Area is where plutonium is stored in thirty pound stainless steel “3013” containers, within larger four hundred pound “9975” shipping containers, which are stacked on pallets three high within Building 105-K in the former K Nuclear Reactor, several miles from the Savannah River. 

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In short, the approximately 11.5 tons of plutonium stored there is very gradually being converted to a waste form in a process called “Dilute and Dispose.” Plutonium is taken out of the 3013 cans; and anywhere from 175 to 400 grams is mixed with an “adulterant” containing a classified mix of materials, and placed into a “critical container overpack (COC). The COC’s are then stored pending shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Southeast New Mexico, where it is scheduled, barring preventative litigation, to be entombed in deep salt caverns over the objections of most New Mexican citizens. (1)

A 3013 can is the container holding plutonium (Pu) metal or oxide powder. There is an approximate average range of 3.0 to 3.5 kilograms (kg) of Pu in each can. At a rate of 100 cans per year, the amount of plutonium is approximately 300 to 350 kg a year, or about one-third of a metric ton. The first plutonium based nuclear explosives reportedly involved six kilograms of Pu. Today, only one kilogram of Pu is necessary for use in a nuclear explosive of mass destruction, although the general usage in modern weapons is three to five kg. 

{Correction: On August 11, 2022, DOE Director of External Affairs provided this new information:

Per our subject matter experts, we are working to reach steady state in the existing glovebox which we believe could be up to 500 Kg/year of plutonium. Currently throughput is around 100 3013s/year but continues to increase. The 3013 plutonium content varies as presented in the CAB meeting depending on the source of the material.  We are processing a mixture of Fuels Grade and Weapons Grade material, and as such, the answer on a KG basis of Weapons Grade Pu is variable.  The average for a 3013 stored in K-area presented in the email is incorrect.  The average 3013 plutonium content in K-Area is 2.1 Kg.”

So a more correct answer to Mr. Malik’s question would be: “about 300 to 350 kilograms a year, or one-third of a ton.” 

[Correction. The updated estimate is 210 kilograms, or 0.21 metric tons; or 0.23 U.S. tons).

DOE’s Rhetorical Duck and Cover Surrounding Savannah River Site 

This question and answer exchange typified the dialogue held in a spacious conference room at the Hilton Double Tree Hotel in West Augusta, GA.  The Hilton Double Tree is more than twenty miles upriver and upwind from the sprawling nuclear weapons materials production complex formerly known as the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Plant,, and referred to as the Savannah River Site (SRS) since 1990.(2)

July 2022 SRS CAB Board Meeting held in the Grand Ballroom of the Hilton Double Tree Inn in Augusta, GA

The federal government was represented by the DOE-SRS’ Environmental Management (EM) office and its primary contractors (3). DOE is one of the bureaucratic descendants of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which had a long tradition of manipulating public perceptions with evasive, fuzzy answers to even the most pointed questions, a tradition continued to this day. 

Citizens were represented by the Savannah River Site (SRS) Citizens Advisory Board (CAB or Board), an official federal advisory committee formed in the 1990s during a short-lived period of government “openness.” According to its mission statement, the SRS CAB “will provide” the DOE’s Assistant EM Secretary with “information, advice, and recommendations concerning issues affecting the EM program at SRS.” 

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Board meetings are dominated by presentations from DOE or its contractors. Each presentation is followed by a question and answer session, during which public questions and comments are now prohibited. However, citizens not seated on the CAB are actually encouraged to speak with with officials outside the meeting room, meaning the Board does not receive the benefit of answers to public inquiries. Only DOE, its contractors, or state or federal regulators can answer questions. 

Unless it seeks information from another source, the Board must then use the contractor provided information to forward any advice and recommendations; which DOE can then accept or reject (3). 

Candor was in even shorter supply during two presentations regarding storage and processing of 9.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium “surplus” to U.S. military needs. This plutonium was shipped to SRS in the early 2000’s from various DOE nuclear explosives materials and parts production sites within its vast nuclear explosives and weapons production complex. 

The Board has no authority to address the nuclear materials production and management side managed by DOE’s highly secretive National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). NNSA officials are notoriously tight-lipped and, while certainly present, have minimal participation in CAB dialogue. So plutonium issues are and will be plagued by guarded discussions far more reminiscent of Cold War days than post Cold War “openness.” 

The Board was informed that 5.5 MT of Pu is controlled by the NNSA and 4.0 MT is controlled by EM. Therefore, the Board could be privy to discussions about the future of storage and processing of surplus plutonium at SRS, but not to discussion involving production of new nuclear explosive parts called “plutonium pits.” 

The 9.5 MT of plutonium is the amount to be removed from SRS by 2037 under the terms of an August 31, 2020 legal settlement between the State of South Carolina (the State) and the DOE (4). The highlight of the settlement was a $600,000,000 (six hundred million) payment to the State, to be divided up in any manner proscribed by the state’s legislature. The root cause of the settlement is DOE’s history of misinformation and bait and switch tactics that ultimately led to, in the words of the SC Attorney General’s office:

The highly contentious a battle that involved multiple federal and state administrations and threatened to paralyze the country’s (nuclear weapons) industrial complex and pit the state against the federal government for decades.” (“Nuclear weapons” added for clarity, since the overall military industrial complex as well as general industry was not threatened in any way by the battle over plutonium storage and disposition.) 

This battle also led the state’s top elected officials to increasingly (and cynically) portray South Carolina as a plutonium dumping ground—a term first coined in 2002 by former Governor Jim Hodges. Although above ground plutonium storage within robust, sealed containers within hardened nuclear facilities was approved for up to 50 years at SRS in a legal 1997 DOE record of decision (ROD), Attorney General Alan Wilson stated: 

This settlement is the single largest settlement in South Carolina’s history. It is important to me that the people of South Carolina know of our long-term commitment to preventing South Carolina from becoming a dumping ground for nuclear waste”

Who is trying to keep more radioactive waste out of South Carolina? (hint: it is not Attorney General Alan Wilson)

In spite of the record six hundred million dollar payment and the threat of future litigation, DOE and its contractors continue to evade questions and refrain from offering any more information than it deems necessary. Neither the SC Attorney General’s Office or Governor was present at the meeting. It was not until the public comment period at 4 p.m., nearly two hours after the plutonium presentations, that citizen and long-time nuclear watchdog Tom Clements informed the Board about an issue in which they had been uninformed: 

The number was given as 9.5 MT in the agreement with the state. But there is 11.5 ton onsite because 2.0 tons were already there. But the amount of plutonium to be disposed of is up to 34 tons….We are looking at a tremendous amount of plutonium coming into the site. The CAB will have a very important role in insuring more material is not stranded here.” 

Tom Clements speaking at the July 26, 2022 CAB meeting

Even when a simple, direct question cutting to an essential safety and environmental matter is posed, DOE and its contractors offer a minimal of information. A prime example involved the exchange between Board member Kandace Cave, who also serves as Aiken County’s Keep Aiken County Beautiful program coordinator, and K-Area manager Lee Sims from the contractor Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Ms. Cave asked: 

Is there a difference in how you treat weapons grade plutonium versus other plutonium?” 

The question was in reference to the fact that of the 9.5 tons, “about 1/3 of the inventory contains fuel grade plutonium (higher radiation dose and heat load).” 

Mr. Sims answered: 

“We do have some of our higher dose material stored separately, but there is a mixture” of materials being processed.” 

Omitted from that partial answer was the presence of Americium-241, a radioactive decay product of Plutonium-241; which in turn is present at single digit percentages in militarily preferred “weapons-grade” plutonium, and in double digit percentages in weapons-usable, “fuel-grade” plutonium. Americium-241 is an intense gamma radiation emitter with a radioactive half-life of seventy five years and is considered one hundred times more toxic than plutonium-239. 

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Weapons plutonium was routinely purified to eliminate americium, which of course produced stockpiles of it, some of which went into consumer products like smoke detectors as part of the nation’s “Atoms For Peace” program. Since plutonium decay has been allowed to run its course since 1990, Americium-241 levels in plutonium stored in weapons, and at DOE sites like SRS have steadily increased but still not peaked. 

There is no mention of Americium-241 in either of the two plutonium storage and processing handouts, no mention made during the presentations, and no mention made during an eight minute promotional You Tube video about K-Area shown to the Board. 

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Next Up in “Offsite Insights:” 

More Pu Duck and Cover

Keeping German Nuclear Waste Out of South Carolina

Barnwell and Allendale Counties: Downriver, Downwind, and Unfeasible for Public Meetings

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(1) Presentation material for 3013 Cans and K Area Storage and Processing: 

A DOE presentation to the National Academy of Sciences in 2018 provides more details: 

(2) The name changed when the DuPont corporation pulled up its stakes at the end of the Cold War after a nearly forty year run as the operating contractor, first for the AEC then for its successor the Department of Energy (DOE). Since the year 2000, the nuclear weapons branch of DOE has been ruled by the “semi-autonomous” National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). The NNSA certifies the reliability and safety of the nuclear weapons it delivers to Department of Defense. 

(3) The primary contractors at present are Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) and Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). 

(4) For more information on the SRS CAB and its mission, go to: 

https://cab.srs.gov/srs-cab.html

SRS CAB Board Meeting, Day 2, July 26, 2022

SRS CAB meeting second half July 26, 2022

SRS Promotional Video: K Area

(4) For more information on the Plutonium Settlement including links to the Settlement, see: