“Plutonium is Not For Amateurs” Pt 1.

Offsite Insights 2023-1:
Revisiting the 1998 plutonium pit debate and the day Senator Strom Thurmond insulted nuclear weapon workers in Texas.

by Don Moniak

January 18, 2023

For the first time in nearly twenty-five years, the U.S. Department of Energy is holding hearings to discuss the future of more than 12,000 “surplus” plutonium “pits” that remain in storage at the 18,000 acre Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant near Amarillo, Texas. (1).

Plutonium pits form the primary nuclear explosives in the the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Pits are complex, sealed pressure vessels designed to withstand hundreds of pounds per square inch of gaseous pressures without explosive tritium booster gas leaking. Within beryllium, stainless steel, aluminium, or vanadium cladding is a nested shell of materials, most notably a generally spherical, hollow ring of one to six kilograms of military grade plutonium in a subcritical configuration.

The term “pit” is a wry, Cold War term given to the sealed core of the primary nuclear explosive that is surrounded by carefully machined high explosive spheres, which, when detonated, cause the plutonium to compress, implode, go critical, and trigger a nuclear detonation. Early weapon designers compared the pit to the dry core of a fleshy fruit, as if their creations were living things providing vital sustenance.

The last time the future of surplus pits was under discussion, the Department of Energy had set off a contentious debate between two of its remaining nuclear weapons sites, the 18,000-acre Pantex plant on the open prairie of the Texas Panhandle, and the 200,000-acre Savannah River Site (SRS) hidden within extensive forestland in Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale Counties, South Carolina. At stake were hundreds of operational jobs in a plutonium pit disassembly and conversion (PDCF) facility, and thousands of construction jobs preceding operation. Also at stake was the prospect of more radioactive, toxic waste generation and environmental contamination.

It was in this context that long-time South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond set off a tempest by describing Pantex workers as “amateurs.” On June 23, 1998, Thurmond’s office released a press release in which the Senator stated the obvious:

Plutonium is not a material to be handled by amateurs.”

Part of a Press Release from the office of Senator Strom Thurmond, June 23, 1998.


The “amateurs” statement was a clear reference to the Pantex plant, where plutonium had only been handled in “pit” form—sealed containers containing plutonium-gallium alloy designed for both malleability and long term stability. Pantex had handled plutonium in its most toxic and difficult powder form only in the case of a rare accident involving a cracked pit.

The statement was also made in the context that it was unwise to introduce plutonium processing to a facility with no plutonium processing infrastructure, expertise, or existing plutonium contamination, but that nuance was lost. Pantex workers heard “amateurs” and responded as expected, with righteous anger.

To say that Pantex weapon workers were no strangers to dangerous operations is a grave understatement. Pantex is the nation’s only nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly site, and also is the primary production site for the high explosives (HE) used in the arsenal. In 1977 an accidental detonation of HE killed three workers, an explosion that also catalyzed another round of scientific research and development into less sensitive HE.

Workers who disassembled and assembled nuclear warheads are responsible for separating or joining—or “mating”—the high explosives and the pit. This is considered the only procedure during nuclear weapons production or disarmament involving the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation—even if the risk was remote. The work is conducted in clean rooms in groups of three, one worker reading procedures and the other two workers methodically carrying the the instructions.

More probable is an accidental detonation of high explosives that would scatter radioactive debris. For this reason weapons assembly and disassembly work is conducted in massive, domed, “gravel gerties” designed to collapse if the explosion involved more than 106 pounds of high explosive and thus contain much of the dispersal of radioactive materials—-a design that meant workers would be buried alive under even if they somehow survived the explosion.

Gravel Gerties at Pantex. From Department of Energy files.
DOE file photo of nuclear weapon disassembly work at Pantex. A small electrostatic discharge during a disassembly operation in 1989 activated a tritium canister part, resulting in a release of 40,000 curies of tritium that harmed three workers and compelled DOE to shut the facility.


Pantex workers learned of Thurmond’s contemptuous barb in the days before a scheduled plutonium disposition hearing in Amarillo. On the day of the hearing, August 11, 1998, workers set up a booth where hastily made picket signs and cheap plastic buttons saying “Site PDCF at Pantex” were distributed. The table contained two handouts—a pro-Pantex letter from Amarillo Chamber of Commerce President Gary Mohlberg and the news release from Strom Thurmond’s office.

Normally more reserved, Pantex workers dominated the hearing that day, waving picket signs like it was a political convention, and taking turns at the podium. It was unlike anything ever before seen in Amarillo, all courtesy of The Department of Energy’s cynical strategy of pitting nuclear weapons production communities against each other over jobs; as well as Strom Thurmond’s fierce defense of the Savannah River Site, which received his legislative largesse for more than four decades.

Ultimately, the job of Pit Disassembly and Conversion went to SRS, as expected. But the prize was short-lived. The PDCF never progressed past the early design stage, and the pits continued to pile up at Pantex, to be stored in World War Two bunkers with little or no temperature or humidity controls.

The pits remain at Pantex, having aged another twenty five years. Pantex will only be involved in this disposition debate if no action is taken and more prolonged plutonium pit storage is required.

This time around, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, the “semi-autonomous” sub-agency which began controlling DOE”s downsized nuclear weapons production complex in 2002, has admitted that, at one-tenth the size of SRS and lacking in waste management infrastructure, Pantex is a poor candidate for plutonium processing—-although NNSA has still not admitted that it is a bad idea to process plutonium within a half mile to a mile of productive farmland.


Next: “Plutonium is Not for Amateurs” Pt 2: What will the Chambers of Commerce say after $billions in SRS worker compensation claims?

(1) Announcement and Opportunity to Comment.



The Draft EIS, Federal Register Notice, meeting materials, and listing of public comment opportunities is at https://www.energy.gov/nepa/doeeis-0549-surplus-plutonium-disposition-program


6 thoughts on ““Plutonium is Not For Amateurs” Pt 1.”

  1. You should share a broader perspective on this subject. The 2 atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan ended WWII saving the lives of 10s of thousands of our troops.
    Since then, our nuclear weapons have kept the USSR, Russia, China , Iran ,etc. from attacking us. How else could be done?
    I’d bet that there are more adverse health effects from mining and processing all of the rare earth metals for electric vehicle batteries than from Plutonium.
    I managed the Pu separation process at SRP for 4.5 years in the mid-1980s. Contrary to your assertion, production was our #10 priority after 9 other safety measures.
    Also, SRS is making great progress with the DWPF to convert SRS HLW into borosilicate glass, and SRS is not the site with the most HLW. The Hanford has 177 HLW tanks and is making very slow progress to resolve this. Some of these wastes are from the Manhattan Project in WWII.

    1. Jim Kelly. 1. The two atomic bombs were dropped nearly 80 years ago. Savannah River Plant was not even a thought when that happened. Even if we accept the theory that it was essential to end the war, it was never a justification to spend $6 trillion plus on an arsenal of 10,000+ weapons. (See Atomic Audit, published in 2000)

      2. Please do share how Iran might attack us from the other side of the world. Or how China might incinerate its top trading partner. But you may have a point. Libya might not be a basket case if it had kept its nuclear program as a deterrent against NATO aggression. Iraq might have prevented the Shock and Awe of U.S. aggression in 2003 if it had, like Israel, India, and Pakistan, withdrawn (or never signed onto) the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Why should North Korea give up its nuclear deterrent, for that matter? What incentive do other nations have for complying with nuclear nonproliferation rules when the official nuclear club of China-France-Russia-U.K-U.S. refuses to do so, and there are no consequences for India, Israel, and Pakistan being non proliferation treaty pariahs.

      3. You claim to be scientifically based but are “betting” on the adverse health effects from mining and processing rare earth metals? You do not have time to investigate the matter? And if mining of rare earths is so hazardous, where does that put Uranium mining? Or are you unaware of the Uranium miners portion of the worker compensation law, or the fact that experiments in radiation exposure was conducted on Navajo uranium miners without their consent?

      https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17208792/

      4. The statement made was production “often” took precedence. Former Secretary of Energy James Watkins made that statement. The tens of billions of dollars in compensation claims paid out since 2000 are ample evidence he was correct. Priorities on a piece of paper are not priorities on the ground. For example, wildland firefighter fatalities and severe injuries from burnovers generally occur when one or more of the 10 Standard Firefighting Orders and/or the 20 Watchout Conditions are violated. Maybe you can explain why there was an average of one visit per month to the DuPont Medical Office to treat actinide inhalation.

      5. SRS is making progress at the DWPF. This article does not dispute this fact. Whether it is “great” depends on how “great” is defined. When was it originally projected to be completed? How far behind schedule and over budget was the Salt Waste Processing Facility in the first decade after the fiasco of In Tank Precipitation?

      6. What is your point about Hanford? It was not even in the story. I do enjoy, however, when one party impugns another party to evade accountability—-the B side of “grass is greener” is “grass is browner” on the other side. It reminds me of a survey from Idaho farmland, where 2/3rds of farmers thought there neighbors had soil erosion problems, but only 1/3 thought they had soil erosion problems on their own land.

      But thank you for reminding us of how Cold War thinking worked.

  2. Thank you for sharing this information, there is quite a lot to worry about and consider with SRS being so close by.

Leave a Reply to donaldmoniak Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *