All posts by donaldmoniak

Aiken County, Forests, June 2024, Public health and safety

How Dry is It?

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Short answer: The woods are very dry

by Don Moniak
June 27, 2024
(Updates: July 5, 2024: Latest national drought map shows that in the past week most of Aiken County has regressed into moderate drought and the rest of the county is “abnormally dry.” See new map below Figures 1 and 2. The KBDI index remains in the 500-600 range. August 13, 2024: Since July 5th, the area has received 12-16 inches of rain. Bush Field in Augusta measured 9.5 inches in July alone, and the rain from Tropical Storm Debbie brought anywhere from 2 to 6 inches to the Aiken area.).

On Monday, June 24th, the Graniteville-Warrenville-Vaucluse (GVW) Volunteer Fire Department responded to a wildfire near Old Sudlow Lake Road and adjacent to Hunter’s Glen subdivision, that originated from an escaped campfire.

The proximity of the fire to Hunter’s Glen subdivision further prompted a request for South Carolina Forestry Commission crews, who brought two tractors that were used to contain the fire at two acres.

What was unusual about this fire was not so much a neglected campfire next to a large subdivision, it was the response time of 4:30 a.m, a time of day characterized by higher humidity—and obviously no solar heating. Any fire activity during this time of day is a powerful indication of how dry the woods are across Aiken County.

National Weather Service data shows only one day with more than a half inch of precipation (June 17) in the past three weeks, and no rain in the past ten days. Temperatures have steadily risen from the low 90’s to above 100 degrees and relative humidity has steadily declined towards the thirty percent, which is low for this region. Add to this the desiccation of vegetation further caused by intense solar radiation during the longest days of the year, and the net result is high wildfire danger.

The current pattern is similar to the period of May 17 to June 7, 2019, which featured 24 days without rain, nineteen consecutive days over 90 degrees, and several record setting days exceeding 100 degrees. Relative humidities dropped as low as the teens. Overall, the extremely dry conditions were later determined to constitute a “flash drought,” which the National Integrated Drought Information System defines as “the rapid onset or intensification of drought, set in motion by lower-than-normal rates of precipitation, accompanied by abnormally high temperatures, winds, and radiation.”

The key difference during the 2019 flash drought were high winds, which further dried out vegetation; helping to turn normally green fields brown and create an unusually high level of pine needlecast that was described as unprecedented in recent times.*

A significant event during that flash drought period was the 200-acre Gateway Fire along Interstate 20, a fire that spotted across the highway and burned actively during nighttime hours. The Gateway Fire triggered the closure of I-20 for more than a day and the evacuation of dozens of homes.

Long-term Drought Indices

Like 2019, the current level of drought is not well indicated by long-term drought indices. Last week’s U.S. Drought Monitoring Map (Figure 1) showed our area as normal, but not far from counties with “drier than normal” conditions. However, this week’s map (Figure 2) shows Aiken County as “drier than normal,” and not far from counties in moderate drought. This does provide some indication that a flash drought is developing or already in place, but in this case it is a rapid onset of drought rather than an intensification of existing drought.

The latter conclusion is supported by another long-term drought index, the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), which is “based on a simplified soil water balance and estimates relative soil moisture conditions.” The current PDSI actually shows moist soil conditions in this region (Figure 3).

Figure 1: Drought Monitor Maps for the past two weeks.

Figures 1 and 2. June 20 and 27th Drought Monitoring Maps. (Click to enlarge.)

Update: July 5, 2024 map showing moderate drought status for most of Aiken County and much of the surrounding region.

Screenshot
Figure 3: Current Palmer Drought Severity Index. From drought.gov (click to enlarge)



A Short-Term Drought Index

One drought index that better reflects short-term drought conditions and the possibility or presence of a flash drought is the Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI), which is widely utilized as an indicator of potential wildfire spread and intensity. The index best measures the moisture levels of the finest forest fuels, the litter and duff layers.

The South Carolina Forestry Commission (SCFC), which relies upon this index to monitor potential fire activity, describes KBDI as follows:

“The Keetch–Byram Drought Index (KBDI) is used to assess and predict wildfire potential and severity. Calculated once a day based on rainfall, air temperature and other meteorological factors, KBDI values represent the net effect of evapotranspiration and precipitation relating to the flammability of organic material in the ground. The index ranges from zero, the point of no moisture deficiency, to 800, the maximum drought that is possible. The higher the number, the greater potential of wildfires igniting easily and spreading rapidly.”

The Forestry Commission provides daily KBDI mapping updates and measurements from individual weather stations from across the state. In the past week, the KBDI has risen to a level showing the strong potential for dangerous and erratic wildfire behavior. While the fire risk has been somewhat mitigated by the absence of high winds, that could temporarily change with an approaching cold front or other unstable weather system.

The current map shows values in the 500-600 range. The National Wildland Fire Assessment System (WFAS) describes KBDI values of 400 to 600 as “Typical of late summer and early fall conditions. Lower litter and duff layers actively contribute to fire intensity and will burn actively.”

According to the WFAS, KBDI values of 600 – 800 are “Often associated with more severe drought with increased wildfire occurrence. Intense, deep burning fires with significant downwind spotting can be expected. Live fuels can also be expected to burn actively at these levels.” 

In the past day alone, an area of greater than 600 KBDI has emerged in the Columbia area, and a KBDI measurement at one of our closest weather stations, on the Southeast portion of Savannah River Site, increased from 564 to 591 (Figures 4 and 5).

This region is approaching KBDI values of 600, and Forestry Commission Firewise and Prevention Coordinator Andy Johnson is certain that “there are localized  areas with more pronounced drought conditions,” with KBDI values in excess of 600.

Figures 4 and 5: KBDI Index, June 26 and 27. (Click to enlarge)

With the Fourth of July and its associated fireworks festivities arriving next week, this dryness and the associated fire danger looms a little larger. Although weather forecasters are predicting increased humidity and a more normal pattern of a chance of scattered thunderstorms, no widespread rain is currently predicted.

The current level of dryness is contributing to the flaring of 25-30 wildfires a day (Figure 5), many of them escaped debris burns, which is putting a strain on SCFC firefighter resources, thus increasing the likelihood of firefighter injuries** during any fire as well as extensive property damage from larger fires.

Figure 5: June 27, 2024, South Carolina Forestry Commission may showing wildfire activity across South Carolina.
Smoke at dawn from a two-acre wildfire adjacent to Hunter’s Glen subdivision off Old Sudlow Lake Road in the Graniteville zip code area. From the GVW Facebook page.


Footnote

* Needlecast is the phenomenon in which older pine tree needles turn brown and drop to the ground. It is most notable in Longleaf Pine.

Needlecast is a natural response to dry conditions, and functions to conserve water. New growth of brighter green needles is more visible during needlecast. As such, it also provides an indication of live fuel moisture levels are somewhat reflected by the degree of observed pine needlecast; particularly Longleaf Pine.

This is more of a Fall phenomenom, but also occurs in response to drought conditions in late Spring and early Summer. 

In a 2021 article, SC DNR biologist Johnny Stowe wrote that, since the mid-2000’s he has “seen healthy longleaf pines drop needles before the summer solstice only once.” That was in 2019, when significant needlecast dotted the countryside. The dry sandy ridges found across Aiken County.

During this period, the drier sandy ridges of Aiken County developed a fall-like tannish hue, with patches of browner shades dotting the landscape.

When Longleaf Pine drops its needles, it provides a flashy fuel bed that will persist until there is significant rainfall.

** On April 4, 2024 U.S. Forest Service/Savannah River Site firefighter sustained second degree burns during a prescribed burn. The Occurrence Report for the accident stated that the firefighter “received second degree burns to approximately two percent of his body while attempting to clear a fire line around a dead tree within the boundary of Savannah River Site.”

Below: Example of Longleaf Pine needlecast. Note the proliferation of fresh green needles above the brown needles that will fall during strong winds or heavy rain.



Freedom of Information, June 2024, Savannah River Site

A Lingering, Unnecessary Secret at SRS

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During the Summer of 2020, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) took the rare step of redacting, or censoring, four weekly reports submitted by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (DNFSB) Resident Inspectors (RI) stationed at the Savannah River Site. Although not known with absolute certainty at the time that the redacted entries were related to COVID-19 impacts on site operations, the Board recently confirmed that was the case. In response to a FOIA request for unredacted reports that has been forwarded to DOE for consultation, the DNFSB also revealed that it disagreed then, and continues to disagree, with DOE’s decision to redactions portions of the four weekly reports pertaining to COVID impacts. The information to date suggests the redactions were due primarily to reporting of staffing shortages at Defense Nuclear Facilities that were sufficient enough to compromise or potentially compromise compliance with technical safety requirements for some facility operations.

by Don Moniak
June 4, 2024*

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) is the sole independent oversight agency authorized to monitor operations at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) and other nuclear weapons complex facilities. It was chartered in 1988 “with the responsibility of providing recommendations and advice to the President and the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities.” The agency has no enforcement authority.

The DNFSB is a lean and stoic organization that achieves results through what might be described as legislatively mandated peer pressure. Perhaps its most notable oversight work at SRS was Recommendation 2012-1, which catalyzed the long-overdue effort to safely address the extreme risk from residual radioactive materials within the former Plutonium-238 processing facility known as Building 235-F.

Another major, SRS-related Board oversight effort involved the stabilization of “thousands” of containers of “plutonium-bearing liquids and solids” across the former Cold War-era weapons complex that were stored in various configurations with highly variable levels of instability. Recommendation 94-1 was enacted to address the safety deficiencies, ultimately making a key contribution to the stabilization of approximately 9.5 metric tons of plutonium prior to it being shipped to SRS for long-term storage at the site’s K Area.

Every week since 1996 the Board’s “Resident Inspectors” have submitted one-page reports to their Technical Director highlighting key safety issues at six major sites. A four to six-week gap between report submittal and public disclosure is normal, in part due to a DOE classification review. Prior to 2020, publication of reports containing classification redactions was rare to absent.

The inspectors began making reporting entries regarding Savannah River Site’s COVID-19 preparations, response, workforce status, and status of Mission Critical Programs (1) on March 13, 2020.

By April 3rd they had reported the first cases on-site. By April 17th, only thirty percent of the operational workforce (outside of the Centerra paramilitary security force) was reported to be working on site. By then, SRS had entered into a “Essential Mission Critical Operations” status, which limited personnel to “performing duties directly supporting SRS primary mission essential functions, mission essential functions, or essential supporting activities such as tritium operations and safe and secure storage in K- and L-Areas. This status will result in less than 2500 employees working at SRS.”

After eight more weeks of basic reporting, mostly involving the number of positive cases and quarantine figures, an entry in the June 12th report was classified as “Official Use Only” and redacted in full.

Figure 1. June 12, 2020 DNFSB Resident Inspector report with a highly unusual redaction of information.

There followed a more substantial, half-page redaction that accompanied the June 19th report , and short redacted paragraphs in the June 26th and July 10th reports.

A one-week gap in this censorship period occurred in the July 3rd report, when the inspectors submitted the following short paragraph:

“COVID-19 Update: Between June 25 and July 1, the number of positive tests for SRS employees increased from 52 to 62. As part of a lessons learned, SRS issued guidelines for the use of personal fans in office spaces to reduce the risk of transmission between employees.”

“Lessons Learned from Positive COVID-19 Cases at Savannah River Site,” was obtained from DOE via a FOIA request in late 2020. The July 1, 2020, report described and illustrated a few examples of how COVID-19 transmissions at SRS were occurring, particularly in crowded offices; but not necessarily at facilities where essential functions were performed.

The three-page report focused on the proper use of common fans and air conditioning window units in the workplace (Figures 2-4). As with the ubiquitous use of modular offices onsite, this was another indication that workplaces at high-tech SRS are often densely occupied (2), in steady need of increased office space, and sometimes lacking in reliable cooling systems. The report somewhat undermined DOE’s official position, as described by former Aiken Standard reporter Colin Demarest, that the “majority of infections” were due to “away-from-work ‘activities.’”

Figure 2. From Lessons Learned 2020-LL-74. The extent to which common fans are used to relieve heat stress at SRS is unknown.
Figure 3. Illustration from Lesson Learned 2020-LL-74. It is unknown how often HVAC failures occur on the site.
Figure 4. Illustration from Lessons Learned 2020-LL-74, showing use of air conditioning window units to cool offices.

The Censorship Ends and Reports of Probable COVID-related Staff Shortages Begins.

Following the censorship period, reports of staff shortages at Defense Nuclear Facilities began that were undoubtedly COVID-related; but the word COVID was absent.

The August 7th submittal was the first of these normal, unredacted reports to address staffing shortages while omitting any mention of COVID. The report contained a short entry at the bottom of the page, pertaining to “Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) Minimum Staffing,” that stated:

“Two of the three qualified shift operations managers (SOM) at a defense nuclear facility are unavailable. At this facility, the TSRs require a qualified SOM to be responsible for the facility command function during certain activities. A second facility will be operated for one shift a day because of availability issues with four of the six qualified SOMs.”

A more specific entry referencing a staffing shortage of “40+ staff” at the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) was made in the September 4th report. (Figure 5). Just two weeks earlier, the SWPF had finally been authorized to begin operations, which officially began on September 20th.

Figure 5. Staffing shortages at the Salt Waste Processing Plant.

The September 11th report also identified a smaller staffing shortage of 15 workers at the SWPF, which included “two shift technical engineers, two senior supervisory watch personnel, and another manager.” The shortages were sufficient enough to cause suspension of all “non-essential work.”

The December 11th report identified an entire shift being unavailable at F-H Laboratory, requiring personnel to work overtime to fill the shift needs. The shortage occurred during a month with 425 positive cases—-more than one third of the cumulative total (1207) in 2020.

Subsequent reports further suggest that DOE’s censorship of COVID-related impacts was primarily limited to staffing shortages in Mission Critical Programs.

The Board’s Resident Inspectors were allowed by DOE to associate COVID with deferred and cancelled emergency management drills and deferred maintenance tasks. A few examples included:

January 29, 2021: A review of the operational impacts of COVID-19 on concluded, in part, that in “many cases, the impact was minor, temporary, or reasonable considering the circumstances.” One of the primary concerns was the cancellation of most emergency operations field drills. The inspectors later reported that nearly 20 percent of personnel in emergency response organizations did not participate in a single drill in 2020.

February 5, 2021: A two-fold increase in preventative maintenance deferrals, from 70 to 145, between March and May 2020; with 82 deferrals in May 2020 being COVID-related. That figure was reduced to only five by December 2020.

The DNFSB Position on a Request for Uncensored Reports

In December 2023, a FOIA request was submitted (2) to the DNFSB to provide unredacted versions of the four censored Summer of 2020 reports. The reasoning was that three years had passed and the public has a right to know what cumulative impacts the COVID-19 pandemic had on SRS operations and site safety, if any.

The DNFSB responded with an April 15, 2024, letter from its Chief FOIA Officer explaining that DOE was being asked to “consult with the DNFSB with regard to releasing the COVID-19 information” because for “FOIA purposes, it is DOE’s information.”

Attached to the letter was the FOIA Officer’s consultation request to DOE (Figure 6), which stated, in part, that:

Each of the four reports contains a paragraph (highlighted) that deals with the presence and effects of COVID-19 at the facility. DNFSB’s position at the time the reports were drafted was, and remains, that the reports should have been made public in their entirety. This was not done. DOE insisted at the time that as a matter of Departmental policy such COVID-19 related information was deemed to be for official only. Because DOE’s equity in the information is superior to DNFSB’s the paragraphs at issue were redacted from the copies of the four reports posted to the Board’s public website.”

The consultation request went on to state that “DNFSB’s position continues to be that the reports should be released without redaction,” with the caveat that it is DOE’s decision as to whether the reports should be released in their entirety; an action that required a classification review.

The time frame for an answer is open-ended. The DNFSB advised in its letter to:

“Please be aware that we may not receive DOE’s reply for a considerable period of time.”

For now, a more complete public understanding of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the safety of SRS operations will have to wait. The review process could take months, or even longer.

In the meantime, the paper trail to date suggests the redacted information pertains to localized staffing shortages at individual facilities that achieved levels that did not comply with technical safety requirements; and potentially compromised safety at individual facilities. If this was not the case, there appears to be even less justification to keeping secret what are now four-year old reports with no bearing on current site operations.

Figure 6. April 15, 2024, Letter from DNFSB Chief FOIA Officer Toni Reddish to DOE’s FOIA Department requesting a classification review of the four redacted weekly reports.

Footnotes

* Coverage of this story began in the Fall of 2020 and was reported in the Aiken SC News and Views Facebook group. After the redactions in the weekly reports remained after three years, the FOIA request for unredacted versions was made.

(1) Over the course of the year, the “Mission Critical” facilities requiring at constant staffing included the F and H Area Radioactive Waste “Tank Farms,” the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), hte Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), H-Canyon, L-Area irradiated nuclear fuel storage, K-Area plutonium storage and waste production, and Savannah River National Laboratory’s (SRNL) onsite operations.

On March 30, 2020, Savannah River Site Watch (SRS Watch) submitted a FOIA request to DOE that asked for, in part, a list of “minimum mission-critical activities.”

DOE took nine months to provide a letter of response and two responsive documents:

a. Two pages of a 114-page manual, lightly redacted, that described five mission essential functions and 22 supporting activities.

b. A four-page Telework execution and implementation plan.

(2) Contained in SRS Watch correspondence with DOE was a letter to the editor from Aiken resident Kathy Glenn to the the Augusta Chronicle. Ms. Glenn wrote, in part:

“There are operators working in close quarters and many engineers in cubicles. The cubicle working environment is similar to being in a large airplane – all the air in the room is shared and sometimes four desks back up to the same cubicle wall. Some of the cubicles have two or three people sharing them, and they can get a maximum of about 3 feet away from one another. So many, many people are in the same room, sharing the same breathing air for nine hours a day, for days on end. It’s like flying in a plane but with the people just a little more spread-out, all breathing the same air.

This is putting the site mission at risk by increasing the odds that many of the personnel will get very sick. This is massively irresponsible.”

(3) The entire FOIA request read:

“I, Donald Moniak, hereby request the following documents in unredacted form: 

The DNFSB weekly resident staff reports for Savannah River Site, for weeks ending June 12, 20, 26, 2020; and July 10, 2020. 

These documents are now more than three years old. They were marked “official use” at the time. The reports likely involved the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on facility operations, since other unredacted reports around the same time identified minimum staffing requirement issues. These redactions also occurred at a time when the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic were being routinely reported by DNFSB resident staff at SRS. 

Because the information likely only involved operational conditions that are long past, the general public has a right to know what real impacts the pandemic had on SRS operations. 

Thank you, 

Donald Moniak

May 2024, Savannah River Site

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Timeline: “We will have to get back to you.”

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DOE/SRS contract official unable to address timeline for removal of surplus plutonium from the Savannah River Site.

Twenty-five years after issuing its first decision pertaining to the nation’s 50 metric ton (MT) surplus plutonium stockpile, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) disposition program continues to, as SRS Watch has described, limp along and remain characteristically uncertain. Three weeks ago the head of DOE’s Savannah River Site’s (SRS) primary operating and management contractor could not provide a timeline for processing and removal of 9.5 MT of plutonium from storage at SRS to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) plutonium waste repository in New Mexico.

At the current rate of processing, the site will not be able to meet its 2037 deadline for removing 9.5 MT of surplus plutonium per the “Plutonium Settlement” agreement between the Federal Government and the State of South Carolina, and some materials could remain well past the 50-year long-term storage period selected by DOE in 1997.

by Don Moniak
May 19, 2024

Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) is the primary management and operations contractor at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) vast Savannah River Site (SRS), where more than ten tons of plutonium (Pu), of which more than 90 percent is surplus to U.S. nuclear weaponry needs, is presently stored within the site’s repurposed, seventy-year old K-Reactor building; now referred to as K-Area.

There were approximately 11.5 Metric Tons (MT) of plutonium within ~5,000 containers stored at K-Area in 2019 (Figure 1), of which 10.5 was surplus material shipped to SRS from other sites (1). DOE asserts that 1.0 MT of material was removed since then, leaving 9.5 MT of plutonium that must be removed by 2037 under the terms of the 2020 DOE/State of South Carolina “SRS/Plutonium Settlement.”

Figure 1. Pu inventory in September 2019. DOE asserts 1.0 MT has since been removed, which would have left ~4500 storage containers known as “3013s.” There is approximately 2.3 kilograms/container on average. Source: SRNS presentation to SRS Citizens Advisory Board, July 25, 2023.

At the April 29, 2024 South Carolina Nuclear Advisory Council (2) meeting, SRNS President Dennis Carr recently updated the group on the major programs and missions at SRS that are under SRNS purview. His presentation focused on plutonium pit production (3), surplus plutonium disposition, and production and management of tritium for the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

The surplus plutonium disposition portion featured an uninspiring report on the slow pace of plutonium disposition at SRS. Since fully implementing a program known as “dilute and dispose,” in 2021, only 0.123 metric tons (MT) of the ~10.5 MT of surplus Pu stored at SRS has been processed into a waste form and sent to DOE’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico for disposal.

Less than 0.3 metric tons per year are currently being processed at K-Area; much of it awaiting approval for shipment to WIPP. The processing pace is not expected to pick up until after 2030, and only if an $800 million project to add two glovebox processing lines is completed.

At the end of the surplus plutonium discussion, State Senator Tom Young (R-Aiken) asked Mr. Carr a simple question that proved to be the most difficult of the meeting:

“Do you know the projected timeline when all the (surplus plutonium) material will be disposed of?”

Mr. Carr’s answers were, in order:

“I don’t.”
“It is beyond my knowledge base.
“We will have to get back to you.”

No other DOE official stepped up to the podium to assist with an answer. Nor did any other member of the Advisory Council ask a followup question.

The lack of answers and absence of additional questions were intriguing and astounding for two reasons; both of which involved omissions of important information.

First, the $600 million Plutonium Settlement reached in August, 2020, between the federal government and the State of South Carolina mandates a removal date of 2037 for the 9.5 Metric Tons (MT) of the surplus plutonium that was shipped from other DOE sites and is currently stored at SRS (1). If the deadline is not reached, DOE will face a new set of hefty fines from the State of South Carolina. The lack of additional questions suggests that the settlement agreement is increasingly less of a priority issue for the advisory council or DOE/SRS.

Figure 2: “3013” Plutonium storage containers. All plutonium stored in the cans meet DOE’s 3013 Standard. Monitoring by SRNS and oversight by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has not yielded any significant, chronic safety issues with the 3013 containers. DOE/SRS contractor SRNS has asserted at SRS-CAB meetings that, in its present state, surplus Pu can be safely at SRS past the 50-year long-term storage goal.


Second, just ten days before the meeting DOE’s National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) had issued its Record of Decision (ROD) for the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (SPDEIS), a decision that will help guide the DOE/NNSA surplus plutonium management for the foreseeable future. (A Summary of the SPDEIS provides more detailed justification for the ROD).

As described in Feds Propose Moving ~27 tons of Plutonium to SRS, the latest Surplus Plutonium Disposition EIS process explored the impacts of disposing of 27-34 metric tons of surplus plutonium currently stored within the sealed nuclear explosives components known as “plutonium pits,” as well as surplus plutonium metal not within pits. There is an estimated 11,000 to 14,000 surplus pits presently in storage at the Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant near Amarillo, Texas.

The preferred alternative involved four subalternatives to disassemble the pits and convert Pu metals to a powder in a modern Pit Disassembly and Processing Plant (PDP), process the powder into a transuranic waste form via the dilute and dispose method, and then ship the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for underground disposal.

Within the preferred alternative, DOE/NNSA EIS considered four different alternatives to accomplishing that goal: two versions of processing at both Los Alamos and SRS, an all-in-one Los Alamos processing program, and an all-in-one SRS processing program. WIPP and dilute and dispose were the only constants. (A “No-Action” alternative received only cursory, gratuitous review, as the U.S. remains committed to converting its plutonium stockpile into a waste form that inhibits, but does not prevent, re-use of plutonium for our nuclear arsenal.)

The Record of Decision was more of an indecision amounting to the federal government continuing to not do much with surplus plutonium, other than keep it in storage. Most notably, DOE/NNSA failed to select a processing sub-alternative, leaving the preferred alternative as more of a theoretical than real pathway. (Figure 3).

DOE/NNSA further kicked the surplus plutonium program further down the road by formally announcing a previous decision, first reported by Savannah River Site Watch in October 2023, to delay the Pit Disassembly and Processing plant by at least one decade, writing,

“Increased capacity for producing plutonium oxide, which NNSA evaluated as part of the Preferred Alternative in the SPDP EIS, will therefore be delayed. This decision will extend the timeline for the full 34 MT disposition mission.”

FIgure 3: DOE/NNSA schematic of the surplus plutonium disposition program for plutonium pits and “non-pit” metals. There has been no decision on a final plan. The PDP is being delayed by at least ten years.

In short, the DOE/NNSA plutonium disposition program will continue to limp along at a relatively glacial pace of about 1 MT every 3-4 years.

What this means for the Central Savannah River region, as well Americans along the transportation route from Los Alamos, is far less surplus plutonium being shipped to SRS than if a PDP was constructed; and a greatly reduced likelihood of another Pu processing facility being located at SRS. Depending on an individual’s outlook on the prospect of more plutonium processing at SRS, the indecision and facility delay can be either good or bad news.

In the absence of an answer from DOE/NNSA to Senator Young’s question, the following letter estimating the rate of Pu removal from SRS was sent to Senator Young via email the day after the Nuclear Advisory Committee meeting. The letter was later forwarded to the SRS Citizens Advisory Board.

Dear Senator Young, 

Regarding your unanswered question on the timeline for surplus plutonium disposition posed to SRNS President Dennis Carr during the Nuclear Advisory Council meeting on Monday: “Do you know the projected timeline when all the (surplus plutonium) material will be disposed of.” 

There is no good answer, which might be why Mr. Carr could only answer “I don’t,” and “it is beyond my knowledge base.” I do not think there will be a good answer, either, because: 

a. Ultimate removal from SRS is entirely dependent upon the availability of WIPP, and that is not under the control of SRS; and

 b. Removal in a manner that meets the Pu settlement mandate of 9.5 MT by 2037 is heavily dependent upon DOE/NNSA’s commitment to the $800 million program to increase plutonium dilution to TRU waste production rates by adding three more gloveboxes by FY 2031. 

Even if WIPP were not an issue, at the current rate of work at K Area, it would take DOE/SRS 19-20 more years to remove 9.5 MT of surplus Pu; assuming a steady increase in production rates and an absence of accidents, budget cuts, and other unforeseen circumstances. 

These estimates are based upon the following: 

1. Under the Pu storage settlement agreement, DOE/SRS is required to remove 9.5 MT of surplus Pu by 2037.  (This will leave ~1.0 MT of nonsurplus Pu in place, which was the approximate SRS non surplus Pu inventory before shipments from other sites began in 2002).  

2. At the end of 2019 there was an estimated ~11.5 MT at SRS. DOE/SRS reports accomplishments in terms of 3013 storage containers (aka cans) which contain an average of 2.3 KG of Pu per container. So the best way to track this is by number of storage containers, of which there were ~5,000. (This graphic was presented to the SRS CAB in July 2022). 

3. Assuming 9.5 MT = 4,130 cans, at the current rate of processing Pu into a diluted Transuranic Waste (TRU) form, it would take DOE/SRS ~20 years to complete the conversion process. This assumes that WIPP will be able to accept the waste at the same rate, which is a whopper of an assumption. The rest of this estimate relies on the rosy assumption of gradual increases in production from current rates. 

a. Since 2022, when downblending into a TRU waste form began, the 5,000 can inventory has been reduced by 321 cans (91 in 2022, 110 in 2023, and 120 expected in 2024), leaving ~4,700. If one assumes that all of the converted Pu was part of the 9.5 MT, then ~3820 cans remain to be processed to meet the Settlement Agreement. 

b. Processing is limited by equipment, and currently there is only one glovebox line available. The goal is to increase rate of production by 10 pct each year, with the FY 2024 goal of 120 cans. If production were increased by 10 pct each year, which is a rosy forecast, production might look like this: 

FY 2025: 132 cans

FY 2026: 145 cans

FY 2027: 160 cans

FY 2028: 176 cans

FY 2029: 194 can

FY 2030: 213 cans

So under the current goals of ten percent increase per year, another 1020 cans might be processed through FY 2030, barring accidents, budget cuts, and/or other unforeseen circumstances. 

That will still leave 2,800 cans that would require processing by 2037. 

c. Without any new production capability, it will take another 13 years at the 2030 rate of 213  cans/year to complete the processing of 9.5 MT. So the 9.5 MT of Pu, under the most optimistic scenario, would not be removed until 2043 at the earliest. (Since only 1 MT was removed before 2020, that would still leave 1.0 MT at the site.) 

d. The limiting factor that DOE does not like to stress is that one-third of the stored Pu is in a metal form. This metal requires conversion to an oxide powder suitable for the dilution process. That metal to oxide conversion cost is never included in the cost estimates, and at the SRS CAB briefings that process has never been discussed. 

4. Any significant production rate increase is not expected until installation of three additional gloveboxes is completed in 2030 at the earliest (The Critical Decision to begin operations is not anticipated until FY 2030). 

Assuming the best case scenario of three new gloveboxes going operational in 2031 (decision to go operational expected in 2030), and an associated 3X increase in production, then ~500 cans per year would be processed per glovebox line at current rates. 

Only then will DOE/SRS be able to remove the 2800 cans remaining (under optimistic scenarios) by 2037. 

Conclusion: 

Without the new glovebox line, DOE will never make it by 2037. 
Since the 1997 DOE Record of Decision for long-term storage at SRS was for 50 years, removing it before 2047 would meet DOE’s goals, but not the Settlement Agreement mandate of 2037. 

DOE/NNSA is more likely to limp along at the current rate and then renegotiate the Settlement Agreement in the early 2030s than it is to spend $800 million to improve the removal rate of surplus Pu by 15-20 years; especially since the great uncertainties surrounding WIPP could delay the program even with the addition of the three glovebox lines. 

I hope this helps. I am perfectly willing to be corrected on these estimates, but only DOE/NNSA can do that. Please feel free to submit this to DOE/SRS. 

Thank you, 

Donald Moniak


Footnotes

(1) The decision to consolidate long-term storage of 11-15 MT metric tons of plutonium metals and oxide powders, also referred to as “non-pit” plutonium, at SRS was made in January 1997. The long-term storage period is “up to fifty years.”

Prior to consolidation, the condition of the plutonium had to meet what is known as the 3013 Standard, which “provides criteria for stabilization of plutonium-bearing materials at DOE facilities to safe and stable forms and packaging for storage with minimal surveillance for up to 50 years.” Efforts to meet this standard prior to shipment to SRS took place in the late 1990’s to early 2000’s at the now-closed Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado and the Hanford nuclear reservation in Washington State.

DOE intended to have the “cleanest” of these Pu materials converted to commercial nuclear fuel known as “Mixed Oxide Fuel,” or MOX.”

As a result of the stabilization and shipments, SRS currently has between ~4,300 to 5,000 containers known as “3013 cans;” referred to as such because they meet the requirements of DOE’s Standard 3013.

After the multi-billion dollar program to convert the materials to a commercial “Mixed Oxide” plutonium fuel fizzled in the the mid 2016’s, DOE turned to the “dilute and dispose” process.

Dilute and dispose involves “downblending” plutonium oxide powder with a mix of classified “adulterants” and other inert materials to create a new waste product containing about three percent plutonium. The waste product is then packaged and shipped to DOE’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, where it is buried in the nation’s only operational transuranic waste repository.

Two presentations made by SRNS managers to the SRS Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) in July 2023, describe the dilute and dispose program in general and improvement initiatives.

Additional information on the earlier history of the Surplus Pu Storage and Disposition program can be found is the two-part story, Plutonium is Not For Amateurs and Dr. Edward Lyman’s definitive work on the rise and fall of the MOX project, Excess Plutonium Disposition: The Failure of MOX and the Promise of Its Alternatives.

(2) The Nuclear Advisory Council meeting can be viewed by going to the South Carolina Legislature video archives, and scrolling down to the April 29th Nuclear Advisory Council meeting.

(3) A critique of the Plutonium Pit Production program was provided during the public comment period by Savannah River Site Director Tom Clements.

City Government, May 2024, Plutonium Settlement, Project Pascalis 2024

$850,000 Loss Anticipated on First Sale of a Project Pascalis Property.

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Three years after the City of Aiken, its Municipal Development Commission (AMDC) and the Aiken Chamber of Commerce collectively took control of the seven Project Pascalis properties, the first negative rate of return on that investment has been realized. An appraiser for the first Pascalis property to be sold, Newberry Hall, has described the AMDC and City’s 2021 purchase of the property as “above market value.”

In 2021, AMDC paid $2 million for the property, which came with a long-term lease with eight years remaining, a first right to purchase clause for the lessee, a stipulation to reduce any future sale price by the amount of the lessee’s building improvement investments, and an agreement to pay the lessee lost income during the Pascalis project demolition and reconstruction phase.

Since the Newberry Hall property was recently appraised for $1.5 million, and the lessee’s improvement investments total $0.35 million, the City of Aiken proposes to sell the property for $1.15 million. Thus, one year after ownership was transferred from the AMDC to the City, the property will be sold at a $0.85 million loss. The loss could be viewed as $1.075 million, since the property was encumbered by a lease at the time of the AMDC purchase and the “leased fee interest” market value is only $0.925 million.

As Aiken City Council moves forward with the sale of the property to the owners of the popular Newberry Hall events and catering business, questions regarding the future of the sale proceeds remain. The property was obtained with state funds from the plutonium settlement agreement that was allocated for redevelopment purposes, not the purchase and sale of commercial downtown properties. Will it be a misappropriation of state funds if City Council opts to place the sale proceeds into the General Fund for any purposes other than downtown and Northside redevelopment?

by Don Moniak
May 13, 2024

Project Pascalis was announced in mid-March of 2021 with some fanfare by the Aiken Municipal Development Commission (AMDC). Details of the project, including the project’s downtown location, were not publicly disclosed.

Two months later, that initial version of the project failed when the first developer, GAC, LLC (Agent Weldon Wyatt), backed out of the project, and sought to renege on two purchase and sale agreements (PSA). The first was for $7.5 million for six properties owned by the Shah family of Aiken, and the second was for $2.0 million for the Newberry Hall property owned by the Anderson family of Aiken. Those agreements were negotiated and prepared, in part, by Aiken attorney and investor Ray Massey on behalf of WTC Investment, LLC. Again, no public disclosure was forthcoming.

When GAC backed out of the project, the City of Aiken, AMDC, and Aiken Chamber of Commerce secretly intervened to take assignment of the properties that were under contract to GAC’s property investment arm, WTC Investments, LLC (Agent Ray Massey.) The assignments, made through the Chamber, were completed for the purpose of salvaging a portion of the first, more grandiose Pascalis project; one that orginally included four to five-story apartments on both sides of The Alley.

The first assignment to the Chamber, with the City and AMDC listed as possible future assignees, was the package of six Shah family properties; it was signed on May 24, 2021. The second assignment to the Chamber was the Newberry Hall property; it was signed on June 3, 2021. All the purchase prices matched the collective $9.5 million offered by WTC Investments; which in the process was reimbursed its $135,000 in earnest funds.

In August 2021, Aiken City Council approved the issuance of up to $10 million in general obligation bonds to fund AMDC property purchases within the broad “Parkway District.” The existence of the $9.5 million in Pascalis project purchase and sale agreement assignments, held by the Chamber on behalf of the AMDC and City, was not publicly disclosed as the only set of properties then under consideration for purchase.

Three months later, the Chamber of Commerce’s interest in the Pascalis properties was transferred to the AMDC, which then paid $9.5 million for the seven properties, and reimbursed the Chamber its $135,000 in earnest funds. Only then were details of Project Pascalis finally released.

One month later, on December 6, 2021, the AMDC signed a $5 million Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) for the seven properties with the new developer, RPM Development Partners. RPM agent and investor Ray Massey signed the PSA on behalf of the developer. While the existence of the contract was publicly announced, the proposed sale price and other details were not discovered until a year later.

The $2.0 million purchase of the Newberry Hall property came with a long-term lease held by Patrick and Natalie Carlisle, the owners of the Newberry Hall events and catering business. The lease, first signed in in 2007 by owner Myrtle Anderson and lessees David and Margaret Sacks, was for 20 years—one ten-year period followed by two five-year renewal periods.

The first Newberry Hall contract signed by WTC in April 2021 that was assigned to the Chamber in June 2021, and executed by the AMDC in November 2021, contained an addendum with two new lease provisions. First, the Newberry Hall business owners would be granted the first right to own, or operate, the new conference center planned for the Pascalis project on the Newberry Hall property. Second, the business would be eligible for payments for lost income during the demolition and reconstruction period. The amended lease agreement stated, in part, that:

“The development of the (Pascalis) Project contemplates that the improvements on the Property would be demolished and replaced with a larger conference center and kitchen, and that (the) Carlisles would be compensated for loss of income during interruption of Carlisle’ s business, and would lease the replacement conference center and kitchen pursuant to a replacement lease and operating agreement, the terms of which are under discussion but are not finalized (the “Operating Agreement”).

If the Pascalis project failed and the AMDC and the City chose to sell the property, the lessee still retained the first right of purchase. That purchase price would be determined by an appraisal value minus the costs of investments made to the building during the term of the lease to date; in this case $350,000.

Between November 2021 and June 2022, lengthy and unproductive negotiations occurred between the AMDC and Newberry Hall for future ownership or operations of the planned Pascalis project conference center. The negotiations were further complicated in April 2022, when the City and the AMDC opted to try to repurpose the Park Avenue Aiken Municipal Building into the Pascalis Project conference center. In total, the AMDC spent just under $86,000 on its conference center effort; including $36,000 to reimburse Newberry Hall for its legal costs.

In June 2022 the Pascalis project faltered due to legal and contractual issues, and was paused pending a major reorganization and rebranding effort; again with no public disclosure. In addition, the second round of demolition application approvals were withdrawn. Shortly thereafter, a major lawsuit was filed to stop the project, effectively putting a halt to the reorganization effort. Two months later RPM withdrew from the $5 million PSA. Two weeks after that the AMDC cancelled the project.

Nine months later, in early May 2023, following months of tumultous and disorganized efforts, City Council dissolved the AMDC and ownership of the properties was transferred to the City. One month previously, City Council also approved spending $9.6 of its $25 million in plutonium settlement funds to pay off, in full, the Pascalis properties general obligation bond. The City’s request for funds included the misguided inclusion of Newberry Hall in the same category as the vacant Hotel Aiken—of having “fallen into disrepair.”

Following the transfer of properties from the AMDC, progress towards the sale of Newberry Hall and other Pascalis project properties such as the Hotel Aiken were deferred as the only remnant of Project Pascalis, the SRNL/“Mixed Use” project, remained under deliberation.

Now, following at least four months negotiations, the City of Aiken and Newberry Hall have reached an agreement based on an appraisal by the firm of Willis Real Estate Services—an “as is” market value of $1.5 million and an “as is” leased fee interest value of $925,000 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Market values for Newberry Hall identified in the recent appraisal. To date, the City of Aiken has only provided 19 pages of the 131-page appraisal. Availabe information regarding the purchase begins on Page 63 of the May 13, 2024 City Council agenda packet; ,with the well-written, plain English Appraisal Introduction, property data, and recent history of the property beginning on Page 66.


The appraisal includes the statement:

“Based on comparable sales and the market conditions in 2021, the 2021 sale from Myrtle Anderson to the City of Aiken Municipal Development Commission for $2,000,000 appears to be above market and is not considered arm’s length. The City of Aiken Municipal Development Commission(City of Aiken”

Once the Newberry Sale property sale is finalized, the City of Aiken will realize a net loss of $0.85 million. If this appraisal had been made in 2021, when the AMDC purchased the property using city funds, then the City of Aiken will arguably realize a loss of $1.075 million.

Where will the revenues go?

On April 10, 2023, Aiken City Council approved spending $9.6 of the City’s $25 million Plutonium Settlement allocation to pay off the entire Pascalis general obligation bond debt. At that time, Council opted to not commit to the allocation of proceeds of future sales of the property.

Unlike previous sales of city property, the proposed Newberry Hall sale contains no reference to the future use of the $1.15 million of sale revenue. For example, in September 2021, City Council approved placing the $150,000 from the sale of the Mattie Hall property to the General Fund.

According to a February 21, 2024, letter from State Senator Tom Young (R-Aiken), the legislative intent behind the allocation of Plutonium Settlement funds expressly did not include the “reduction of local government debt obligations.” Yet, to date that has been the only purpose of the approved $9.6 million allocation by City Council from The City’s portion of the settlement funds.

If City Council opts to place Pascalis property sale proceeds into the General Fund, and not return it to its Plutonium Settlement funds account, the overall process would arguably constitute a misappropriation of state settlement funds. If Council opts to return the sale proceeds to its Plutonium Settlement fund account, then the legislative intent of the allocation would be preserved.

Additional Reading. from The Aiken Chronicles

The first 19 pages of Daniel Willis’ Newberry Hall appraisal can be found on Pages 66-85 of the May 13th City Council Agenda Packet. This section of the appraisal is written in plain English and contains property data, appraisal definitions, and an explanation for the conclusion. The remaining 112 pages have not been publicly disclosed.

The AMDC Purchase and Sale Agreements and Amended Newberry Hall Lease Agreements are available in the November 9, 2021, AMDC Meeting Agenda Packet.

Previously in the Aiken Chronicles.

How Much Project Pascalis Can the Taxpayer Stand provides a simple accounting of the known market values of the Pascalis properties in 2021 compared to the purchase prices. This was followed up by Project Pascalis Has Exposed Aiken City Officials as Lousy Real Estate Investors.

Project Pascalis Includes the Alley and Project Pascalis and The Wyatt Factor both offer detailed accounts of the first failed Pascalis project.

The Project Pascalis RFP offers a review of the chain of events leading up to the cancellation of the project.

The Pascalis Attorneys and The AECOM Plan both contain more detailed accounts of the City of Aiken’s and AMDC Pascalis project properties acquisition process and the first year of the project.

When No Info is Good Info… contains details of the Newberry Hall lease and amended lease.

Project Pascalis Conference Center Costs breaks down the $86,000 the AMDC spent on studies and appraisals in support of a Conference Center; which included $35,000 to pay the legal costs to the owners of Newberry Hall.

Project Pascalis and the Plutonium Settlement, Offsite-Infrastructure, and Failed Project Pascalis, A Mayor’s Legacy all include details about the Plutonium Settlement allocation process.

Why is the City Toying with 113 Jobs provides details of the effort to convert the former Municipal Building on Park Avenue to a conference center.

Rebranding Project Pascalis details how in late June 2022, the AMDC was in the process of cancelling the project and rebranding it as “The Aiken Community Improvement” project; the effort to redo the project was further curtailed by the July 2022 Pascalis lawsuit.

Keeping Up Appearances provides more details of the $9.6 million bond.



City Government, May 2024, Public Safety

The Teddy Milner Investigation

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A review of the veracity and paucity of the FITS News story.

by Don Moniak

May 9, 2024

On Monday, Irmo, South Carolina-based FITS News published a brief story by its Founding Editor, Will Folks, headlined: “Aiken S.C. Mayor Facing SLED Investigation: Agency probing “exploitation of a vulnerable adult” allegations.”

Below are seven issues to know or consider about the FITS News story.

The information pertaining to the SLED investigation of Teddy Milner, aka Theodora Ely, was four sentences long—about a 20-second read. The remainder of the article was a rehash of the City of Aiken’s 2023 Mayoral election.

Figure 1. May 7, 2024, FITS News story. Areas in red represent an uncorroborated statement, “elder abuse,” and possible disclosure of confidential information—the “financial component”—by an unnamed source or sources. According to SLED, Mr. Alphin did not provide any additional information beyond the official agency statement.

The SLED statement was one sentence long, and FITS failed to provide the full, actual, and official statement.

According to SLED’s Director of Public Information Renee Wunderlich (1), the agency’s official and only statement regarding the issue was as follows:

“SLED was requested by Aiken Department of Public Safety Director Charles Barranco on 2/29/2024 to investigate exploitation of a vulnerable adult allegations by Theodora Ely.”

FITS News chose to paraphrase the statement instead of simply quoting it.

There is no reference to “elder abuse” in the SLED statement.

The official statement is important because FITS News added the allegation of “elder abuse” for unknown reasons. FITS has declined to respond to a May 7th email (2) regarding the veracity of its “elder abuse” claim.

To date, SLED has stated it is investigating Ms. Milner for “exploitation,” but not “abuse” or “neglect.”

FITS News, and other subsequent news stories, opted to avoid citing the relevant state law governing the investigation and any potential criminal charges; a law that makes distinctions between “abuse,” exploitation,” and “neglect” of vulnerable adults.

The “Omnibus Adult Protection Act” (The Act), Title 43, Chapter 35 of the South Carolina Code of Laws provides a system for the protection of vulnerable adults. (The Act is outlined in plain English in a training and reference manual from the Adult Protection Coordinating Council, and in a Training Guide for Mandated Reporters.)

The Act legally defines a “vulnerable adult” as:

“A person eighteen years of age or older who has a physical or mental condition which substantially impairs the person from adequately providing for his or her own care or protection. This includes a person who is impaired in the ability to adequately provide for the person’s own care or protection because of the infirmities of aging including, but not limited to, organic brain damage, advanced age, and physical, mental, or emotional dysfunction. A resident of a facility is a vulnerable adult.” (3)

According to the Adult Protection Coordinating Council’s manual, the Omnibus Adult Protection Act is intended to protect vulnerable adults from caregivers. (4)

The Act distinguishes between “abuse,” “exploitation,” and “neglect;” although it must be noted that each offense involving “knowing” and “willful” behavior is a felony, and penalties (5) are similarly severe.

The Act’s legal definition of “abuse” is “physical abuse or psychological abuse.” The former is described as any act causing physical harm; the latter as “threats or harassment or other forms of intimidating behavior causing fear, humiliation, degradation, agitation, confusion, or other forms of serious emotional distress.”

“Exploitation” has a three-part legal definition, similar to the common understanding of “exploitive” as unfair, manipulative behavior for unethical and/or criminal personal gain. A financial component can be involved, but is not necessary. The criteria for exploitation are, in part:

  • “Causing a vulnerable adult to engage in activity or labor which is improper, unlawful, or against the reasonable and rational wishes of the vulnerable adult.,” 
  • “An improper, unlawful, or unauthorized use of the funds, assets, property….for…profit and advantage. 
  • “Causing a vulnerable adult to purchase goods or services.”

The Act also identifies “neglect” as a third potential crime, defining it, in part, as:

“The failure or omission of a caregiver to provide the care, goods, or services necessary to maintain the health or safety of a vulnerable adult…”

According to SLED, at the present time Ms. Milner is being investigated for allegations of exploitation, not abuse or neglect. FITS provided no reason to include “elder abuse” in its 20-second read of the pertinent issue.

In this situation, the difference between abuse and exploitation should be as evident as the difference between assault and larceny; or violence and chicanery.

(For the full list of complete definitions, see Footnote 3.)

Because confidentiality of records is a pervasive hallmark of The Omnibus Adult Protection Act, the FITS News’ “sources familiar with the inquiry” could arguably be subject to penalties if there was any disclosure of confidential information; particularly if any investigating authority law was involved in the leaking of information leak.

There are numerous references to confidentiality requirements within The Act, including specific exemptions of some records and meetings from the requirements of South Carolina’s Freedom of Information Act.

For example, SECTION 43-35-60 states that,

“Unless otherwise prohibited by law, a state agency, an investigative entity, and law enforcement may share information related to an investigation conducted as a result of a report made under this chapter. Information in these investigative records must not be disclosed publicly.” (emphasis added).

The reasons for high levels of confidentiality should be evident. The law requires investigations into allegations that often involve personal family matters that might have devolved into a criminal matter. In this respect, it is not much different than the high degree of privacy and confidentiality afforded in family law.

SLED publicly announces the filing of criminal charges, not the existence of investigations—except for shootings involving law enforcement officers.

SLED’s media release webpage for this year to date contains 38 announcements of various criminal charges filed, and 12 investigations into officer-involved shootings. No announcements of any other investigations other than officer-involved shootings are in the 2023 list of media releases.

The SLED statement regarding the Milner investigation was clearly made in response to a FITS News inquiry that was based on information from what reporter Will Folks described as “sources familiar with the inquiry.”

The source or sources of the leaked information is unknown, as is the motive; both are likely to remain unknown.

FITS News has yet to update its story, despite new information being presented on WJBF News Augusta and in the Aiken Standard.

WJBF published the full, unedited statement (6) from Milner’s attorney Chris Austin, that described the accusations as unfounded and unsubstantiated.

FITS stated in its story that, “we will obviously update our audience,” when Ms. Milner responds. As of noon on May 9th, no update has occurred.

______________________

Footnotes

(1) May 7, 2024 Email from SLED.

In response to a subsequent email pointing out the awkward phrasing of the statement, Ryan Alphin wrote: “She (Teddy Milner) is the subject of the investigation.”


(2) May 7, 2024 Email to FITS News and Will Folks, with no response to date.


(3) Definitions in the Omnibus Adult Protection Act; Title 43, Chapter 35 of the South Carolina Code of Laws.

(4) From the Adult Protection Coordinating Council manual:


(5) Penalties for criminal behavior in the Omnibus Adult Protection Act;”Title 43, Chapter 35 of the South Carolina Code of Laws.

Screenshot


(6) Full statement by Teddy Milner’s attorney, Chris Austin, as published on WJBF.

We extend our gratitude to members of the press for their impartial approach as we received calls and emails from the local news stations and newspaper. Their professionalism has allowed Mayor Milner the opportunity to provide a statement and offer insight into to the recent events.

Unfortunately, Mayor Milner is currently facing unwarranted scrutiny amidst a highly publicized situation characterized by unfounded accusations. Mayor Milner vehemently denies any wrongdoing. It is regrettable that her accusers did not opt for direct resolution of this personal family matter, depriving my client the chance to address and refute the allegations without undue publicity.

To provide context, as I currently understand it, the allegations were initially reported to the Department of Social Services (DSS) which referred the matter to Aiken Department of Public Safety (ADPS) for investigation. Recognizing the conflict of interest, the case was subsequently sent to the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) in accordance with standard protocol for handling such allegations. I have been in communication with the SLED special agent overseeing the investigation, and we anticipate participating in an interview shortly, once SLED has completed its information gathering process. While no specific requests have been made of us thus far, we are actively compiling relevant information and documentation to support SLED in its investigation.

We remain fully committed to cooperating with SLED throughout its investigation and maintain confidence that these allegations against Mayor Milner will ultimately prove unsubstantiated.”